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Abstract 
The Health Protection Branch of the Victorian Government Department of Health and 
Human Services monitors and responds to incidents that could adversely affect the 
health of Victorians. During 2014-2015, I completed a field placement with the branch, 
assisting with numerous public health investigations and responses. In doing so I 
fulfilled the requirements of the Master of Philosophy in Applied Epidemiology (MAE). 
The skills I gained are demonstrated in this thesis. 
Evaluation of a public health surveillance system is a core requirement for the MAE 
program. I evaluated Victoria’s surveillance and response to legionellosis, which 
includes both disease surveillance and environmental surveillance and response arms. 
I found little evidence to support the current practice of sampling and disinfecting 
cooling towers around the home and workplace for sporadic cases. Improved co-
ordination between databases and strategic use of spatial software could help develop 
more targeted and useful approaches in the future. 
I embarked on two epidemiological projects. I designed a cross sectional study 
examining the prevalence of Legionella in domestic potable water and developed 
participant resources including letters to explain results, meeting the MAE requirement 
to communicate findings to a non-scientific audience. The study was not completed 
due to legal considerations; however the proposal and relevant participant resources 
are included as an appendix. 
I completed an epidemiological project estimating the number of notified sporadic 
Salmonella Typhimurium 9 Phage type 9 cases likely to be associated with a recurrent 
outbreak source during a five year period. I examined 301 clinical Salmonella isolates, 
including sporadic and outbreak isolates from a series of linked outbreaks, and used 
multi-locus variable number tandem repeat analysis and whole genome sequence 
results to estimate the number of isolates genetically linked to the outbreak strain. 
Outbreak cases accounted for just one third of all isolates estimated to be closely 
related to the main outbreak clade. This project inspired my lesson from the field, in 
which I taught MAE colleagues how to analyse MLVA data. 
I investigated an outbreak of Salmonella Typhimurium phage type 44 at a school 
function. I conducted a cohort study and interviewed twenty-nine out of thirty guests, of 
which ten were affected. Roast beef appetiser was the most likely food vehicle for 
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Salmonella infection. Cross-contamination from raw eggs during preparation was a 
possible source. 
I analysed a public health dataset to assist a public health investigation into suspected 
antimony exposure in a rural mining town in Victoria. Residents were concerned about 
potential health effects from exposure to antimony dust from a local mine. Many sought 
urinary antimony testing to quantify exposure, with numerous elevated results. I used 
multivariate regression to examine risk factors for elevated urinary antimony and 
demonstrated residential proximity to the mine was not associated with urinary 
antimony results. Overwhelmingly, the largest risk factor for elevated results was the 
month of testing, consistent with false positive laboratory reports. 
This thesis documents my experience and capabilities gained during the MAE program, 
and demonstrates my contribution to protecting the public health of Victorians. 
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Introduction 
My field placement for the Master of Philosophy in Applied Epidemiology (MAE) was in 
the Health Protection Branch of the Regulation, Health Protection and Emergency 
Management division of the Victorian Government Department of Health and Human 
Services. Within the branch the placement was divided between Communicable 
Disease Epidemiology and Surveillance and the Legionella Team, which sits within 
Environmental Health Regulation and Compliance. My experience included a three 
week deployment to Vanuatu to assist with disease surveillance following Tropical 
Cyclone Pam in March 2015. 
Communicable Disease Epidemiology and Surveillance conduct surveillance for sixty 
five notifiable conditions in Victoria. Their work is focussed on data management, 
analysis and reporting for notifiable infectious diseases. They work closely with 
Communicable Disease Prevention and Control who collect data during public health 
follow up, and implement control measures to prevent or control outbreaks of infectious 
disease. The Legionella Team aims to reduce the burden of legionellosis on the 
Victorian community. Their work is divided between routine cooling tower inspections to 
ensure compliance with regulations, and investigation of potential environmental 
sources relating to notified cases of legionellosis in Victoria.  
Field activities 
The opportunities I encountered during my field placement enabled me to fulfil the 
requirements of the MAE. Beyond this, they provided me with unique insights into the 
workings of government, the challenges and opportunities presented by new 
technologies, and the central role epidemiologists play in a myriad of disease control 
activities.  Through my placement with the Legionella team I developed significant 
knowledge and experience regarding the epidemiology, surveillance and control of 
Legionella. I was also involved in several other activities, including investigating 
relatedness between historical Salmonella isolates using genomic data, a field 
deployment to Vanuatu to support the establishment of an EWARN surveillance system 
following Tropical Cyclone Pam, investigating a variety of acute public health incidents, 
and assisting with Ebola preparedness.  The skills I gained are demonstrated in this 
thesis.  
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During my placement I played an active role in Victoria’s legionellosis disease 
surveillance system. This included coordinating information between the disease 
surveillance and environmental investigation systems, presenting surveillance reports 
at weekly surveillance meetings, troubleshooting database and mapping problems, 
assisting with outbreak investigations, and participating in the Legionella Set of 
National Guidelines (SONG) working group. I worked with a geographical information 
systems specialist to develop an automated geospatial workflow to rapidly detect 
legionellosis clusters and outbreaks and associated cooling towers. With the same GIS 
expert, I also explored methods to improve the use of GIS technology to strategically 
select cooling towers for inspection. These projects developed my expertise in the 
Geocortex (EsriTM) mapping system, and throughout my placement I provided advice 
and training on its use to colleagues. I learnt that geospatial technologies are a 
powerful but underutilised tool for epidemiological analysis. 
I evaluated Victoria’s surveillance system for legionellosis. The evaluation, outlined in 
Chapter 2, led to several recommendations for improvement. These included 
developing an integrated database for disease and environmental data, and 
establishing a working group to improve laboratory methods for detection and typing of 
Legionella. As part of this work I collaborated with researchers from the Doherty Centre 
for Applied Microbial Analysis to investigate the utility of whole genome sequencing 
data for Legionella surveillance. The results are currently being prepared for 
publication. I also shared findings from my surveillance system evaluation with 
colleagues from the CDC and New York City Health Department to assist their 
response to a large legionellosis outbreak in New York City1. 
Through my work with the Legionella team I designed a cross sectional survey to 
investigate the prevalence of Legionella bacteria in residential hot water systems (the 
Legionella HoWS Survey). The project was developed to address concerns that non-
cooling tower sources may account for a larger proportion of legionellosis cases than 
expected. The study was intended to inform sample size calculations for a future case 
control study investigating the association between Legionella contamination in 
residential hot water and illness with legionellosis. As part of this process, I developed 
a library of participant resources to assist with participant recruitment and result 
reporting, satisfying the MAE requirement to communicate results of a study to a lay 
audience. 
1http://www.nbcnewyork.com/news/local/Legionnaires-Disease-New-York-City-Bronx-Cooling-
Tower-Death-Sick-Outbreak-Source-Health-Department-322407892.html 
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Unfortunately, the HoWS survey was not pursued following receipt of departmental 
legal advice. Where Legionella was identified in a participant home, the study team had 
planned to advise participants they could choose whether or not to address it as the 
risk to health is likely negligible unless a person is in a high risk group for infection. 
However, we were advised landowners have a non-delegable legal duty of care to 
resolve the issue due to potential risk to people visiting the residence. In practice, 
resolving the issue is not always straightforward. It was decided the study findings may 
place an excessive burden on landowners, particularly because identifying landowners 
to gain consent for study participation may be problematic. For these reasons the study 
was not pursued. However the study protocol and results letters are included as an 
appendix to this volume (Appendix A). Note that the results letters reflect the team’s 
planned approach to result reporting, where participants could use a ‘risk based’ 
approach to choose whether or not to address the issue. If the study is pursued in the 
future these resources need to be updated to reflect the landowner’s non-delegable 
duty of care. 
My epidemiological project appears in Chapter 3. The project has been prepared for 
publication and the late draft of an article for peer-reviewed publication makes up the 
body of the chapter. This project provided me a unique opportunity to engage with 
microbial genomics, a new frontier in communicable disease surveillance. I used 
multilocus variable-number tandem repeat analysis (MLVA) and whole genome 
sequence (WGS) data to investigate the number of notified salmonellosis cases 
potentially attributable to recurrent outbreak sources, with some interesting findings. 
Large scale WGS provides incredible discriminatory power and is likely to change the 
nature of public health surveillance over the next few years. Like any new technology it 
presents a variety of challenges. Investment of time and skill is required to identify the 
best use for the extensive data it generates. This project was one of Victoria’s first 
forays into the use of this new technology for surveillance purposes, and provided a 
fantastic learning opportunity for me. The project inspired my lesson from the field, in 
which I taught MAE colleagues how to analyse MLVA data. This lesson is included as 
an appendix to this volume (Appendix C). 
During my field placement I assisted with investigations into a variety of acute public 
health incidents. These included a number of legionellosis outbreaks, a suspected Zika 
virus outbreak in Vanuatu, a foodborne Salmonella outbreak, and suspected 
environmental exposure to excessive levels of antimony for residents in a regional 
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Victorian town. The salmonellosis outbreak and the antimony incident appear as 
Chapters 4 (outbreak investigation) and Chapter 5 (analysis of a public health data set) 
respectively. The salmonellosis outbreak has been prepared for publication, and the 
body of Chapter 4 is made up of the late draft of an article for peer reviewed 
publication. I presented the findings from the salmonellosis outbreak at the 2015 
Communicable Disease Control conference in Brisbane; the abstract and slides are 
included as an appendix to Chapter 4.  
The devastating West African Ebola epidemic during 2014-2015 led to a massive 
mobilisation of global public health effort, both for response at the source (if somewhat 
delayed) and local preparedness. I assisted with Victoria’s preparedness activities, 
including assisting with the development of Victoria’s case and contact questionnaires, 
preparing Victoria’s disease surveillance database to capture this information, and 
evaluating a whole of Victorian Government Preparedness tabletop exercise. The 
experience provided some interesting insights into the challenges in developing a co-
ordinated and timely national response in a system of federated states where each 
jurisdiction works within separate legislative frameworks.  
In May 2015, I spent three weeks in Vanuatu on secondment with the Secretariat of the 
Pacific Community, where I provided technical assistance following Tropical Cyclone 
Pam’s impact. I spent the majority of my deployment in the remote Penama Province 
where I provided capacity building for the establishment of an Early Warning Alert and 
Response Network (EWARN) Surveillance System and the EpiNet team, a local 
outbreak response team. Vanuatu had no established system for outbreak response 
prior to Cyclone Pam. The Penama EpiNet team was established as a pilot program 
with the hope of developing similar outbreak response teams in other provinces.  
During my deployment I supported the EpiNet team through its first outbreak 
investigation and response, a three-day field trip to an adjacent island to investigate a 
suspected Zika virus outbreak. The trip highlighted the challenges in developing 
sustainable surveillance mechanisms in resource poor settings. My final mission report 
is included as an appendix to this volume (Appendix B). 
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Summary of core activity requirements 
 
Core requirement 
 
Chapter 
2 
Chapter 
3 
Chapter 
4 
Chapter 
5 
Appendix 
A 
Appendix 
B 
Appendix 
C 
Response to an acute public health problem or 
threat 
 
 
       
Analysis of a public health dataset 
 
       
Evaluate or establish a surveillance or other health 
information system 
 
 
       
Design and conduct an epidemiological study 
 
     
  
Literature review 
 
       
Report to a non-scientific audience 
 
       
Advanced draft of a paper for peer-reviewed 
publication 
 
       
Oral presentation at national scientific conference 
 
       
Teaching activities 
 
       
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Preface 
My role 
Victoria’s unique approach to legionellosis surveillance that combines environmental 
and infectious disease surveillance has been operational since 2000 but never formally 
evaluated. I was tasked with designing and conducting an evaluation with a focus on 
the integration between the disease surveillance and environmental investigation 
systems.  
I developed the evaluation plan in consultation with stakeholders and generated 
evidence through interviews, participant observation, document review and data 
analysis. I drafted the final report and developed recommendations for improvement. 
Throughout the evaluation stakeholders provided valuable feedback and advice. 
During my field placement I also provided epidemiological support to the legionellosis 
surveillance system. This included signing off notifications, reviewing records for 
completeness, providing verbal reports at our weekly surveillance meetings, and 
assisting with outbreak investigations. I also developed expertise in the mapping 
software and assisted with the development of new mapping tools, as well as providing 
advice and troubleshooting when required.  
Lessons Learnt 
I learnt a great deal during this evaluation, not least of all the value in selecting the 
most appropriate framework for the task at hand. At times I found it difficult to address 
the aims of the evaluation using the surveillance evaluation framework. If I were to 
conduct an evaluation of this type again, I would select a program evaluation 
framework instead.  
I gained technical knowledge relating to Legionella, including the challenges involved in 
pinpointing a source. I learnt that for complex public health problems a multidisciplinary 
team is essential. However I also learnt that such teams need to have clear leadership 
because the more complex a system is, the greater the risk of problems ‘slipping 
through the cracks’.  
I developed skills in the use of mapping software, and learnt that spatial analysis is 
underutilised in infectious disease epidemiology. I also observed that powerful 
Chapter 2. Evaluation of a surveillance system 
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information technology can be underutilised if the right questions aren’t asked, and if 
skilled operators are not available to ask them.  
Public Health Implications 
I found no evidence the system has reduced the burden of legionellosis in Victoria, 
although it provides excellent surge capacity for investigating significant outbreaks. I 
made several recommendations to improve both the integration and usefulness of the 
system.  
I recommend reviewing the protocol for investigating environmental sources for 
sporadic cases, and instead focus on environmental investigations for outbreaks and 
clusters. This includes using more sophisticated spatial algorithms and improved 
molecular typing to identify areas that should be targeted for inspection.  
Stakeholders have agreed in principal to explore changes to data management which 
should lead to significantly improved record keeping, which in turn may improve the 
capacity to review results of investigations to inform program planning. 
Project Outputs 
I produced an evaluation report for the Department of Health and Human Services, and 
presented my recommendations to the major stakeholders in the system. In addition, 
the evaluation is included here as a chapter in my thesis submission for the Master of 
Philosophy in Applied Epidemiology. 
Acknowledgments 
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Abstract 
Introduction: Victoria has a unique approach to legionellosis surveillance that 
combines infectious disease and environmental surveillance. The system aims to 
rapidly identify outbreaks or cases of public health significance and interrupt 
transmission from environmental sources to prevent further disease. This evaluation 
assessed the integration between the infectious disease and environmental 
surveillance systems and examined the usefulness of this combined approach for 
reducing transmission in Victoria. 
Methods: The evaluation was guided by an evaluation framework. Evidence regarding 
system operation, simplicity, integration, stability and flexibility was gathered through 
participant observation and stakeholder interviews. Data quality and timeliness was 
assessed through an analysis of historical stored data and an audit of fifteen recent 
cases. Sensitivity was examined through a combination of the above methods. The 
system’s usefulness for interrupting transmission from environmental sources was 
assessed by examining changes in legionellosis incidence over time including changes 
in frequency and size of clusters and outbreaks, and investigating the risk of Legionella 
contamination in cooling towers targeted for case investigations. 
Results: The evaluation resulted in over thirty recommendations. The system is 
complex and not well integrated. There is excellent information technology but system 
stability is threatened by regular unstructured staff handovers within the disease 
surveillance system. Case confirmation and subsequent public health intervention is 
timely, except for cases notified on serology which are subject to significant delay. Data 
quality in the disease surveillance system is generally excellent; however geocoding 
accuracy and cluster/outbreak records are poor. Data quality in the environmental 
investigation system is hampered by the use of a database not designed to store case-
related data. Sensitivity for detecting clusters or outbreaks is excellent. Sensitivity for 
confirming an environmental source is low, although this may be partially due to poor 
availability of molecular typing information. There is little evidence the system is useful 
for interrupting transmission from environmental sources for routine investigations, 
however it provides excellent surge capacity for large outbreaks. 
Discussion: The system would benefit from improved integration, including the use of 
a shared database for storing case-related information and regular meetings between 
key stakeholders. There is no evidence that routine environmental investigations are 
Chapter 2. Evaluation of a surveillance system 
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useful for interrupting transmission; however this assessment is necessarily coarse due 
to limitations in available data. System usefulness may be improved by transferring 
routine environmental investigative efforts away from sporadic cases, and redirecting 
efforts toward clusters. The identification of clusters could be made more specific 
through development and utilisation of culture-free molecular typing techniques. The 
geographical information system should also be leveraged to develop a spatial 
clustering workflow to detect statistical spatial clusters that fall outside the protocol 
definition, and these clusters should be used to guide selection of cooling towers for 
targeted inspection.  
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1. Introduction  
In this evaluation I review Victoria’s unique approach to the surveillance of legionellosis 
which combines disease surveillance and environmental investigation systems. I have 
followed the evaluation framework provided in the CDC guidelines for the evaluation of 
surveillance systems (1), with adjustment to suit the internal and programmatic focus of 
the evaluation.  
In this report I begin by explaining the public health significance of legionellosis, then 
document the operation and internal stakeholders of the combined Victorian 
Legionellosis Surveillance System. Next, I describe the methods used to evaluate the 
system and present evaluation findings for relevant system attributes. Finally, I provide 
conclusions and recommendations for improvement. 
1.1 Public Health Significance of Legionellosis 
The CDC guidelines for evaluating public health surveillance systems (1) describe 
several factors influencing the public health importance of a given disease.  These 
include the number of people affected, the resources required to control or treat 
disease, clustering of disease in time and space, public concerns, previous control 
efforts, and the level of preventability.  
Legionnaires’ disease is significant from a public health perspective due to high 
morbidity and occasional mortality amongst cases, a tendency to cluster in time and 
space, and capacity to generate acute public concern. The disease is at least partially 
preventable, which elevates its public health importance.  
Historical Context 
Legionella bacteria were first identified following a large outbreak of atypical 
pneumonia at a convention of American Legion ex-serviceman at a Philadelphia hotel 
in July 1976. One hundred and eighty cases were affected with 147 hospitalisations 
and 29 fatalities (2). Investigators suspected an airborne infectious agent and 
demonstrated an association between illness and spending time in the hotel lobby (2). 
However they could not identify any known pathogens. The outbreak resulted in wild 
public speculation and eventual closure of the hotel (3).  
The mystery was solved the following year when a previously unidentified gram 
negative bacterium was isolated from the lungs of four affected patients (5). 
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Retrospective analysis of stored serum samples found at least two other unsolved 
outbreaks were likely caused by the newly identified organism (5).  Investigators of one 
such outbreak had previously suspected the air-conditioning system as the most likely 
source of infection and exposed guinea pigs to water from the evaporative condenser. 
The Legionnaires’ disease bacterium were subsequently identified in stored lung tissue 
harvested from these animals (6), establishing a link with the cooling system. The 
bacterium, later named Legionella pneumophila, was the first of over 50 Legionella 
species which have since been identified, approximately half of which have been 
associated with human disease (7).  
Microbial Ecology 
Legionella bacteria are widespread in both the natural and built environment (8, 9) and 
cause disease relatively infrequently given their ubiquitous nature (8). The bacteria 
occur naturally in aquatic environments including fresh and brackish water, mud and 
soil (10). They proliferate in biofilms of organic matter and microbes such as algae, 
protozoa, and other bacteria; multiplication occurs most rapidly between 30˚C and 43˚C 
(8). Cooling towers, hot water systems, warm water systems, drinking fountains, spas, 
car washes and other wet elements of the built environment are often colonised with 
Legionella due to the presence of warm water that facilitates bacterial growth (8). 
Transmission to humans usually occurs through inhalation of aerosols (11), though the 
‘infectious dose’ required to cause disease remains controversial (10, 12). Cooling 
towers are the most commonly implicated source of Legionella infection, but 
contaminated water in hospital warm water systems, spas, humidifiers, decorative 
fountains and domestic showers has also been associated with disease (8, 13).  
Appropriate design, management and regular disinfection of high risk water systems 
can help minimise Legionella colonisation (8). An exception is L. longbeachae, which 
thrives in warm soil. L. longbeachae infection is frequently associated with exposure to 
potting mix (14).  
Clinical Spectrum 
Infection with Legionella bacteria can result in outcomes ranging from subclinical 
infection or a mild illness known as Pontiac fever to a severe and sometimes fatal 
pneumonic illness referred to as Legionnaires’ disease.  
Chapter 2. Evaluation of a surveillance system 
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Legionnaires’ disease affects a small proportion of people exposed to Legionella 
bacteria, however because of its severity the illness is of significant public health 
concern. It predominantly affects people predisposed to lung disease due to pre-
existing lung pathology, co-morbidities, immunosuppression, older age or smoking 
(11). Males are also disproportionately affected. Following exposure to the bacteria, the 
illness has an incubation period of 2-10 days followed by headache and non-specific 
malaise, then development of fever and a non-productive cough. The illness 
progresses to atypical pneumonia with interstitial pulmonary infiltrates. Widespread 
consolidation can ultimately develop (2). Extra-pulmonary disease can also occur with 
significant consequences (7).  
Morbidity and Mortality 
The case fatality rate of the Legionnaires’ convention outbreak was 16% (2), 
demonstrating the high mortality for Legionnaires’ disease in the absence of 
appropriate treatment. However, appropriate antibiosis vastly improves recovery and 
recent case fatality estimates are closer to 5% (15, 16). 
Although the case fatality rate has improved with the discovery of appropriate 
antibiosis, the illness still results in significant morbidity. Legionnaires’ disease has 
been estimated to cause around 15% of community-acquired pneumonias (17, 18) and 
is the second most common cause of community-acquired pneumonia requiring 
intensive care (19). It is also a significant contributor to the nosocomial pneumonia 
burden due to colonisation of complex warm water systems in health-care facilities (20, 
21). Hospitalisation often extends up to 8-10 days (15) and treatment including 
mechanical ventilation in intensive care is not uncommon. Severe cases can require 
extra-corporeal life support when mechanical ventilation fails (22).  
Incidence of Disease in Victoria 
Legionellosis has been a notifiable disease in Victoria since 1979 and notifiable 
nationally through the National Notifiable Disease Surveillance System since 1991. 
However notified cases underestimate the true burden of disease in the community 
because legionellosis is difficult to diagnose and can be treated without being 
confirmed as the specific etiologic agent. Diagnosis of sporadic Legionnaires’ disease 
can be challenging as the clinical presentation is non-specific and no single diagnostic 
technique is both sensitive and specific for all species of Legionella (23, 24). In 
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addition, effective antibiotic treatment is available so clinicians can treat Legionnaires’ 
disease empirically even in the absence of a diagnosis (15, 24).  
Males and older adults are disproportionately affected by both L. pneumophila and L. 
longbeachae, as demonstrated in Figure 1a and 1b, although L. longbeachae affects a 
narrower age range. During the period 1991-2013, 89% of all notified legionellosis 
cases in Victoria were aged 40 or older (median age 60, range 15-99 years), and 70% 
of all cases were male. The majority (80%) of cases were not known to be associated 
with any outbreak or cluster and were assumed to be due to sporadic illness. L. 
pneumophila was the most common causative organism and was responsible for 80% 
of all cases. L. longbeachae accounted for 14% cases, and the remaining 6% were due 
to other species or were not further specified. Figure 2 shows the frequency of 
legionellosis cases over time according to causative organism, along with the crude 
rate of disease in the Victorian population between1991-2013. 
Figure 1a. Age-sex chart for legionellosis cases due to L. pneumophila in 
Victoria during 2013 
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Figure 1b. Age-sex chart for legionellosis cases due to L. longbeachae in Victoria 
during 2013 
 
Figure 2. Victorian notified cases of Legionella by causative organism over time, 
Jan 1991 to 31 Dec 2013  
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Figure 2 demonstrates the year with the largest annual number of notifications between 
1991 and 2013 occurred in 2000, coinciding with a large outbreak at the Melbourne 
Aquarium. This year accounts for 245 or 16% of all L. pneumophila cases seen during 
the 22-year period. The Aquarium outbreak contributed 125 of these cases, but a 
further 120 notified cases were not associated with the outbreak. This is approximately 
twice the number of ‘sporadic’ (i.e., non outbreak-associated) cases recorded in any 
previous year. This phenomenon likely reflects increased awareness and testing due to 
the Aquarium outbreak in 2000 and suggests a substantial burden of cases previously 
went undetected. The increase in case detection and reporting persisted briefly then 
declined over time, and rates have stabilised since 2005. 
The distribution of legionellosis is strongly influenced by geography. Victoria and South 
Australia have higher rates of illness due to L. pneumophila compared to the rest of 
Australia, where the mean rate for L. pneumophila during the period 2005-2013 was 
0.69 per 100,000 persons per year compared to a mean of 0.84 per 100,000 persons 
per year in Victoria and South Australia (data retrieved through data request from 
NNDSS). However these rates are lower than that reported in Europe (26). In contrast, 
legionellosis due to L. longbeachae is relatively rare in Victoria, where the mean rate 
was 0.21 cases per 100,000 persons per year between 2005-2013 compared to 0.91 
cases per 100,000 persons nationally.  
Outbreaks in Victoria 
The potential to cause outbreaks is one of the key reasons legionellosis is under 
surveillance. These are of public health significance both due to the clustering of 
disease in time and space (1) and due to the significant public and political concern 
generated by these events.  
Between 1991 and 2013, 52 Legionnaires’ disease clusters/outbreaks were recorded in 
Victoria, ranging in size from 2 to 125 cases and affecting at least 360 cases. 
Legionella were identified during environmental sampling in 20 of these. These 
originated from a variety of sites including industrial areas, shopping centres, a car 
wash, and a large tourist attraction.  
Victoria developed a specific interest in Legionnaires’ disease following an outbreak at 
the Melbourne Aquarium in 2000. The outbreak was Australia’s largest with 125 cases 
and 4 deaths. The source was identified as a poorly disinfected cooling tower in the 
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large, recently opened international tourist attraction (28).  The outbreak attracted 
significant international attention and highlighted the need for stringent regulation to 
ensure regular testing and treatment of cooling towers for Legionella (29). Following 
the outbreak detailed legislation was introduced in Victoria to ensure cooling towers are 
appropriately maintained and monitored according to a risk-based model (30). 
Preventability 
Legionnaires’ disease can be prevented, or at least limited, through careful design and 
maintenance of the built environment (8). In addition, prompt identification of outbreaks 
allows rapid investigation to find the source of infection and public health intervention to 
limit the size of the outbreak.  
Summary of Public Health Significance 
Legionnaires’ disease is a significant cause of both community-acquired and 
nosocomial pneumonia, especially pneumonia requiring intensive care. The bacteria 
are capable of causing sizable outbreaks resulting in significant public anxiety. 
Appropriate management of the built environment can reduce the risk of disease, and 
early detection of outbreaks provides the opportunity to limit further disease through 
public health intervention. Effective surveillance is essential to monitor trends, detect 
outbreaks, and guide public health interventions. 
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1.2 System Operation  
The Legionellosis Surveillance System in Victoria operates from within the Health 
Protection Branch at the Department of Health and Human Services. The current 
structure of the Health Protection Branch is shown in Appendix 1. 
The Disease Surveillance and Environmental Investigation components of the system 
operate separately. The disease surveillance system is shared between Communicable 
Disease Prevention and Control (CDPC) and Communicable Disease Epidemiology 
and Surveillance (CDES) sections. The former group undertakes case follow-up for 
notified cases of Legionellosis, while the latter is responsible for analysis and reporting 
on disease surveillance data gathered during public health follow-up by CDPC.  
Environmental investigations for confirmed and some probable cases are conducted by 
the Legionella Team (LT) which sits within the Environmental Health Regulation and 
Compliance section. For ease of discussion in this report the activities of CDPC and 
CDES are referred to as the Disease Surveillance System, the activities of LT are 
referred to as the Environmental Investigation System, and the activities of the overall 
system are referred to as the combined Legionellosis Surveillance System. An 
overview of the two systems and the information flow between them is provided in 
Figure 3. The component systems are described below.
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Figure 3 Victorian Legionellosis Surveillance System Information Storage and Transmission 
Environmental Investigation System
PHESS
• Electronic case file
•Accessible to CDES and CDCP; 
not accessible to LT
•Detailed case information
• Searchable database
Confirm case status
Determine onset date
Collect exposure history and 
other  enhanced surveillance
(refer to workflow 1.1)
Incident Response Report 
(initial)
Distributed to Legionella 
mailing group
Incident Response Report 
(updates)
Distributed to Legionella 
mailing group
REIMS.net
Online incident notification 
system used to monitor 
incidents within the 
Department of Health
EMERALD
•Cooling tower database
•Accessible to LT; not 
accessible to CDES, CDCP
GEOCORTEX
•Online mapping tool
• Integrates PHESS and EMERALD data
•Visual display of exposure sites and 
cooling towers
•Relies on accurate entry of exposure data
•Accessible to CDPC, CDES and LT
• Cooling tower location
• Last audit date
• Most recent results (nb. Results only for 
samples taken by LT)
REIMS notification
Brief summary of 
incident and planned 
response 
Generate initial IRR
Some data drawn direct from PHESS
Manual input for linked exposures
Further case 
follow up
Legionella team leader:
Environmental risk 
assessment 
Automatic transmission (daily)
Environmental 
investigation: 
sampling +/- disinfection
Sample Analysis 
(MDU)
Sample results emailed/
posted to LT
Results of ALL sampling for 
outbreak investigations 
manually added to PHESS* * Note disparity between CDCP and LT protocols
Results of positive 
detections from 
outbreaks reported to 
CDCP*
Notification of positive 
detection (outbreak only)
Paper case file
Case summary sheet 
attached to IRR
Notification
Results sometimes entered 
onto REIMS
* Dependent on officer
REIMS closure
Brief summary - May 
include details of 
investigation
Informal discussion:
PHO and LT manager
Identify epi links
(Outbreaks/Clusters)
In practice, any positive detection from a case 
is reported direct to CDCP, but not always 
formally
Database
Filing 
system Process
Document Mapping 
SystemNotification
External 
process
Key:
Disease Surveillance System
Automatic transmission
(every 20 minutes)
                                              Data transfer
Confirmed and Probable cases
plus Suspected cases if: 
• In context of current outbreak, 
• Confirmation would constitute an outbreak 
• Possible hospital acquisition
TRIM
• IRR and case 
investigation reports 
filed here
•Digital filing system, 
not a true database
•Accessible to LT; not 
readily accessible CDCP 
or CDES
Inconsistently 
added to PHESS
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1.2.a Disease Surveillance System 
The activities of the Disease Surveillance System are outlined in the legionellosis 
disease case investigation protocol (31). The Surveillance System’s documented 
objectives are as follows: 
• Guide immediate action for cases of public health importance to prevent further 
transmission 
• Detect and guide immediate action for outbreaks to prevent further transmission 
• Monitor trends in Legionnaires’ disease with respect to time, population groups, 
geography and other risk factors 
• Guide the planning and implementation of policy, service provision, prevention 
strategies and other public health interventions 
• Provide a basis for epidemiological research 
• Monitor and evaluate the impact of interventions such as cooling tower 
regulation. 
Legionellosis is classified as a ‘Group A condition’ in Victoria, reflecting its high public 
health priority. This designation means both clinicians and laboratories must notify the 
Department by phone or fax immediately upon diagnoses (confirmed or presumptive). 
The system uses the nationally agreed upon case definitions as shown in Box 1. 
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Box 1. Case Definitions for Legionellosis in Victoria* 
Confirmed Case 
A confirmed case requires laboratory definitive evidence AND clinical evidence 
Laboratory definitive evidence 
• Isolation of Legionella OR 
• Detection of Legionella urinary antigen OR 
• Sero-conversion or a significant increase in antibody level or a fourfold or greater 
rise in titre to Legionella 
Clinical Evidence 
Fever OR Cough OR Pneumonia 
Probable Case 
A probable case requires laboratory suggestive evidence AND clinical evidence 
Laboratory suggestive evidence 
• Single high titre to Legionella 
• Detection of Legionella by nucleic acid testing OR 
• Detection of Legionella by fluorescence assay 
Clinical Evidence 
Fever AND Cough 
OR 
Pneumonia 
*Extract from the Department of Health Victoria’s legionellosis (Legionnaires’ Disease) 
case investigation protocol (31) 
The surveillance system uses locally unique definitions for clusters and outbreaks, 
which are shown in Box 2. These differ from the outbreak definition provided in the Set 
of National Guidelines for Legionellosis (SoNG).The SoNG does not define clusters 
and outbreaks separately, instead referring to them interchangeably, and defines a 
cluster/outbreak as 2 cases sharing an exposure site within 100m during a 3 month 
period (page 5) (32). Note that neither the SoNG nor the Victorian legionellosis case 
investigation protocol provide a definition for outbreaks or clusters of L. longbeachae, 
which is commonly associated with potting mix rather than aerosol generation. 
Outbreaks associated with L. longbeachae are rarely reported. 
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Box 2. Outbreak and cluster definitions for the Victorian Legionellosis 
Surveillance System*.  
Cluster 
A cluster is defined as two or more cases who have a common exposure (ie they are 
linked to within 500 metres of the same geographical location in their incubation 
period) and their dates of onset of illness are within 3 months of each other. 
Outbreak 
A cluster is defined as two or more cases who have a common exposure (ie they are 
linked to within 500 metres of the same geographical location in their incubation 
period) and their dates of onset of illness are within 14 days of each other. 
*Extract from the Department of Health Victoria’s legionellosis (Legionnaires’ Disease) 
case investigation protocol (31) 
Case Follow Up 
An Epidemiologist from CDES reviews all legionellosis notifications and forwards them 
to an Information Officer at CDPC who enters available data into PHESS within an hour 
of receipt. A designated Legionella Public Health Officer (PHO) commences case 
follow-up within 24 hours of notification. Public Health Officers perform disease follow 
up on a rotating basis. One officer is solely responsible for all legionellosis follow up for 
six to nine months; after this time a ‘disease rotation’ occurs and a new PHO 
commences legionellosis follow up. 
As outlined in Figure 4, case follow-up entails requesting follow up serology and/or 
confirmatory testing of urine or respiratory specimen at the Victorian Infectious 
Diseases Reference Laboratory (VIDRL); applying case definitions; collecting 
enhanced surveillance data for all confirmed and probable cases; and identifying 
clusters and outbreaks of disease. 
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Figure 4. Investigation flow chart for legionellosis disease surveillance*                         
 
*Extract from the Department of Health Victoria’s legionellosis (Legionnaires’ Disease) 
case investigation protocol (31)       
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illness onset) and represent the potential sources of a case’s exposure to the 
Legionella bacteria.   
The PHO geocodes exposure sites after entering the address into the database, which 
enables them to be mapped. Geocoding involves manually prompting PHESS to 
reference a mapping database, which provides latitude and longitude that matches the 
address. Importantly PHESS does not currently provide any immediate feedback to the 
user regarding geocoding accuracy, nor does it allow manual override of geocoding 
when a poor geocode match is returned.  
The PHO next uses a spatial software package called Geocortex (EsriTM) to identify 
whether exposure sites are shared by multiple cases, which signifies an outbreak or 
cluster. At the time of writing (December 2015), some PHOs also conducted a manual 
‘postcode search’ within PHESS to identify shared exposure sites.  This method was 
used prior to the introduction of Geocortex in February 2014 and the requirement to 
continue or discontinue it has not been clarified in the case investigation protocol (31). 
Information Transfer 
PHESS transmits exposure site data (and limited case data) to the Geocortex mapping 
system every twenty minutes. PHESS also automatically transmits core disease 
surveillance data to the National Notifiable Disease Surveillance System daily. The 
Legionella Epidemiologist provides a verbal report summarising recent legionellosis 
notifications and follow-up activities during weekly surveillance meetings. 
The PHO communicates a summary of case information to the Environmental 
Investigation System using an Incident Response Report (IRR). This is a reporting 
template generated through PHESS that summarises the clinical details, exposure 
period and exposure sites for the case of interest as well as highlighting any links with 
other cases.  IRRs are circulated by email to representatives from CDPC, LT, CDES, 
and the Office of the Chief Health Officer. They are generated for all confirmed and 
probable cases, and for suspect cases if (31):  
• The case is associated with a possible hospital source 
• In the context of an outbreak 
• Confirmation of the suspect case would constitute an outbreak 
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Note that IRRs are generated for each individual case, but not for clusters or 
outbreaks. An example IRR is provided in Appendix 2. PHO’s update and recirculate 
IRRs as new information is received.  
Outbreaks  
When an outbreak is identified an outbreak record is opened in PHESS, and thus the 
outbreak is provided with its own PHESS case number.  Cases associated with the 
outbreak are “linked” to the outbreak record.  The requirement to create an outbreak 
record for clusters is not articulated clearly in the Legionella case-follow-up protocol. As 
such, cluster records are inconsistently created. Outbreak and cluster records are 
differentiated through naming conventions. Outbreaks are named “year-month location 
legionellosis outbreak”, while clusters are named “year-month location legionellosis 
cluster”. 
For outbreaks (but not clusters) a case conference is convened between the LT, CDPC 
and Office of the Chief Health Officer to plan the response. There are no formal written 
reporting mechanisms for outbreaks or clusters.  
Resources 
Legionellosis is one of sixty-five notifiable conditions under surveillance in Victoria. 
Many of the resources required to operate the Legionellosis Disease Surveillance 
System are shared across other notifiable diseases. CDPC resources include a 
manager, 16 Public Health Officers, 3 senior Public Health Officers, 3 senior officers 
with roles in planning, relationships and projects, and 8 Information Officers. CDES 
resources include five Epidemiologists, a manager, and two IT staff. Approximate 
resources required to operate the Disease Surveillance System from within this pool 
include one full time PHO, access to the PHESS database and associated IT support, 
access to Geocortex and associated support, an Information Officer (0.4 full time 
equivalent), an Epidemiologist (0.2 full time equivalent), as well as IT, communications, 
and laboratory expenses.  
1.2.b Environmental Investigation System 
The LT conduct an environmental risk assessment for each notified legionellosis case, 
and conduct an environmental investigation and disinfection if indicated. The LT is also 
responsible for regulation and compliance of cooling towers in Victoria. The team 
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administers Division 1 of Part 7 of the Public Health & Wellbeing Act 2008 (33) relating 
to cooling tower systems (CTS) and the Public Health & Wellbeing Regulations 2009 
(30) relating to Legionella control in water delivery systems. Their documented 
objectives are: 
• To minimise the impact of Legionnaires’ disease on the Victorian community.  
• To identify, and render safe, potential sources of the disease 
Regulatory Activities 
The regulatory work of the LT team is underpinned by legislation introduced in 
response to a large Legionnaires’ disease outbreak at the Melbourne Aquarium (28) 
which highlighted the need for regulation of CTS to mitigate risk due to Legionella 
colonisation (29).  
Regulation was initially introduced as the Building (Legionella) Act 2000 (34), and is 
now incorporated under the Public Health & Wellbeing Act 2008 (33) and the Public 
Health and Wellbeing Regulations 2009 (30). The regulations require landowners of 
sites housing CTS to register all CTS with the Department of Health and Human 
Services; to prepare and follow CTS risk management plans; to conduct regular 
maintenance and testing for Legionella; and to undergo an annual third party audit to 
ensure compliance. Legionella Team Environmental Health Officers inspect and 
sample CTS from sites that fail to complete annual audits or who receive a non-
compliant audit. The team also conducts random compliance inspections. 
The mandatory registration of CTS is managed using Emerald, a central database of all 
registered cooling towers in Victoria. The Emerald cooling tower database contains 
information on all registered and decommissioned cooling towers in Victoria including 
location, registration status, results of annual audits and results of LT inspections. This 
centralised database provides a unique advantage to investigation of CTSs as potential 
sources of legionellosis in Victoria, as it enables case exposure sites to be mapped 
against cooling tower locations to identify potential sources of infection.  
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Case Investigation 
The LT conduct a risk assessment and public health action if indicated in response to 
confirmed legionellosis cases, probable cases diagnosed by PCR, and probable cases 
in a residential care facility or hospital.  
The LT commence case investigations within 24 hours of receiving formal notification 
of a new case through an Incident Response Report (IRR) from CDPC. The LT do not 
have access to PHESS. Case information provided through the IRR is supplemented 
by the Geocortex mapping system. Geocortex displays data from both PHESS (case 
exposure data) and EMERALD (CTS data) concurrently, providing a rapid inventory of 
potential cooling tower sources for each case. 
The Standard Operating Procedures for Environmental Investigation of Legionella 
provides guidelines for sampling and disinfection of cooling towers in response to 
notified cases (35). It is standard procedure to sample and disinfect any CTS within 
500m of case homes, and those at the workplace, plus any CTS within 500m of an 
outbreak. Cooling towers within 500m of cluster locations are noted for targeting during 
the routine cooling tower inspection program. Figure 5 describes the protocol for case 
investigation followed by LT.  
Inspectors collect a water sample from each cooling tower for Legionella and 
Heterotrophic Colony Count (HCC) testing. HCC measures the number of colony-
forming bacterial units present in a system and is an indicator of system maintenance. 
Samples are analysed including culture and identification at Victoria’s Legionella pubic 
health reference laboratory, the Microbiological Diagnostic Institute (MDU). Isolates of 
L. pneumophila serogroup 1 are further typed using Pulse-Field Gel Electrophoresis 
(PFGE). 
Any cooling tower with an elevated HCC (>200,000 cfu/ml) or a Legionella detection 
undergoes a disinfection (if not already performed at the time of sample collection) and 
is resampled at weekly intervals until the problem is resolved. 
Non-cooling tower sources may be sampled and possibly disinfected if warranted by a 
risk assessment. A high index of suspicion is maintained for hospitals and aged care 
facilities as potential sources of Legionella because of the significance of an outbreak 
in those facilities. Where cases have spent considerable time at such facilities during 
their acquisition period, the Environmental Investigation System will sample and require 
Chapter 2. Evaluation of a surveillance system 
34 
 
disinfection of the warm water system and CTS (if present) at the site. Other sources 
that may be investigated include CTS beyond 500m from the home or in the vicinity of 
the workplace, warm water systems, warm water car washes, spas or fountains and ice 
machines.  
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Figure 5. Environmental investigation workflow for cases of legionellosis in Victoria, 2015 (extract from Environmental Investigation Standard 
Operating Procedures) (35)
OUTBREAK
OUTBREAK ACTIONS
• Conduct case conference between 
EHU and CDPCU to determine the 
specific investigation area, sampling 
and disinfection requirements and other 
actions to be taken (the default 
approach is to sample and disinfect all 
CTS within 500 metres of the common 
exposure area).
• Take actions as per case conference
• Issue media release, brief Minister, 
notify Regions and Local Government
• Review results for past 3 months for 
sampled CTS
CLUSTER
NOTIFICATION, DATA COLLECTION & DETERMINATION OF 
LINKAGE WITH OTHER CASES
CDPCU are notified of Legionnaires’ disease case, collect case history 
and provide information to EHU. CDPCU will also advise if case is:
• Linked to other case(s) in an OUTBREAK* or CLUSTER*, or
• A single case
Undertake individual 
investigations for each case
SINGLE CASE ACTIONS
Undertake single case risk assessment to 
determine any specific actions to be taken 
in addition to:
• Sample and disinfect CTS within 500m 
of home (unless home is in area with 
high density of CTS e.g. CBD, in which 
case sample and disinfect home only)
• Sample and disinfect CTS at workplace
• Review results for past 3 months for 
sampled CTS
No 
further 
action 
required
DECONTAMINATION
If at any time during the course of an 
investigation the opinion is formed that 
a specific CTS is likely to be the 
source of infection for the case(s) 
under investigation then the Chief 
Health Officer may direct the 
responsible person to decontaminate 
that CTS.
CLUSTER ACTIONS
• EHU will note common exposure areas 
and target these within the routine EHU 
CTS inspection program.
Undertake individual 
investigations for each case
SINGLE CASE
*DEFINITIONS
Outbreak:  two or more cases have a common exposure (they are linked to within 500  metres of the same 
geographical location in their incubation periods) and their dates of illness onset are within 14 days of each other.
Cluster: two or more cases have a common exposure (they are linked to within 500  metres of the same 
geographical location in their incubation periods) and their dates of illness onset are within 3 months of each other.
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RIEMS Incident Notification 
Upon receipt of an IRR from CDPC the LT open an incident in a web-based incident 
management system called RIEMS. RIEMS automatically sends an email notification to 
previously nominated recipients whenever a new incident is opened, when the incident 
details are updated, or when an incident is closed. RIEMS recipients for Legionella 
events include the following: 
• All recipients of IRR (CDPC Legionella interest group) 
• Environmental Health Team 
• Legionella Team 
• Water Program 
• Radiation Team 
• Regional Public Health Managers 
• Regional Environmental Health Officers 
• Health Protection Branch Executive 
• Health Protection Emergency Management 
An example RIEMS notification is shown in Appendix 3.  
The RIEMS web-based record can be accessed to review all updates relating to a 
particular incident. Historically RIEMS was updated when any further information was 
provided and following completion of a case to provide LT with a record of case 
progress. However the system has not kept pace with changing technology and is no 
longer used consistently and these updates are now rarely completed. RIEMS has 
been used historically across parts of the department to manage and track incidents. 
RIEMS has never been adopted by CDPC or CDES as the teams manage 
communicable disease incidents using purpose built software (currently PHESS and 
prior to that a legacy system called NIDS). 
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Case Summary Sheets 
The LT summarise each case investigation on a Case Summary Sheet. This is a word 
document appended to each IRR.  An example Case Summary Sheet is provided in 
Appendix 4. 
The LT files each IRR along with its completed Case Summary Sheet in TRIM, the 
department’s digital filing system. When updated IRRs are received, information from 
the previous Case Summary Sheet must be copied over to the new Case Summary 
Sheet and updated to reflect new information. The new IRR and appended Case 
Summary Sheet are filed in TRIM alongside the previous documents for the case. 
These documents can be retrieved from the TRIM filing system using a “title” search for 
the case ID number or by browsing within the case investigation folder for the relevant 
year. A recent TRIM innovation also searches within the text of documents, eg 
searching for “humidifier” will bring up all Case Summary Sheets that list humidifiers as 
an exposure, along with any other electronic documents filed within the Department of 
Health and Human Services that include the word “humidifier”. 
The TRIM digital filing system has not been rolled out to CDPC or CDES, so these 
teams cannot readily access files in TRIM. The LT Standard Operating Procedures 
also stipulate the Case Summary Sheet should be attached to RIEMS when a case is 
closed in the RIEMS system, however in practice this is rarely done.  
Case Summary Sheets are designed to record information regarding individual cases. 
There is no equivalent record keeping in place for outbreaks. Currently, records 
regarding investigations for outbreaks are included on the Case Summary Sheets for 
one or some of the cases involved in the outbreak but there is no systematic way of 
deciding which Case Summary Sheet should record the information. Consequently 
record keeping for outbreaks (and clusters) tends to be fragmented across multiple 
Case Summary Sheets. 
Inspection Records 
Findings of CTS inspections for case investigations are entered into the team’s cooling 
tower database, Emerald. An example inspection report from Emerald is shown in 
Appendix 5. 
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Inspections relating to case investigations are marked by selecting “Case Investigation” 
as the reason for inspection from a drop down menu to differentiate them from 
inspections conducted for other purposes. There is no option for “Outbreak 
Investigation”. There is also no designated field to record the PHESS ID number for the 
case the investigation relates to. The PHESS case ID number is usually noted along 
with other remarks in a free-text comments field.  
For outbreak related inspections, a PHESS case ID number for one of the outbreak 
cases, not the outbreak itself, is usually noted in the comments box. Note that the 
sample inspection record shown in Appendix 5 relates to an outbreak and the PHESS 
number in the comments box was the most recent case that prompted sampling; 
however, this is not evident from the record. Emerald does not capture whether the 
sample was collected due to a home or workplace exposure for the single case, or due 
to a shared exposure with another case. 
No specific inspection record is made for non-cooling tower sources. The Emerald 
system can only accommodate cooling tower system records and so cannot be used to 
store information relating to non-cooling tower sources, such as hot water systems, 
fountains, spa pools, etc. Notes about inspection findings for non-cooling tower sources 
are occasionally made in the Case Summary Sheets, but this is inconsistent. 
Sample Results 
Laboratory results are received within 10 days of sample collection, and include the 
case PHESS ID number. Results are transcribed onto the relevant Case Summary 
Sheet. For CTS results, the Legionella result (Legionella species, concentration) is also 
manually entered into Emerald, and the result notification is filed in TRIM in a folder for 
the CTS.  
Sample results for non-cooling tower sites are filed as word documents or PDFs in 
TRIM. Historically, results were filed in a “warm water incident” TRIM folder for a given 
year. As a new folder was started each year, results for a given facility could be 
scattered across multiple folders. Notes relating to each investigation/disinfection were 
noted in the relevant Case Summary Sheets, further dispersing the information. In 
2015 a new system has commenced which partially addresses this problem. A folder is 
generated for each facility or home address sampled. This folder will store all sample 
results for that facility over time in a single location. 
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PFGE results for environmental samples are received intermittently, at intervals of up 
to 6 months. Result notifications are filed in the TRIM digital filing system under the 
relevant CTS system or non-CTS site folder. PFGE results for environmental samples 
are not added to Emerald or to the Case Summary Sheet. They are inconsistently 
communicated to the disease surveillance system and thus inconsistently added to the 
case records in PHESS. 
Results of environmental investigations are not routinely fed back to CDPC. However if 
Legionella is detected in any CTS, CDPC are notified using a Legionella detection 
notification form to enable them to check for cases in the area. This notification does 
not include a field for PHESS case ID, and does not specify whether the inspection is 
case related. 
Resources 
The LT team includes a Team Leader, two and a half full time equivalent Inspection 
Officers and one full time student intern. It shares a number of resources with other 
teams in the Environmental Health Regulation & Compliance Section (one systems & 
database manager; one trainee, as well as a shared registration and licensing team). It 
operates on an annual budget of approximately $560,000.  The Team recovers 
approximately $420,000 annually in registration related income.  
1.2.c Geocortex 
Geocortex is a web-based digital mapping system that integrates case exposure data 
from PHESS and cooling tower data from Emerald by displaying multiple data tables in 
a simultaneous spatial array. The system is managed by a Geographic Information 
Systems Administrator from Modelling, GIS and Planning Products in the System 
Intelligence and Analytics Branch. Separate Geocortex windows are available to 
PHESS and Emerald users. Figure 6 shows the Geocortex mapping interface. Clicking 
on a case exposure site or cooling tower opens a pop-up window that describes the 
site attributes.  
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Figure 6. Geocortex mapping interface 
 
Case Exposure Data 
PHESS exports two case exposure data tables to Geocortex. One table includes 
exposure and summary data for confirmed and probable cases notified during the most 
recent 90 days; the other provides data for cases during the most recent 2 years. 
Summary data includes the following attributes: 
• PHESS case ID 
• Organism cause 
• Illness onset date 
• Event classification eg. confirmed or probable 
• Exposure site details eg address, latitude, longitude, LGA, health region 
Case exposure sites recorded in PHESS are only displayed on Geocortex if certain 
criteria are met. These criteria are: 
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• Case classification is confirmed or probable 
• Symptom onset date must be recorded 
• Exposure sites must be geocoded 
• Geocoded sites that have had their address details edited must be re-
geocoded, because editing an eddress deletes the previous geocode.  
• A twenty minute lag is observed between exposure site entry into PHESS and 
transmission of data to Geocortex. This means if PHOs check for outbreaks or 
clusters immediately after updating details, these will not yet be included on the 
map. 
Cooling Tower Data 
Cooling tower data are exported to Geocortex from Emerald every 24 hours. Cooling 
tower layers include registered cooling towers, decommissioned cooling towers, and 
layers for systems with overdue or pending registration. Cooling tower attributes 
include: 
• Cooling tower system identifier (CTSID) 
• Cooling tower site identifier (SIDID) 
• Registration status 
• Legionella result at last sample (detected/not detected) 
• HCC concentration at last sample 
• Results obtained from latest sample (yes/no) 
• Risk management plan reviewed/implemented/compliant at last inspection 
(yes/no for each) 
• Site details eg address, latitude, longitude, LGA, health region 
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Functions 
Geocortex allows basic exploration and analysis of spatial data displayed on the maps. 
Most functions are easy to use after basic training but are not readily accessible to 
those without prior mapping experience or advanced IT skills. Functions include 
searching the maps to identify addresses, applying filters to display features of interest 
from a particular layer (eg exposure sites for a particular case, or series of cases) and 
buffering localities to identify features within the chosen buffer distance. There is also a 
distance measure tool that is useful for measuring the distance between exposure sites 
and potential sources. The system also has the capacity to select a subset of features 
for display in an attribute table which can then be exported to comma-separated values 
or excel files. Where required, new data layers can be imported in comma-separated 
value or excel format. Users can add notes or drawings to the maps to mark important 
features, and projects can be saved for later reference.  
Cluster and Outbreak Detection 
Geocortex features a customised function that streamlines the detection of clusters and 
outbreaks. This workflow automatically identifies exposure sites for a case of interest 
within the “90 day” data layer and applies a buffer of a specified distance to each site. 
The workflow then identifies any exposure sites within the buffered areas and returns 
an attribute table listing all sites for the case of interest as well as sites for any other 
cases within the area of interest. Figures 7a and 7b shows the workflow input and 
output display. Note that the output shown in Figure 7b includes both a cluster and an 
outbreak associated with case 320152304931, but these are not specifically noted by 
the output table and could be missed by an untrained operator. 
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Figure 7a. Geocortex workflow for cluster/outbreak detection: Workflow input 
 
Figure 7b. Geocortex workflow for cluster/outbreak detection: workflow output 
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1.3 Stakeholders 
The Legionellosis Disease Surveillance and Environmental Investigation Systems in 
Victoria have a number of internal stakeholders. Table 1 lists internal stakeholders and 
their interest in the surveillance system.  
This evaluation was guided by consultation with managers from LT, CDPC, and CDES. 
These stakeholders collaborated to identify the intended purpose of the evaluation, 
focus the design, and provide feedback on the draft evaluation plan. Internal 
stakeholders continued to be a rich source of information during the evaluation through 
qualitative methods.  
Due to the internal focus of this evaluation, consultation with external stakeholders was 
considered out of scope.
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Table 1. Internal stakeholders of the Legionellosis Surveillance System, Victoria 
Stakeholders Interest in the system 
Communicable Disease  
Prevention and Control  
(CDPC) 
Information Officers Enter disease notifications and laboratory results into PHESS 
database 
Important role in data quality 
Public Health 
Officers 
Case follow up and update PHESS database with case clinical, 
demographic and exposure data 
Ensure exposure sites map properly 
Identification of clusters/outbreaks 
Refer case information to LT for environmental investigations 
Communicate clusters and outbreaks to CDPC Senior Public 
Health Officers, CDES, Office of the Chief Health Officer and 
LT 
Senior Public Health 
Officers 
Provide support and advice to PHO’s 
Initial escalation point for clusters/outbreaks 
Provides strategic advice regarding clusters and outbreaks or 
unusual cases 
Manager, CDPC Manages activities of Information Officers and Public Health 
Officers 
Escalation point for important cases eg. If cases die, are 
associated with hospitals or aged care facilities, if an outbreak 
or cluster is detected, or media attention is anticipated 
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Table 1. continued 
Communicable Diseases  
Epidemiology and Surveillance  
(CDES) 
Legionellosis 
Surveillance 
Manager  
Epidemiologist responsible for analysing, interpreting and 
reporting on legionellosis disease surveillance data 
Manages the disease surveillance system, including ensuring 
case definition is consistently applied and data is complete 
Provides epidemiological support during outbreaks/complex 
clusters 
Database Manager, 
CDES 
Manages the Public Health Event Surveillance System 
(PHESS) database, which is the repository for legionellosis and 
other notifiable disease surveillance data 
Facilitates data sharing with Geocortex mapping service 
Manager, CDES Oversees the work of the surveillance manager and database 
manager 
Provides support, advice and strategic guidance around 
surveillance system and outbreaks as necessary 
Legionella Team (LT) 
Legionella 
Environmental 
Health Officers 
Monitor cooling tower risk management compliance; includes 
random and targeted site visits, sampling for Legionella/HCC 
and reviewing maintenance records 
Risk assessment and environmental investigations for cases 
and outbreaks 
Implements public health interventions as directed by the 
manager, LT 
Team Leader, LT Oversees activities of environmental health officers 
Co-ordinates environmental investigation and response to 
notified cases 
Provides advice on environmental risk management for health 
care facilities 
Key role in risk assessment 
Manager, 
Environmental 
Health Regulation 
and Compliance 
Oversees the work of the LT  
Provides support, advice and strategic guidance around 
regulation and compliance and response to outbreaks as 
necessary 
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Table 1. continued 
Database manager, 
LT 
Maintains database of cooling tower inspection data 
Facilitates data sharing with Geocortex mapping service 
Modelling, GIS and  
Planning Products 
GIS Administrator Development and maintenance of Geocortex mapping software 
(interface between cooling tower and disease surveillance 
data) 
Office of the Chief  
Health Officer 
Senior Medical 
Advisers 
Provide advice to CDPC 
Provide a conduit between CDPC/CDES/LT and Chief Health 
Officer 
Require succinct and rapid updates integrating information from 
both CDPC and LT during outbreaks 
Chief Health Officer Statutory functions under the Public Health and Wellbeing Act 
(2008) 
Provides advice to the Minister, Secretary, and healthcare 
providers on matters relating to public health including 
legionellosis outbreaks, clusters or cases of public health 
importance 
The Government’s media spokesperson on matters relating to 
control of disease, including legionellosis 
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2. Methods 
The evaluation purpose was developed in consultation with key stakeholders. The aim 
was to assess the integration between the Disease Surveillance and Environmental 
Investigation components of the system and generate recommendations for 
improvement.  
The evaluation framework was adapted from the Centres for Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC) guidelines for evaluation of surveillance systems (1), with some 
adjustment to account for the internal focus of the evaluation.  
In this evaluation I assessed system performance against relevant attributes identified 
in the CDC framework, plus an additional attribute unique to this system called 
“Integration”. Thus, I examined performance in terms of the following attributes: 
a. Simplicity 
b. Integration 
c. Stability  
d. Timeliness 
e. Data quality  
f. Sensitivity 
g. Flexiblity  
h. Acceptability 
I considered each attribute as it relates to the co-ordination between the Disease 
Surveillance and Environmental Investigation arms of the system. Note the CDC 
evaluation framework includes the attributes Predictive Value Positive and 
Representativeness, which I excluded from the current evaluation framework as they 
were not relevant to the evaluation focus. 
I examined the usefulness of the system in terms of whether it had reduced the burden 
of disease in Victoria.  This included examining changes in legionellosis notifications in 
Victoria over time, assessing whether the system reduced the number and size of 
clusters and outbreaks over time, and reviewing the risk of Legionella detection in 
cooling towers targeted for case investigations relative to randomly sampled cooling 
towers. 
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I generated evidence for the evaluation using mixed methods, including participant 
observation, stakeholder interviews, document review, and extraction and analysis of 
data from relevant databases (PHESS, Emerald, TRIM, and the Laboratory Information 
Management System (LIMS) database at MDU).  
Stakeholder interviews were guided by semi-structured questionnaires. All 
stakeholders were asked to comment on system simplicity, flexibility, acceptability and 
the Geocortex mapping software. They were also invited to comment on specific areas 
relevant to their work. Interview notes were recorded manually, then entered into Excel 
(Microsoft, 2011) and coded into themes relating to each attribute. 
I reviewed documents including departmental protocols, hard copy case records, and 
digital case records from PHESS, TRIM, Emerald, and RIEMS. I examined data 
extracted from PHESS, TRIM and Emerald to assess timeliness and completeness, 
and compared against LIMS data and relevant hard copy documents for accuracy. 
I audited fifteen cases to document the flow and completeness of data through the 
system. Cases included a convenience sample of seven consecutive cases notified 
between June-July in 2014, plus a random selection of eight cases notified during the 
period August 2014-March 2015. Additional examples are provided where relevant. 
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3. Results 
3.1 System Attributes 
3.1.a Simplicity 
Simplicity reflects both the structure and the ease with which a surveillance system 
operates and should be maximised as much as possible while still meeting surveillance 
objectives (1). In this evaluation I considered the simplicity of operations within each 
system where they influence, or are influenced by, the co-ordination between the two 
systems. I assessed simplicity through stakeholder interviews and participant 
observation. Stakeholders who contributed through interviews are listed in Appendix 6. 
Integration between the Disease Surveillance and Environmental Investigation 
Systems is a structural factor with a major impact on the simplicity of the overall system 
and I examined this as a separate attribute. 
Disease Surveillance System 
The Legionellosis Disease Surveillance System is not a simple system. Surveillance is 
complicated by the difficulties associated with diagnosing legionellosis by serology, 
both when confirming diagnoses and determining the causative species. Geocortex 
simplifies identification of clusters and outbreaks; however complexities around the use 
of Geocortex could be pitfalls. Identifying suspect cases associated with outbreaks is 
challenging but important for timely response. Defining clusters and outbreaks using 
the definitions provided in the legionellosis protocol (31) is not straightforward where 
multiple linked cases occur over a prolonged time period, and record keeping for these 
events can be complex. 
Classification of Cases Diagnosed on Serology 
Diagnosing cases based on serology is complicated because antibody titres in 
response to legionellosis are slow to rise, and cross reactions occur both with non-
Legionella pathogens and with other Legionella species (36). Further, the additional 
information required when classifying such cases is not clearly articulated in the 
protocol or captured by the case definition which make classifying some cases seem 
unnecessarily complicated. 
The case definition for confirmed and probable legionellosis cases notified on serology 
was provided in Box 1. However, in practice the classification is more complex than 
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this. According to the case investigation workflow shown in Figure 4, additional 
considerations for confirmed cases include: 
• The second serology test must be tested in parallel with the first. This means 
the first blood specimen must be retained and retested in the same test run as 
the second test, to account for poor test repeatability 
• The second blood specimen must be collected within 3-8 weeks of illness onset 
• Tests for other cross-reacting pathogens must be negative. 
For probable cases, the additional considerations are: 
• The single high titre must be collected at least 2 weeks after symptom onset 
• The single high titre must be ≥ 512 
• Tests for other cross-reacting pathogens must be negative. 
These additional requirements lead to confusion as they are not succinctly summarised 
in the protocol. Currently, these requirements are only presented in the workflow shown 
in Figure 4, but do not appear elsewhere in the document. Case classification for 
serology cases would be simplified by clearly outlining these requirements within the 
text of the protocol, or ideally, capturing them within the case definition.  
Determining Causative Species 
Another complexity in the disease surveillance system is that serological determination 
of the species of Legionella responsible for Legionella infection is unreliable (37, 38, 
36). The Public Health Laboratory Network of Australia advises “serological tests 
for Legionella species other than L. pneumophila serogroup 1 are predictive of 
legionellosis caused by the Legionella species antigen used or a 
related Legionella species” (36). This means for example, a case of legionellosis 
diagnosed as L. longbeachae on serology may be caused by L. pneumophila 
serogroup 1, or any other species of Legionella. This complexity is addressed in the 
Legionella disease case investigation protocol, for example page 22 states “There 
should be a high degree of suspicion for any case notified that may have a link to a 
cluster or outbreak. This would include cases with a low titre (e.g. 256) or notified 
cases of a different species (e.g. L. longbeachae and L. pneumophila)”. However, this 
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is not well known amongst PHOs. For example, when asked whether they would check 
for shared exposure sites for Legionella cases caused by two different species of 
Legionella one PHO replied “No, I don’t see why you would”. This reflects a generally 
poor understanding within the Disease Surveillance System of the unreliability of 
speciation of Legionella infection based on serology.  
Identifying Suspect Cases Involved in Outbreaks 
Identifying involvement of suspect cases notified based on serology during outbreaks is 
not simple. Cases notified with an initial low titre are classified as suspect cases until 
further results allow either confirmation or rejection of the case. There can be between 
twenty and thirty suspect cases on the system at any one time. Ideally suspect cases 
would be considered when identifying outbreaks and clusters to maximise timeliness of 
the system. The disease follow-up protocol advises that for suspect cases, an IRR 
should be sent “in the context of a possible outbreak, or where confirmation of a case 
would constitute an outbreak” (page 25 (31)). It also advises that during an outbreak a 
high index of suspicion should be maintained for potentially linked cases with a low 
titre. These requirements are challenging because: 
• Only confirmed and probable cases are transmitted to the Geocortex mapping 
system which is used to identify clusters and outbreaks 
• There is no mechanism in place to identify where “confirmation of a case would 
constitute an outbreak”, as spatial relationships are not routinely examined for 
suspect cases 
• Where an outbreak has been identified, the PHO must manually review 
postcodes for all suspect cases to identify those that may potentially be 
involved in the outbreak. If they identify a case whose residential postcode 
matches the outbreak they manually locate the residential address in Geocortex 
to assess proximity to the outbreak. In practice this process is time consuming 
and only undertaken during large outbreaks.  
Transmitting data for suspect cases to Geocortex would strengthen the system by 
enabling these cases to be included in the usual automated workflow to readily identify 
suspected outbreaks and clusters.  
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Defining Clusters and Outbreaks 
The combined Legionellosis Surveillance System employs rigid outbreak and cluster 
definitions. These aim to simplify response to linked cases by automating decision-
making, however in practice clusters and outbreaks do not always align neatly with 
these strict definitions. Where multiple cases occur in a small geographical area over 
weeks to months it is common to see temporally overlapping clusters and/or outbreaks. 
Defining and generating accurate records for such events can be complex. Data quality 
and consistency of outbreak records is discussed further under “Data Quality”. 
The possibility that two or more cases may attend popular sites during their incubation 
period through chance alone is an added complexity and contributes to the problem of 
overlapping clusters and outbreaks.  Molecular typing information could be used to 
differentiate between such cases to improve the specificity of outbreak detection. 
However the system uses molecular typing infrequently because Victoria’s current 
typing approach (PFGE) relies on sputum collection and culture, both of which are 
challenging to achieve in practice (42, 43). 
Environmental Investigation System 
The basic operations of the Environmental Investigation System are simple. However 
data storage and retrieval is complex because there is no designated database for 
case related data, and because outbreak and cluster investigations are not specifically 
documented. 
Basic Operations 
Investigating environmental sources of Legionella is operationally simple. The Standard 
Operating Procedures (35) clearly outline which sites should be sampled, including 
cooling tower and non-cooling tower sources. Environmental sampling is a 
straightforward process involving collection of a water sample and submission for 
culture at MDU. Interpretation of results can be challenging which is discussed further 
under sensitivity. 
Data Storage and Retrieval 
Data storage and retrieval is a major complexity within the Environmental Investigation 
System. The problem arises because the main database used by the LT is not 
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designed to store case-related data; thus most case-related data is electronically filed 
in word documents and PDFs. The problem is compounded during outbreaks or cluster 
as there are multiple linked cases and it is not always clear where information 
will/should be stored. 
Case investigation information stored in Emerald cannot be easily queried as Emerald 
does not have a field for the PHESS case identifier. This means it is not possible to 
generate simple statistics using Emerald data such as average number of sites 
inspected per case or total number of cases with CTS inspections each year. Similarly, 
because non-cooling tower case investigations are not captured in any database it is 
difficult to retrieve and analyse data including sampling and detection frequency for 
non-cooling tower exposures. 
Clusters and Outbreaks 
Data management for clusters and outbreaks is a particular challenge for the 
Environmental Investigation System. The system does not create a dedicated record or 
utilise a unique identifier for cluster or outbreak related investigations. This means 
there is no specific record of environmental investigations conducted in response to 
each outbreaks/cluster. Environmental samples collected as part of outbreak 
investigations are allocated a PHESS ID from one of the cases within the outbreak 
(generally the most recent case at the time of sampling). However, cases within 
outbreaks frequently also have non-outbreak related samples collected. This situation 
makes it difficult to determine retrospectively which samples relate specifically to 
outbreak investigations and which relate to routine case investigations.  
The lack of specific record keeping for clusters/outbreaks also makes it challenging to 
compile a complete record of sites sampled during an outbreak investigation. 
Stakeholders reported it is difficult to keep track of which sites have been inspected 
and when results were due for sampled systems during large or complex 
investigations. This is compounded by a delay in updating case inspection information 
in the Emerald database. Inspection details are usually entered into Emerald within 24-
48 hours but during large outbreaks this may be significantly delayed because the 
officers do not have access to EMERALD in the field. The team relies on memory to 
recall which towers have been inspected until inspection details are entered. This 
creates a risk that some sites may be missed, or that sites may be sampled (and 
disinfection ordered) twice by different inspectors particularly during larger outbreaks.  
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The key complexities identified for sporadic and outbreak associated cases in the 
Disease Surveillance and Environmental Investigation Systems are summarised in 
Table 2.  
Table 2. Key complexities for sporadic and outbreak associated cases in Disease 
Surveillance and Environmental Investigation Systems 
Event Type Disease Surveillance  System 
Environmental Investigation 
System 
Sporadic cases Classifying serology cases 
Determining causative species 
Data retrieval, particularly for 
large numbers of cases or 
exposure types  
Outbreaks and 
clusters  
Identifying involvement of 
suspect cases 
Defining and recording 
overlapping clusters and 
outbreaks 
No designated record for each  
cluster/outbreak  
Keeping track of inspections 
Data retrieval for cluster/outbreak 
investigations 
Geocortex 
Geocortex streamlines the information interface between the Disease Surveillance and 
Environmental Investigation Systems. The customised work-flow for cluster and 
outbreak detection and cooling tower identification simplifies activities within both 
systems. However, geocoding of exposure sites and ensuring complete and accurate 
transfer of data to the Geocortex mapping system are complex tasks, and there are 
some intricacies to Geocortex which are not well understood. Many stakeholders 
reported a lack of confidence using the system due to inadequate training.  
The workflow for identification of clusters and outbreaks ensures all exposure sites for 
cases are easily taken into account (assuming all exposure sites are properly mapped), 
thus simplifying the task of identifying clusters and outbreaks. The workflow also rapidly 
identifies CTS near case exposure sites for one or multiple cases, simplifying the risk 
assessment process for the LT.  
While Geocortex simplifies identification of clusters, outbreaks, and potential cooling 
tower exposures, it has some complexities. If exposure sites are not accurately 
geocoded and transmitted to Geocortex, the mapping system cannot account for them. 
The ‘black box’ nature of the Geocortex workflow means there is a strong potential for 
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omissions to go undetected. The evaluation identified poor knowledge among PHOs 
regarding the complexities of Geocortex including limited awareness of pre-requisites 
for transmission of data to the maps, and limited understanding of the need and 
method for quality checking to ensure mapping was accurate and complete.  
Geocortex is simple to use but requires appropriate training and practice. However no 
practical training was provided when Geocortex was introduced. During evaluation 
interviews over half of all stakeholders expressed a lack of confidence in navigating the 
system for basic tasks, and some staff within the Environmental Investigation System 
could not use the system at all, instead relying on other staff to conduct risk analysis on 
their behalf.   
3.1.b Integration 
Integration refers to how well the Disease Surveillance and Environmental Investigation 
Systems coordinate and is a major structural factor affecting the ease of operation for 
the combined Legionellosis Surveillance System. Integration is strongly influenced by 
organisational structure and leadership, and data storage and access.  
Structure and Leadership 
Roles in the combined Legionellosis Surveillance System are distributed across four 
teams and two branches in the Department. Operational activities are undertaken by 
three teams within the Health Protection Branch, while Geocortex is administered from 
within the System Intelligence and Analytics Branch. The three teams within the Health 
Protection Branch fall under different management streams and are characterised by 
distinct professional cultures. Meetings between stakeholders from the three key teams 
only occur in response to outbreaks. The evaluation interviews highlighted that no 
individual within the system understood how the entire system operated.  
The distribution of roles across multiple teams and a flattened organisational structure 
means the system operates without clear leadership. Below the level of the Branch 
Director no single person has engagement across the whole system, and consequently 
the component systems are scantily integrated. This lack of role definition impacts 
poorly on efficiency and effectiveness, as demonstrated in the following examples: 
• PHESS identifiers for clusters and outbreaks: When outbreaks (and 
ideally clusters) are identfied, the Disease Surveillance System records the 
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incident and allocates it a unique PHESS identification number; however 
this number is not communicated to the Environmental Investigation 
System. The Environmental Investigation System struggles to effectively 
keep track of outbreak (and cluster) investigations as they do not assign 
outbreaks their own unique record number. The outbreak/cluster PHESS 
number would be ideal for this purpose if it were shared by the Disease 
Surveillance System in a systematic way.  
• Dual notifications following a case of Legionellosis: CDPC circulates an 
IRR email to alert stakeholders when a notified case of Legionellosis is 
confirmed. Shortly afterwards LT also provides a RIEMS email notification. 
A single alert would be adequate in the majority of cases, however, the 
systems have not co-ordinated this.  
• Data accessability: Recently CDPC decided to convert all IRRs to PDF 
format before circulating them. However, this format interferes with LT 
record keeping system, as it does not allow them to update the attached 
Case Summary Sheet. As the LT was not aware of the planned change, and 
the Disease Surveillance System was not aware of the LT requirements for 
record storage the problem was not identified until after the IRRs had been 
altered and circulated in PDF form. 
• Communication of Legionella detections: The Environmental 
Investigation System notifies the Disease Surveillance System when 
Legionella is detected in an environmental sample. The notification form 
does not specify whether the detection relates to a case investigation, and 
does not include a field for PHESS number. During the evaluation one PHO 
was in the Legionella role for 4 months before being added to the email list 
to receive these notifications.  
Data Storage and Access 
The Disease Surveillance and Environmental Investigation Systems use separate 
databases, with database access restricted to the teams involved with each system. 
This inhibits integration within the system and leads to duplication of effort in an 
attempt to maintain the required information within each part of the system. It also 
means data relating to case investigations is fragmented across multiple systems. 
Chapter 2. Evaluation of a surveillance system 
58 
 
Table 3 lists the databases used by the system, their functions and users within the 
system.  
Table 3. Databases in the combined Legionellosis Surveillance System 
Database 
 
Type of database Function Access 
PHESS Data repository 
(web-based) 
Disease surveillance 
data 
CDPC 
CDES 
 selected data exported 
to Geocortex 
TRIM Electronic 
document 
management 
system 
Stores documents 
relating to 
environmental 
investigation for cases 
including Case 
Summary Sheets and 
laboratory results for 
environmental 
sampling 
LT 
PHOs can gain access by 
completing a TRIM training 
course, arranging for TRIM 
installation on their PC, 
and gaining security 
access through the LT 
leader. However the 6 
monthly ‘disease rotation’ 
system makes this 
impractical. 
EMERALD Data repository 
(desktop) 
 
Cooling tower 
regulation and 
compliance data 
LT 
 selected data exported 
to Geocortex 
RIEMS Incident 
management 
system 
Incident notification 
Incident management 
(historical function) 
LT 
Has not been adopted by 
CDPC. Could be accessed 
with appropriate 
training/protocol 
adjustments, but is no 
longer updated 
consistently 
Officers within the Environmental Investigation System are reliant on information 
communicated in IRRs and via Geocortex when making risk assessments regarding 
cases. Where information changes over time it is difficult to check/verify it’s accuracy, 
and missing or inaccurate updates are not uncommon (see also “Data Quality”). In 
addition due to limited understanding of the functions in other parts of the system 
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PHOs are not always aware of which information updates would be helpful to the 
Environmental Investigation System. 
3.1.c Stability 
Stability is the reliability of the system including ability to be operational when needed 
(1). The main factors affecting stability for the combined Legionellosis Surveillance 
System are human resources and information technology.  
Human Resource Stability 
Human resource skills and training have an important impact on stability within the 
Disease Surveillance System due to the complexities of legionellosis follow-up. In 
CDPC, Public Health Officers rotate their disease responsibilities every 6-9 months. 
Because rotations occur simultaneously across the team the outgoing PHO trains the 
incumbent PHO while learning the protocol for a new disease. Similarly, the incumbent 
PHOs learn the legionellosis protocol while handing over previous duties to another 
PHO. Legionellosis handovers are unstructured and usually conducted in a single 
session. The legionellosis Epidemiologist and senior PHOs are not routinely involved, 
and handovers do not include any formal training on the use of Geocortex. This regular 
staff changeover risks gradual degradation of the skills and knowledge required for 
effective legionellosis surveillance. For example during the evaluation, several weeks 
after a handover the new Legionella PHO: 
• Did not know how to open or operate the Geocortex mapping system  
• Was unaware of the need or method for ensuring exposure sites were properly 
geocoded  
• Did not know how to interrogate the maps to check for outbreaks or clusters. 
Further examples of loss of knowledge with each handover are included under the 
discussion on “Data Quality”. 
Information Technology 
Information technology stability in the system is excellent. The three key systems 
PHESS, EMERALD and Geocortex all experience minimal unscheduled outages. 
PHESS reported four unscheduled outages during the 2014 calendar year. Only one 
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was greater than fifteen minutes in duration, and this lasted less than an hour. Emerald 
reported one unscheduled outage during the same period. This lasted half a day and 
occurred following a planned system upgrade.  Geocortex reported three outages with 
a maximum duration of two hours. Each system is supported by dedicated IT staff that 
are available to resolve unexpected outages during working hours.  
3.1.d Timeliness 
Timeliness is the amount of time between steps in a surveillance system (1). The 
combined Legionellosis Surveillance System aims to implement immediate response to 
outbreaks or cases of public health significance and timeliness is therefore a critical 
attribute. I assessed timeliness by calculating the time between key milestones within 
the system, with a focus on detection and response. Table 4 outlines these milestones 
along with the data sources and methods used to assess dates. I excluded L. 
longbeachae cases diagnosed by serology because timeliness is less of a priority for 
these cases, given these infections are less prone to outbreaks than other Legionella 
species.  
Table 4. Key timeliness milestones, records reviewed and how dates were 
retrieved from the system. 
Milestone Sample size Sample description How dates retrieved 
Symptom onset 
date 79 cases 
All confirmed and 
probable cases, 2014* 
Date field extracted from 
PHESS 
Notification date 79 cases All confirmed and probable cases, 2014* 
Date field extracted from 
PHESS for the first 
notification received 
Confirmation 
date (confirmed 
or probable) 
79 cases All confirmed and probable cases, 2014* 
Date field extracted from 
PHESS 
Date Incident 
Response Report 
(IRR) circulated  
15 cases Audit cases – convenience sample 
Manual review of email 
records  
Date source 
sampled/ 
disinfected 
7 cases (28 
inspections) 
All audit cases where 
an environmental 
investigation was 
conducted 
Date of first inspection 
manually retrieved from 
Case Summary Sheet 
*Excluding L. longbeachae cases diagnosed on serology 
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Timeliness within the disease surveillance system is excellent, although timeliness of 
case confirmation could be improved for cases diagnosed by serology. Timeliness 
within the Environmental Investigation System is also excellent in the majority of cases. 
Figure 8 outlines the median (and range) number of days between each key milestone 
within the system. Timeliness is presented separately for cases diagnosed by serology 
and urinary antigen detection because the time between symptom onset date, 
notification date and case classification date differs substantially with method of 
diagnosis. 
Figure 8. Timeline of key milestones in the Legionella surveillance system, 
Victoria 2014* 
 
 
* Figure shows median number of days (and range) between key milestones, excluding L. 
longbeachae cases notified by serological diagnosis. 
Onset to Notification Date 
Symptom onset date and notification date are recorded for all cases in PHESS. Data 
was extracted and the interval assessed for confirmed and probable cases notified 
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during 2014 (excluding L longbeachae cases notified based on serology). The majority 
of cases diagnosed by urinary antigen detection were notified promptly after symptom 
onset. Half were notified within 8 days of symptom onset. There were a small number 
of outliers. The longest interval extended up to 56 days in a patient who described an 8 
week history of intermittent fever and cough prior to diagnosis. This variability is an 
important consideration as it reduces the reliability of exposure information due to loss 
of recall, and reduces the potential for timely identification of clusters and public health 
intervention.  
Cases diagnosed by serology had a longer delay to notification. After excluding cases 
due to L. longbeachae, there were 15 serologically diagnosed cases including seven 
due to L. pneumophila (one due to serotype 7-14, and the others not able to be 
serotyped); seven due to Legionella not further specified; and one due to L. micdadei. 
There was a median interval of 30 days between symptom onset and notification date, 
and a range of up to 64 days. This delay reflects, in part, the time interval required to 
collect a follow up blood sample. It may also be influenced by patient factors including 
illness severity. Patients with a less acute illness are more likely to delay presentation 
to a health facility, and clinicians may be more likely to select a broad approach to 
diagnosis such as an atypical pneumonia serological screen, in preference to a specific 
Legionella urinary antigen test.  
Notification to Case Classification Date 
Case classification is when case status is altered from “suspect” to “confirmed” or 
“probable”, triggering public health intervention. The date of classification was extracted 
directly from PHESS and the interval between notification and case classification 
calculated for confirmed and probable cases during 2014 (excluding L longbeachae 
cases notified based on serology). Case classification was timely for cases diagnosed 
by urinary antigen detection. Over half of all cases were confirmed the same day the 
notification was received. The longest interval between notification and case 
classification was five days. This delay reflects the time it takes PHO’s to contact 
doctors to determine whether the patient meets the clinical requirements of the case 
definition. This can be delayed where cases are diagnosed in an emergency 
department and there is a large turn over in medical staff, making it difficult to contact 
the treating clinician. 
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In a small number of cases delay in case classification of 1-3 days occurred as PHOs 
awaited confirmation of urinary antigen results at VIDRL before confirming a case. This 
occurs because primary laboratories sometimes notify the department by phone of 
positive results as “preliminary findings”, then send urine to VIDRL for confirmation 
before issuing a final laboratory result. Confirmation of results by a reference laboratory 
is not required by the case definition. 
The interval between notification and case classification was substantially longer for 
cases diagnosed by serology. For these cases the median delay between notification 
and case classification was six days. However there was substantial variation with the 
delay extending to over one hundred days for two cases (134 and 148 days, 
respectively).  When added to the delay between symptom onset and notification, this 
delay is sometimes substantial, for example one patient had a total delay of 212 days 
between symptom onset and confirmation.  
Part of this delay is accounted for by 3-6 week lag required for collection of follow up 
serology for those cases notified after a single bleed.  However a significant portion of 
the delay occurs due to workflow because there is no system for managing serology 
case follow-up, making it challenging to keep track of which cases require action. In 
addition, some serology cases could be classified as probable based on the first bleed. 
However a portion of these might later be rejected based on a stable titre in the second 
bleed. Rather than update the case classification to probable at the earliest possible 
time, PHOs sometimes wait for the second serology result to avoid the possibility of 
conducting public health follow up only to reject the case later. For cases that aren’t 
rejected this results in a significant lag before case interview, delaying the potential 
identification of outbreaks and increasing the likelihood of poor recall of exposure sites.  
Case Classification to Incident Report Circulation 
Circulation of the Incident Response Report is a key milestone within the system as it 
transfers essential information from the Disease Surveillance System to the 
Environmental Investigation System, triggering public health intervention. The date of 
circulation is not recorded in the disease surveillance database, thus the parameter 
was assessed by examining the fifteen cases selected for audit purposes. For each 
case a manual search within the departmental email system was conducted to identify 
the date the first IRR was circulated. This date was compared against the case 
classification date extracted from PHESS. Incident Response Report circulation was 
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timely for the majority of cases. Twelve of fifteen (80%) IRRs were sent on the day of 
case classification. One was sent the following day, one three days after confirmation, 
and one was circulated 14 days after case confirmation due to challenges in contacting 
the case for interview.  
The time between classifying cases and circulating the IRR can reflect the time it takes 
PHO’s to make contact with the case, conduct the case interview, ascertain exposure 
sites, and conduct a search for linked cases. This is in line with the legionellosis 
disease investigation protocol that states “an internal e-mail should be prepared and 
sent to key department staff as soon as possible after case status is confirmed, the 
exposure history taken, and a search for epidemiological links has been completed” 
(section 10.1) (31). However, timeliness of environmental investigations could be 
improved through the provision of an initial IRR containing residential and work address 
(if available), followed by an update containing additional exposure sites when 
available. This is because the majority of environmental investigations are conducted 
around the residential and workplace addresses, which are frequently available before 
the complete exposure history is determined.  
Incident Response Report to Sampling/Disinfection 
The interval between IRR circulation and sampling/disinfection of exposure sites was 
determined for the fifteen audit cases. Where more than one IRR was sent the interval 
between the latest IRR and sample collection was used. The sampling/disinfection date 
of the first site sampled was manually retrieved from the Case Summary Sheets filed in 
TRIM. Seven of the fifteen audited cases had an environmental investigation 
conducted. Four of these investigations occurred within one business day of receiving 
the IRR. Two investigations were conducted more than one business day after 
receiving the IRR, and one was conducted five days later.  
3.1.e Data Quality 
Data quality refers to both completeness and validity of the data recorded by a 
surveillance system (1). In this evaluation I assessed the quality of data separately for 
the Disease Surveillance and Environmental Investigation Systems, with a focus on 
data that is required by and shared between the two systems.  
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Disease Surveillance System 
Case follow up data 
I examined completeness and validity of data required for case follow-up by reviewing 
the progress of fifteen cases through the system. Cases reviewed for the audit are 
presented in Appendix 7. As shown in Table 5, data completeness and validity varied 
across fields. Completeness was excellent for the true onset date and acquisition 
period, but reduced to around 80% for geocoding exposure addresses and for 
recording whether an environmental investigation was conducted. Clusters were poorly 
recorded; there were three clusters and one outbreak associated cases in the audit and 
only the outbreak was recorded in PHESS. Data was valid (over 90% correct) for case 
classification and whether an environmental investigation was conducted, but slightly 
less reliable for organism type. Validity of dates and exposure site information provided 
to the Environmental Investigation System in IRRs was low, indicating updated 
information had not been communicated to the Environmental Investigation System. 
Table 5. Completeness and validity of case follow up data 
Data field Records reviewed Complete/Valid 
Completeness n no % 
Outbreak/cluster record created  4 1 25 
"Was environmental investigation 
conducted?"  15 12 80 
Exposure Sites geocoded  80 72 89 
True onset date complete 15 14 93 
Acquisition period complete 15 15 100 
Validity    
IRR matches onset date and exposure 
sites recorded in PHESS 15 11 73 
Organism/Cause correctly applied 15 13 87 
"Was environmental investigation 
conducted?" field correct 12 11 92 
Case correctly classified 15 15 100 
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Geocoding Accuracy 
To assess the geocoding accuracy of exposure site addresses stored in PHESS I 
extracted all addresses for exposure sites recorded during 2010-2014 and geocoded 
them using ArcGISv10(EsriTM), referencing the department’s internal geocoding 
database. I then plotted the geocoding accuracy (as reported by ArcGIS). This 
approach was necessary because PHESS does not currently report the accuracy of 
geocoding. The validity of address data stored in PHESS is presented in Figure 9. 
During 2013 and 2014 around 60% of exposure site addresses stored in PHESS 
geocoded to address level accuracy, meaning they could be mapped to a specific 
address. Around 30% geocoded to street level, meaning they could only be mapped to 
the centre of the street. For short streets this may be a reasonable approximation, but 
for longer streets or roads this may be several 100m from the actual exposure site. The 
remainder were only geocoded to postcode level (mapped to the centre of the 
postcode) or could not be matched at all. An increase in geocoding accuracy for 
address data in 2013 coincided with the introduction of the PHESS database which 
was accompanied by intensive efforts to improve address standardisation. 
Figure 9. Geocoding accuracy for exposure addresses recorded in PHESS 
(n=2043) 
 
The poor validity of geocoding can be attributed to limitations in the current geocoding 
interface in PHESS. The geo-coder is sensitive to spelling, formatting and other 
address variations, and does not provide immediate feedback to the user regarding the 
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accuracy of the match. Further, staff members from CDPC were unaware that the 
geocoding ‘confidence’ level reported on IRRs refers to the confidence of the geocode 
regardless of whether the match is successful at address, street or postcode level. 
Thus a site geocoded with 100% confidence may be 100% accurately matched only to 
postcode level.  
PHESS Records of Environmental Detection 
I assessed completeness of PHESS records for environmental detection of Legionella 
in case investigations by examining the number of Legionella environmental detections 
recorded in PHESS over the period 2006-2014, and comparing these against those 
recorded in MDU’s LIMS database. Maintenance of complete records of environmental 
Legionella detections in the PHESS database is essential as PHESS is the only 
database in the system that stores case-related environmental investigation data in a 
searchable format. However recording of environmental detections in PHESS is poor. 
The Legionella Quick Entry Guide (39) outlines how to enter environmental Legionella 
results into PHESS’ laboratory package to create a searchable record. Table 6 shows 
that environmental detections were consistently recorded in the appropriate PHESS 
field historically, but no detections have been recorded since 2011. 
Table 6. PHESS records of environmental Legionella detections, 2006 – 2014 
Year Number of cases Environmental detection recorded in PHESS (laboratory package) 
  no. % 
2006 69 1 1.45 
2007 41 3 7.32 
2008 54 3 5.56 
2009 48 2 4.17 
2010 67 4 5.97 
2011 75 0 0 
2012 68 0 0 
2013 70 0 0 
2014 91 0 0 
Total 586 13 2% 
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Results from MDU were available for comparison from January 2010 onwards. 
Between January 2010 and Dec 2015 MDU reported 22 case-related environmental 
detections of Legionella.  This apparent discrepancy occurs because since 2010 
results for environmental detections have been noted in the free text ‘comments’ box 
rather than the PHESS laboratory package. Results in this field cannot be readily 
extracted. This change is likely to have arisen through an omission of detail in a PHO 
handover, demonstrating the importance of complete, thorough and structured 
handovers, well documented databases and standard operating procedures to ensure 
stability in surveillance practice.  
Outbreak and Cluster Records 
Incomplete recording of clusters was documented through the case audit and has been 
previously discussed. To assess completeness for existing records, I extracted 
outbreak and cluster records created during the period 2010-2014 from PHESS and 
reviewed key data fields. To assess validity of the cluster versus outbreak designation 
for each record I reviewed the onset dates and exposure sites for cases linked to each 
record and noted any combination of cases that met the formal cluster or outbreak 
definitions, then compared these against the recorded incident type, as derived from 
the incident name.  
Outbreak records provide important epidemiological information, and are of particular 
interest in the Legionellosis Surveillance System because the system is geared toward 
identifying and resolving outbreaks. Completeness of key data fields in cluster and 
outbreak records was poor. As presented in Table 7 only organism/cause and outbreak 
reference fields were above 90% complete.  The number of cases (laboratory 
confirmed) was the next most complete field with just over half complete, while 
completeness for all other assessed fields was below 50%. Poor completeness for 
outbreak and cluster records may arise because the outbreak record structure is 
modelled around gastrointestinal outbreaks and there is no Quick Entry Guide to guide 
record keeping for legionellosis outbreaks/clusters.  
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Table 7. Completeness of outbreak and cluster records, 2010-2014 (n=17) 
 Data field Records reviewed Complete  
 n no. % 
Organism/cause 17 17 100 
Outbreak reference ID 17 16 94 
Number of cases (lab confirmed) 17 9 53 
Date of onset of first case 17 8 47 
Date of onset of last case 17 7 41 
Number of hospitalisations 17 3 18 
Number of deaths 17 3 18 
Was an organism positively identified 17 3 18 
Were water samples obtained 17 0 0 
Designation of incident type for clusters and outbreaks was inconsistent due to a 
tendency for these events to overlap and a lack of clear guidance on naming 
conventions. Figure 10 demonstrates overlapping clusters and outbreaks at a 
Melbourne venue during 2015. Each case is represented by a dot on the timeline; the 
case number appears above the timeline and the onset date for the case is denoted 
below the timeline. Ovals on the timeline represent clusters (lighter ovals) or outbreaks 
(darker ovals) defined according to the protocol definitions. Clusters and outbreaks 
have been individually depicted in the schema below the timeline to demonstrate timing 
of individual events. However in reality the events overlap on the timeline, producing a 
single large cluster that extends over 8 months. Note that the size of each circle is 
proportional to duration of event, not number of cases.  
Chapter 2. Evaluation of a surveillance system 
70 
 
Figure 10. Timeline showing multiple cases at a busy Melbourne venue during 
2015, resulting in numerous overlapping clusters and outbreaks.  
 
Designation as cluster or outbreak is recorded using naming conventions as outlined in 
the description of the system. Seventeen cluster and outbreak records were created 
between 2010-2014, including seven incidents recorded as clusters, eight recorded as 
outbreaks and two unspecified incident types. Over half (4/7) of all records designated 
as “clusters” included outbreaks within the linked cases, ie included linked cases with 
onset dates less than 14 days apart. Conversely, close to 40% (3/8) of records 
designated as “outbreaks” included clusters within the linked cases, ie included linked 
cases with onset dates up to 90 days apart. Overall, 46% of events designated as 
either outbreak or cluster included linked cases fitting the alternate definition.  
Record keeping for clusters or outbreaks that fall outside the protocol definitions can be 
challenging. One atypical incident included multiple cluster/outbreaks in a small 
geographical area over a five-month period. Separate records were created for each 
smaller incident, as well as a larger record that included all cases that had occurred 
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across the area. This assisted with management of the incident but may cause 
confusion when it comes to counting the number of incidents or the number of cases 
associated with outbreaks over time. In another example, Legionella was isolated from 
the cooling towers at a case’s workplace and this site was considered to be the most 
likely source of exposure. Another case worked at the same workplace as the case, but 
a cluster record was not created for the two cases as the onset dates were just over 3 
months apart, even though epidemiologically it is likely the cases had the same source. 
However the second case had returned from an overseas holiday and was linked to a 
cluster in the holiday destination, as well as a cluster at the airport in spite of having a 
primary source identified at the workplace. 
Environmental Investigation System 
The Environmental Investigation System does not generate case-related data, defined 
as “a collection of items of information” (40). Instead case records for individual cases 
are maintained in Case Summary Sheets (word documents) and inspection records in 
the Emerald database where they are not readily linked to a specific case. Information 
relating to cases must be manually extracted and assembled from Case Summary 
Sheets, the emerald database and TRIM records if required for analysis. This makes it 
difficult to interrogate information generated by the system.  
I manually reviewed the completeness of records for the fifteen audit cases in Case 
Summary Sheets and the Emerald database to determine how completely 
environmental investigations were documented. An example Case Summary Sheet is 
provided in Appendix 4, and an Emerald inspection record is shown in Appendix 5.  
I assessed data completeness for the fields presented in Table 8 by reviewing the 
percentage of fields ‘not missing’, apart from the fields ‘cooling towers that have been 
sampled and disinfected’ and ‘disinfection dates’. To validate the completeness of 
records for ‘cooling towers that have been sampled and disinfected’, I compared the 
number of cooling towers listed on the case summary sheet against the number of 
cooling tower samples recorded under the PHESS ID for each audit case in MDU’s 
LIMS database. Sites found to be decommissioned on attendance (as noted in 
Emerald) were excluded from the calculation. Assessing completeness of disinfection 
dates in Case Summary Sheets was complicated by the fact that disinfection is 
indicated for some inspections but not all, and the sheet does not include a field 
specifically capturing whether disinfection occurred (yes/no). Rather, it includes only a 
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field for ‘disinfection date’. To differentiate between true missing ‘disinfection date’ and 
circumstances where disinfection was not indicated (and therefore, where the field was 
intentionally left blank), I compared the number of disinfection dates recorded on Case 
Summary Sheets with disinfections noted in Emerald for each system listed on the 
Case Summary Sheet. This approach assumes the Emerald record is accurate and 
does not account for disinfections not captured in Emerald. Sites inspected for a case 
investigation but not recorded on the Case Summary Sheet (ie sites identified only 
through the LIMS data extract) were excluded from the calculation. Results are 
presented in Table 8. 
Table 8. Completeness of Environmental Investigation System case records 
Data Field Records reviewed Complete 
Case Summary Sheets n no. % 
Cooling towers within 500m of the home Y/N 15 15 100 
Results recorded (CTS near home)* 2 0 0 
Cooling towers at workplace Y/N 15 9 60 
Results recorded  (CTS at work place)* 4 0 0 
Any other sites inspected Y/N 15 8 53 
Results recorded  (other sites)* 1 0 0 
Cooling towers sampled and disinfected 25 20 80 
Date disinfected  12 8 75 
Links to other cases noted 4 0 0 
Link noted on other case's Case Summary 
Sheet 4 0 0 
Emerald cooling tower database n no. % 
Entered as case investigation 25 23 92 
Legionella test results entered 21 20 95 
Case ID noted in comments box 25 25 100 
HCC results entered 21 21 100 
* Completeness for sample results was only assessed if an inspection was conducted; ie where 
the response to “Cooling tower within 500m of the home”, “Cooling tower at workplace” or “Any 
other sites inspected” was “Yes”.  
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Because cases had a variety of exposures, and the number of towers on any given 
cooling tower property varies, the number of records available to review changed with 
each data field and this is reflected in the column “Records reviewed”. The fifteen audit 
cases included three clusters and one outbreak. Twenty five cooling towers were 
inspected in response to these cases, including sites near the home for two cases, 
near the workplace for four cases, and at “other” (not further specified) for one case. 
Twelve towers were disinfected. Three non-cooling tower samples were collected, one 
from a humidifier, one from a car wash, and one from a spa. Two samples tested 
positive for Legionella, one from a cooling tower (associated with in outbreak) and one 
from a domestic humidifier.  
Completeness of Case Summary Sheets was excellent for recording RIEMS 
notification number and whether there were cooling towers within 500m of the home. 
The high level of completeness for the field “were there any cooling towers within 500m 
of the home” is likely to reflect the question’s location at the beginning of the Case 
Summary Sheet. There was poor completeness for the similar questions “were there 
any cooling towers at the workplace” and “were any additional sites inspected”. 
Disinfection date was entered in the Case Summary Sheet for only 75% (8/12) of sites 
that had cooling towers disinfected. As there is no binary (yes/no) field capturing 
whether disinfection occurred, this means for 25% of sites that were disinfected there is 
no readily accessible record of disinfection in association with the case.  
Links to other cases were not noted on the Case Summary Sheet for any of the cases 
associated with outbreaks and clusters. As the Case Summary Sheet is stored with the 
Incident Response Report, it is possible to cross check the Incident Response Report 
for any linked cases. However noting it on the Case Summary Sheet provides evidence 
the link has been noted by the Environmental Investigation System and that an 
appropriate risk assessment has been conducted.  
For linked cases, no record was made to distinguish which inspections related to the 
outbreak/cluster and which related to the single case investigation.  
Only 80% (20/25) of cooling tower sites sampled for case investigations were recorded 
on the Case Summary Sheets. This makes it difficult to compile a complete list of sites 
inspected for a particular case or cluster of cases.  
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Results of environmental samples were not noted on the Case Summary Sheets for 
any cases. The fifteen audit cases included four cases with cooling tower investigations 
and two cases with non-cooling tower investigations. Legionella was isolated in two 
cases (one cooling tower, one humidifier) and these results were available in Emerald 
(for cooling tower samples) and TRIM files (for non-cooling tower samples). However 
none of the results (detection or non-detection) were recorded in the Case Summary 
Sheets. This means, to determine whether Legionella was detected for a given case 
one must review the Case Summary Sheet to identify which sites were investigated 
and cross reference Emerald records for each system in each site inspected, and also 
refer to TRIM for non-cooling tower samples to determine whether Legionella was 
detected during the investigation. 
Case-related Emerald fields were all over 90% complete. Note that while 92% of the 
case related cooling tower inspections were entered as ‘case investigations’, 52% of 
inspections (13 cooling towers) were outbreak or cluster inspections. These were all 
entered into Emerald as “case investigation” as there is no option for “outbreak 
investigation” in Emerald. PHESS case number was consistently noted in the 
comments box along with other details. However, there was inconsistency in the way it 
was recorded with some officers including spaces between the digits, and others not.  
3.1.f Sensitivity 
According to the CDC guidelines sensitivity can relate to both the ability to detect 
individual cases and the ability to detect outbreaks (1). In this evaluation I focused on 
the sensitivity to detect clusters and outbreaks using the Geocortex interface, and the 
sensitivity for finding a source during environmental investigations.  
Sensitivity for Detecting Clusters and Outbreaks 
The sensitivity for detecting spatial clusters and outbreaks using the Geocortex 
mapping system is potentially excellent. The automated workflow provides a 
comprehensive check of all exposure sites within 500m of exposures for the case of 
interest. However in practice the sensitivity of the workflow is reduced by the quality 
and range of available data, the output layout, and by the distance selected for the 
buffer search.  
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Quality of Available Data 
Many of the data quality issues affecting cluster and outbreak detection have been 
discussed previously. Briefly, the sensitivity of cluster and outbreak detection is limited 
by the following data quality issues:  
Geocoding accuracy: Accurate geocoding is essential because the workflow identifies 
exposures sites within 500m of each other. As discussed under “Data Quality” only 
60% of exposures site addresses recorded for cases during 2013-2014 could be 
geocoded to address level, reducing the sensitivity of the outbreak detection tool. 
Completeness of geocoding: As shown previously in Table 5, only 89% of 80 exposure 
sites for the 15 audit cases were geocoded. To ensure detection of all clusters and 
outbreaks ideally the target would be closer to 100%. Sites that are not geocoded are 
excluded from the sampling frame for outbreak detection. 
Non-notifiable cases: Non-Victorian residents with exposures in Victoria are omitted 
from the Geocortex data tables as they are classified as “Not Notifiable’ in PHESS, and 
therefore cannot be assessed by the outbreak detection workflow.  
Recall of exposure sites: Cases may have imperfect recall of sites visited during their 
acquisition period, which means the reported sites may not represent all the sites a 
case attended. This may be particularly true for cases interviewed while still 
symptomatic (as confusion is a common symptom of Legionnaires’ disease) and for 
cases with a serological diagnosis who may be interviewed weeks or months after their 
illness.  
Available Data Range 
The sensitivity of the Geocortex workflow for cluster detection is limited by its execution 
in the “Legionella 90 days” data table which includes exposure sites for cases notified 
within the past 90 days. However, cluster detection requires a review of cases with 
onset dates within 90 days of the case’ symptom onset date, rather than notification 
date within 90 days of the date of case classification. 
Consider a serology case confirmed 44 days after symptom onset (the median interval 
for serology cases during 2014, excluding L.longbeachae cases). The Geocortex 
workflow would be conducted following confirmation and case interview, ie 44 or more 
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days after symptom onset. To detect all possible clusters with the current case, 
exposure sites for cases with onset dates up to 134 days prior to the current date (44 
days + 90 days) need to be examined. The sampling frame limits the sensitivity of the 
workflow as the 90 day data table only includes cases with a notification date within the 
previous 90 days. Thus some clusters will be missed by the workflow cluster checks.  
Output Layout 
The sensitivity of the workflow for detecting clusters and outbreaks may be affected by 
the need for careful interpretation of the workflow output. The output is presented as a 
table of exposures, including those for the case of interest as well as exposures from 
other cases within 500m of these notified during the preceding 90 days. The tables do 
not highlight cases that are different to the case of interest and therefore need to be 
carefully checked to identify potential outbreaks or clusters. The dates of onset and 
exposure sites for additional cases detected within the buffer ranges must also be 
examined to decide whether the shared exposure constitutes an outbreak or a cluster 
and whether these represent single or multiple sites. Figure 11 shows a workflow 
output in which both a cluster (marked with arrows) and an outbreak have been 
detected, but these are not specifically noted by the output table. For descriptive 
purposes the outbreak has been circled and the cluster is marked with arrows; however 
no such alert appears in practice.  
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Figure 11. Geocortex workflow output table demonstrating an outbreak and a 
cluster 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Buffer Search Distance 
Sensitivity of the workflow for detecting clusters and outbreaks can be adjusted by 
altering the size of the buffer applied to search for other case exposures. The standard 
practice is to apply a 500m buffer to identify any exposure sites within 500m of the 
exposure sites reported by the current case. However the case definition for clusters or 
outbreaks includes cases that “are linked to within 500 metres of the same 
geographical location in their incubation period”. The wording in this definition leaves 
the size of the required buffer open to interpretation, as demonstrated in Figure 12. The 
scenario shows the exposure sites for two cases, case A and case B. Each exposure 
site lies within 500m of the ‘same geographical location’. However the exposure site for 
case B lies 1km from case A and therefore is not detected using a 500m buffer from 
case A. The ‘same geographical location’ is not captured by the workflow as the 
system only searches for case exposure sites.  
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Figure 12. Two cases with exposure sites within 500m of a shared geographical 
location and failure of a 500m buffer to detect both exposure sites 
 
Sensitivity for Identifying a Source 
I examined the ability of the Environmental Investigation System to detect the 
environmental source of infection during case investigations between 2010-2014. I 
examined sensitivity for both implicating and confirming sources according to the 
definitions used by the system (39), whereby “implicated” means Legionella was 
isolated from an epidemiologically linked environmental source, regardless of whether 
the species was identical to the case species, while “confirmed” means the 
environmental detection was matched by PFGE to a clinical isolate from the case.  
I requested environmental sampling results and associated PHESS case numbers from 
MDU’s LIMS database for the period 2010-2014, and calculated sensitivity using the 
formula:  
Sensitivity =       number of cases with a source implicated (or, confirmed)  
                                                   number of cases with environmental investigation 
The Environmental Investigation System conducted environmental investigations for 
138 cases during the period 2010-2014. This included cooling tower investigations for 
111 cases and non-cooling tower investigations for 68 cases. A number of cases had 
both sources investigated. Record keeping practices meant it was not possible to 
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differentiate between single case and outbreak investigations. As presented in Table 9, 
the sensitivity for implicating a cooling tower source was 14%, while non-cooling tower 
investigations implicated a source for 19% of investigations. For non-cooling tower 
sources, the species from the implicated source was often difficult to compare to the 
clinical species, as five of these cases were diagnosed as “Legionella not further 
specified” based on urinary antigen result (Enzyme immunoassay (EIA) positive and 
immunochromatography (ICT) negative). Interestingly all of these cases had L. anisa 
detected from environmental shower samples. 
Table 9. Sensitivity for implication of environmental sources for cooling tower 
and non-cooling tower investigations 
Source Investigations Sources inspected 
 Source 
implicated 
 Source  implicated 
with species match 
 n. n. 
 n %  n % 
Cooling tower 111 658  16 14  15 14 
Non-cooling tower 68 336  13 19  6 9 
All 138 994  28* 20  15 11 
* Note one case had both a cooling tower and a non-cooling tower source implicated 
The 138 environmental investigations included inspection and sample collection from 
658 cooling towers. Legionella bacteria were isolated from 2.8% (19/658) cooling tower 
samples (some sites had multiple positive systems). This detection rate is comparable 
to the overall positivity rate for randomly collected CTS samples during the same 
period (3.9%), reflecting the fact that Legionella are ubiquitous organisms that can be 
cultured from many different environmental sources in the absence of associated 
disease (41). Thus, at least some of the sources ‘implicated’ by the detection of 
Legionella during environmental investigation will reflect the background contamination 
rate in cooling tower (and presumably, also non-cooling tower) systems. This highlights 
the necessity for further typing of both case and environmental specimen in order to 
confirm environmental sources as the cause of disease.  
Sensitivity for confirming sources (ie demonstrating matching PFGEs for clinical and 
environmental isolates) relies on the availability of both environmental PFGE results 
and clinical isolates from cases.  However, PFGE is only performed if environmental 
isolates are Legionella pneumophila 1, and thus PFGE results were available for 
around half of all environmental Legionella isolates during the period. Amongst the 28 
cases that had a Legionella environmental detection, only seven also had a clinical 
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isolate available. Three of these had a PFGE result available for the epidemiologically 
linked environmental Legionella isolate. Two of these isolates matched on PFGE, one 
each for cooling tower and non-cooling tower investigations. Thus the sensitivity for 
confirming sources was 0.9% and 1.5% for cooling tower and non-cooling tower 
investigations respectively. 
Availability and Typing of Clinical Isolates 
The exceptionally low sensitivity for confirming sources is due, in part, to the small 
number of clinical isolates available for comparison with environmental samples. 
Implicating an environmental source of infection requires availability of clinical isolates 
as well as environmental isolates. Between 2010-2014, sputum sample results were 
available for only 120 of 365 confirmed and probable cases. Clinical isolates can be 
challenging to obtain as legionellosis is often characterised by a dry cough, making 
respiratory specimen problematic to collect (42). Respiratory specimen may be more 
likely to be collected in critically ill patients where interventions such as intubation 
provide an opportunity for sample collection. Note that the PHESS field recording 
whether or not sputum had been collected was left blank in 57% of cases during 2010-
2014, raising the question of whether the PHO’s had discussed the importance of 
sputum collection with treating clinicians.  
Even once a sputum sample is collected, isolation of Legionella bacteria can be 
challenging, particularly if the sample is collected after commencement of antibiotics. 
Of the 120 confirmed and probable cases where a sputum sample was collected during 
the period 2009-2014, only 56% (67/120) were culture positive. A recent study found 
Legionella could be isolated from only around two-thirds of hospitalised cases 
confirmed on urinary antigen, but this improved to 80% where samples were collected 
within 48 hours of hospital admission (43). 
A method to provide clinical typing information in the absence of a Legionella clinical 
isolate has recently been evaluated (43). The approach begins with qPCR detection of 
Legionella in respiratory specimen, followed by direct amplification of Legionella DNA 
and the use of sequence based typing (SBT) to analyse 7 genes that can be used to 
differentiate between strains of Legionella. While the technique provides an excellent 
solution to typing in the absence of a clinical isolate, the clonal nature of Legionella can 
limit the capacity of SBT to differentiate between common strains in some areas (44). 
However in the absence of a clinical isolate this approach may add significant value to 
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epidemiologic investigations. Whole genome sequence analysis is emerging as a 
viable surveillance technology and provides the most discriminatory method for 
analysing epidemiologically linked Legionella specimen, but currently relies on 
obtaining both clinical and environmental isolates (44). 
3.1.g Flexibility 
Flexibility allows the surveillance system to adapt to changing circumstances with 
minimal additional resources (1). The combined Legionellosis Surveillance System is 
characterised by excellent flexibility for response. Both the Disease Surveillance and 
Environmental Investigation Systems have excellent surge capacity for response to 
outbreaks or other incidents. The PHESS database is a flexible system with the 
capacity to accommodate cooling tower and non-cooling tower environmental 
investigation data which could help overcome current challenges with the storage and 
retrieval of case related environmental data. 
Flexibility to Respond to Outbreaks 
The Legionellosis Surveillance System has excellent flexibility for outbreak response. 
PHOs rotate duties every six-nine months. This ensures there are always a number of 
officers in the team who understand the protocol for legionellosis case-follow up and 
can be mobilised to provide additional support if required during outbreaks. The 
Environmental Investigation System also has excellent surge capacity. The LT is 
predominantly involved in regulatory activities; indeed 70% of cooling tower inspections 
conducted by the team are regulatory rather than case related. The team is able to 
rapidly re-prioritise and respond when a case requires environmental investigation. 
Flexibility to Integrate Data 
The information technology available to the system is very flexible and provides a 
means to integrate the data into the future. The PHESS database can readily be 
extended to capture cooling tower and non-cooling tower environmental investigation 
results, and an automated reporting system is available that can transmit this data from 
PHESS to Emerald to prevent double entering results.  
3.1.h Acceptability 
I explored the willingness of staff to be involved with the system through stakeholder 
interviews. The system was considered acceptable by most staff, although in general 
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acceptability would increase with improved coordination between the Disease 
Surveillance and Environmental Investigation Systems. 
Acceptability for Disease Surveillance System Staff 
Staff within the Disease Surveillance System felt the system was acceptable overall. 
Most staff commented that acceptability would improve with improved communication 
and co-ordination between the Disease Surveillance and Environmental Investigation 
Systems. In particular staff members were eager to receive feedback summarising 
results from environmental investigations, consistent with the culture of feedback within 
clinical professions. PHOs expect to receive a summary of environmental 
investigations before ‘closing’ or completing each case. When they don’t receive these 
results they find it difficult to decide when to close a case which has implications for 
their workflow. Staff felt feedback of results would improve work satisfaction and also 
provide a more complete epidemiological record. Interestingly the protocols for the two 
systems conflict on this point. Section 6.9 of the Legionellosis disease investigation 
protocol advises “The CDPC PHO should obtain copies of any environmental sampling 
conducted and enter these results” (31), while the protocol for the Environmental 
Investigation System advises CDPC need only be advised of results that test positive 
for Legionella during outbreak investigations (35). 
Many stakeholders within the disease surveillance system commented that the 
Legionella PHO would benefit from an induction with the LT, including a field trip to 
inspect and sample a cooling tower. This would improve collaboration between teams 
and increase co-ordination by developing the PHO’s understanding of the activities 
within the Environmental Investigation System. 
Acceptability for Environmental Investigation Staff 
Staff within the Environmental Investigation System found the system acceptable 
although acceptability was reduced by the lack of transparency between systems. Most 
commented that acceptability was improved when there was regular communication 
from the PHO, particularly when the PHO made personal contact. Many had little 
confidence in the accuracy of information gathered through case interview, and 
reported it was not uncommon to encounter additional exposures during field 
investigations that were not reported at interview. Some suggested that ideally a 
second interview should be completed when cases were recovered to ensure exposure 
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information was complete, however it was acknowledged this could be resource 
intensive and the benefits gained through interview may need to be weighed against 
the resources involved. Acceptability was also reduced by inaccuracies in geocoding 
which was compounded by the inability for LT staff to access PHESS to check or 
correct geocoding when required to correct an exposure site on the maps.  
Acceptability of Geocortex 
Geocortex was widely accepted amongst interviewees. However many staff 
commented it is underutilised, and felt the current system is “just scratching the 
surface” of what can be achieved. Most staff felt the system had a great deal of 
potential but they had not been adequately trained in using the system, and 
acceptability would improve with training.  
3.2. System Usefulness 
I assessed the usefulness of the system for reducing transmission from environmental 
sources. I assessed this by reviewing its impact on the overall incidence of legionellosis 
and outbreaks of legionellosis in Victoria, and by examining the risk of Legionella 
detection in cooling tower systems targeted during case investigations. The system is 
unique to Victoria and focuses on reducing clusters/outbreaks which are predominantly 
caused by L. pneumophila. Therefore I compared rates of legionellosis due to L. 
pneumophila for the periods before and after the introduction of the system, and 
compared Victorian rates with those observed in other jurisdictions. Next, I examined 
the frequency and size of clusters/outbreaks before and after introduction of the 
system. Finally, I assessed the usefulness of environmental investigations by 
comparing the risk of Legionella detection in cooling towers targeted for case 
investigations with the risk of detection in randomly selected cooling tower samples. 
Impact on L. pneumophila Notifications Over Time 
To assess the impact of notifications over time relative to other jurisdictions, I 
requested notification data according to species for each jurisdiction for each year 
between 1995-2013 and calculated rates per 100,000 using population data from the 
Bureau of Statistics (27). As shown in Figure 13, the Victorian notification rate is 
amongst the highest in Australia and does not appear substantially reduced following 
the introduction of the combined Legionellosis Surveillance System during 2000. 
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Figure 13. Notification Rate of Legionellosis due to L. pneumophila according to 
State and Territory in Australia, 1 Jan 1991 to 31 Dec 2013* 
 
* Disease data from the National Notifiable Disease Surveillance System; population 
data from Australian Bureau of Statistics (27). 
Next, I formally assessed whether Victorian incident rates differed during the period 
prior to the introduction of the system compared to the following period using negative 
binomial regression in STATA (45). The enzyme immunoassay urinary antigen test was 
introduced in 1995 (46) resulting in an increase in case detection during 1995-1997; 
therefore I selected 1998 and 1999 as baseline years and examined incident rates in 
the years following the introduction of the system (2001-2013) relative to these. Note 
that the year 2000 was excluded as it was an outbreak year. There was no significant 
difference in the incident rates of disease in the years after the introduction of the 
system (incident rate ratio for annual incidence during the years after the introduction of 
the system relative to the incidence during the years prior to the system 0.86, 95% 
confidence interval 0.51-1.44). 
Impact on the Frequency and Size of Clusters/Outbreaks 
The combined Legionellosis Surveillance System responds to legionellosis cases by 
identifying potential sources of transmission and rendering them safe to prevent further 
disease. If the system were useful for this purpose the frequency and size of clusters 
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and outbreaks should be reduced following the introduction of the system. To assess 
this, I examined the frequency and size of clusters and outbreaks recorded in the 
PHESS database over time, excluding those with overseas exposures. Due to 
inconsistencies in record keeping (as discussed under ‘Data Quality’) clusters and 
outbreaks could not be accurately stratified, and thus are presented together. 
Inconsistencies in record keeping also mean not all clusters (and potentially outbreaks) 
are recorded in the database. In addition, poor availability of molecular typing 
information (due to infrequent sputum collection and subsequent culture) means the 
outbreak and cluster definitions likely have poor specificity (ie events that are not truly 
clusters/outbreaks may be counted as clusters/outbreaks). These significant limitations 
mean this data needs to be interpreted with caution. Figure 14a presents the number of 
clusters/outbreaks each year, while Figure 14b presents the number of cases recorded 
for each incident between 1998 and 2014, including a line of best fit showing the trend 
in number of cases per incident over time. An unusually large number of clusters and 
outbreaks were recorded during 2003. The graphs demonstrate there was no reduction 
in the frequency or size of outbreaks/clusters following the introduction of the combined 
surveillance system in the year 2000. 
Figure 14a. Annual number of legionellosis clusters/outbreaks in Victoria, 1998 – 
2013. 
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Figure 14b. Number of legionellosis cases per outbreak/cluster Victoria 1998-
2014 
 
 
Risk of Legionella in cooling towers targeted for case investigation 
I assessed the usefulness of the current protocol for environmental investigations by 
comparing the risk of Legionella detection in case-related cooling tower inspections 
against the risk of detection in cooling tower samples collected for other purposes 
during the period 2010-2014.  
I extracted cooling tower inspection data from Emerald and analysed it in STATA (45). 
There were 37 inspection types recorded during the period. I identified major inspection 
types in consultation with LT staff and collapsed inspection records into meaningful 
categories. Inspection records listed in Emerald as “other” ”survey” or “record only” 
were excluded from the analysis. I calculated the risk of Legionella detection for each 
inspection category over the five year period, and formally compared the risk of 
detection for case investigations against the risk of detection for randomly selected 
towers using chi square analysis. It was not possible to stratify the analysis to assess 
whether there was a higher risk of Legionella detection for outbreak versus cluster or 
single case investigations as these categories are not differentiated in the Emerald 
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cooling tower database. Table 10 presents the results of the analysis. The number and 
per cent of missing results for each category is also presented. 
 Table 10. Cooling tower Legionella detections according to inspection type, 
2010 – 2014. 
 Inspection Type 
 
 Legionella Detected Result Missing 
 
n  No. % 95% CI (%)*  No. % 
Case  987  27 2.74 (1.81, 3.96)  114 11.55 
Random 482  19 3.94 (2.39, 6.09)  92 19.09 
Compliance 3,112  81 2.60 (2.07, 3.2)  766 24.61 
Follow up 1,228  66 5.12 (4.18, 6.79)  377 29.27 
Total 5,869  193 3.29 (2.84, 3.78)  1,349 22.99 
95%CI: 95% Confidence Interval 
The risk of identifying Legionella in cooling towers sampled for case investigations was 
only 2.74%. This was lower but not significantly different to the risk of detecting 
Legionella in randomly sampled towers (chi square P value=0.119). The similarity 
between risk of Legionella detection in case-related versus randomly selected sites 
suggests the sites currently targeted for case investigation do not pose an increased 
risk to the public compared to other cooling towers.  
At the time of the inspection, cooling tower operators are directed to disinfect sites 
linked to a case (ie. within 500m of home, at the workplace or within 500m of an 
outbreak) within 24 hours. The only exception is sites investigated for cluster 
investigations or cooling towers beyond 500m from shared exposure sites in an 
outbreak investigation. In these cases the need for disinfection is determined by a risk 
analysis and sample results. The financial burden of disinfection is borne by the cooling 
tower operator. The finding that sites inspected for case-related investigations have the 
same risk of Legionella detection as a random sample of sites makes this request for 
immediate disinfection difficult to justify.   
Sample results were missing for over 20% of all inspections. This missing data may 
bias the reported risk of detection upwards because Legionella detections are likely to 
be more reliably recorded than non-detections. The proportion of missing sample 
results varied between inspection types. Those with a higher percentage of missing 
data are likely to be disproportionately affected by recording bias.  
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4. Discussion 
The Victorian combined Legionellosis Surveillance System is a complex system that 
integrates infectious disease and environmental surveillance components. The use of 
the Geocortex mapping system simplifies the interface between the two systems, 
however staff require appropriate training to avoid some important pitfalls. Overall the 
integration between the two systems could be significantly improved through more 
regular, structured engagement between key stakeholders and access to a shared 
database.  
The system has stable information technology but experiences some instability due to 
human resourcing. Regular staff handovers within the Disease Surveillance System 
result in loss of skills and knowledge in the complex system. These could be overcome 
through structured handovers including a handover checklist and a dedicated training 
session on Geocortex.  
Case notification and confirmation is timely for cases notified by urinary antigen or 
respiratory specimen, but could be improved for serology cases by developing targets 
to guide timely follow-up. Communication of cases to the Environmental Investigation 
System and subsequent case investigation occurs promptly. 
Data quality was good for the majority of data fields examined within the Disease 
Surveillance system. However the quality of geocoding and information updates to the 
Environmental Investigation System could be improved and Legionella environmental 
detections have not been entered into the database properly since 2010.  
Data quality within the Environmental Investigation System was hampered by the use 
of multiple databases and reliance on Emerald, which is not designed to store case 
related data. Case Summary Sheets provide the only comprehensive record of case 
related investigations, however these were frequently incomplete which means 
collating information on case investigations is labour intensive and error-prone. Record 
keeping for outbreaks and clusters was poor across both the Disease Surveillance and 
Environmental Investigation Systems.  
The system has excellent sensitivity for detecting clusters and outbreaks, although 
inaccurate geocoding reduces this sensitivity. The specificity of outbreak and cluster 
detection could be improved with increased availability of molecular typing to identify 
cases that were infected with the same or similar strain of Legionella. The system 
Chapter 2. Evaluation of a surveillance system 
89 
 
implicates environmental sources moderately frequently, but this may reflect 
background contamination rates as a large number of sources can be sampled for a 
single investigation. The system has remarkably low sensitivity for confirming 
environmental sources through molecular typing. This is at least partially attributable to 
the low number of cases with clinical specimen available, and the fact that typing of 
environmental isolates is only undertaken for a portion of isolates (L. pneumophila 1). 
The system is flexible and provides excellent surge capacity for outbreak response, 
and the PHESS database offers flexibility that should enable integration of the two 
systems into a single database. Overall the system was considered acceptable by 
stakeholders, although acceptability would improve with improved integration between 
the two components. 
Based on the available data, the system does not appear useful for reducing 
transmission from environmental sources. The introduction of the system had minimal 
impact on the notification rates of legionellosis due to L. pneumophila, and has not 
reduced the frequency or size of clusters and outbreaks observed. The lack of change 
in cluster and outbreaks may be a record keeping artefact due to inconsistency in 
record keeping over time. However, the finding that cooling tower sites currently 
targeted for case investigations are at no greater risk of contamination with Legionella 
than randomly selected cooling towers suggests the usefulness of targeting these sites 
for sporadic case investigations is limited. However, the Environmental Investigation 
System is almost cost neutral and operates within a regulatory framework. Disease 
investigation activities may be seen as an extension of regulatory activities. 
The Environmental Investigation system samples and disinfects systems within 500m 
of case homes or at the workplace for all cases. This approach is consistent with the 
findings of a Glasgow study that found people living within 500m of a cooling tower had 
three fold the risk of illness compared to people living further than one kilometre from a 
cooling tower (47); however this study has not been validated in the Australia. Systems 
within 500m of other case exposure sites are tested in response to outbreaks (and 
occasionally clusters). However, aerosols spread from a contaminated cooling tower 
have been shown to cause illness in cases exposed up to 6km from the most likely 
source of an outbreak (48). This extensive aerosol spread makes it difficult to identify 
the environmental source for legionellosis even where cooling towers are the source. In 
Victoria, systems greater than 500m from case exposure sites may be tested in 
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response to larger outbreaks or clusters, but it is not practical or efficient to test all such 
towers for routine investigations. 
The usefulness of the system may be improved through more strategic selection of 
cooling towers for investigation. Investigative efforts currently spent on sporadic case 
investigations may be better invested in response to clusters and outbreaks. Currently, 
very little environmental investigative effort is focussed on clusters. Strategic cooling 
tower selection may include increased use of molecular typing to improve the 
specificity of cluster and outbreak definitions, and more sophisticated use of mapping 
to target areas associated with spatial clustering of disease. 
Although there is little evidence the system has had impact on the overall burden of 
legionellosis in Victoria, the system is undoubtedly useful for the rapid detection and 
prompt investigation of significant outbreaks. The structure of both CDPC and the LT 
provides excellent surge capacity when required for large outbreak investigations. 
Usefulness of the system may be improved with more strategic selection of cooling 
towers for sampling, and improved molecular typing to improve specificity of outbreak 
and cluster detection. 
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5. Recommendations 
A number of recommendations to improve the operation and usefulness of the system 
are presented below. These include major and minor recommendations for the 
combined Legionellosis Surveillance System, the Disease Surveillance System, the 
Environmental Investigation System and for the Geocortex mapping system. 
5.1 Combined Legionellosis Surveillance System  
Major Recommendations for Combined System 
5.1.1 Use a single database 
The system would benefit from moving toward a single repository of information for 
case related data. PHESS has the potential to store detailed environmental 
investigation information for cases for both cooling tower and non-cooling tower 
exposures. This could include systems/sites investigated for each case, whether the 
investigation was for a sporadic case, cluster or outbreak, laboratory results for 
samples, and the reason for sampling (eg residence, workplace, outbreak, or other). 
This information could be linked to the case of interest or to relevant clusters/outbreaks 
resulting in a complete, easily accessible record of case information in a single 
database.  
Integration would improve significantly if the two systems worked form a shared 
database. Adopting PHESS for storage of data relating to Environmental Investigations 
would overcome many of the case-related data storage challenges faced by the 
Environmental Investigation System as PHESS is specifically designed to store case-
related information. Access to the PHESS database would reduce the need for email 
updates, enable the LT to freely check and verify exposure sites, onset dates, or other 
relevant information, and would also enable stakeholders from the Disease 
Surveillance System to access results of environmental investigations.  
5.1.2 Review definition and protocol for clusters versus outbreaks  
The distinction between clusters and outbreaks is unique to Victoria. The SoNG 
provides only a single definition (32). Clusters and outbreaks in Victoria frequently 
overlap and the definitions can cause confusion. Recorded outbreaks in the system 
often extend into clusters, and clusters often contain outbreaks. This may reflect 
sustained transmission from a single source, or coincidental movements in cases that 
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are unrelated but difficult to differentiate using current typing methods. Currently, little 
investigative effort is applied to clusters. 
Consideration should be given to adopting a single definition and investigating all 
incidents with the same vigour. Ideally the definition would align with the guidelines 
provided in the SoNG (32) which considers a cluster/outbreak to be two or more cases 
within 100m of a shared exposure and onset dates within 90 days. However, other 
definitions are used, for example in New Zealand, outbreaks are 2 or more cases with 
a single exposure site and dates or onset within 6 months of each other (49) although 
all 19 outbreaks since 1990 involved cases separated by a month or less. In the 
Netherlands, outbreaks are any two cases with a shared exposure site and onset dates 
within 2 years (13). 
5.1.3 Invest in geospatial analysis for identification of spatial clustering 
To overcome limitations of current molecular typing methods for identifying clusters and 
outbreaks, the system should invest significantly in the development of geo-spatial 
methods for the detection of spatial clustering. See discussion under 
“Recommendations for Geocortex”.  
5.1.4 Engage through regular, structured meetings  
System integration would benefit by having a clearly defined committee of responsible 
parties who meet regularly to provide leadership and review the components of the 
system. The aim of such a group would be to ensure key decision makers understand 
the complex system, activities remain co-ordinated, data flow is unimpeded and any 
changes to one component of the system are accounted for by the other. The 
committee could regularly review recent cases and investigation findings to ensure 
completeness and identify issues for resolution. Selecting representatives for this 
committee will be important. While Public Health Officers should be represented, it will 
be essential to also include a consistent representative from CDPC (such as a team 
leader) to ensure continuity due to the rapid changeover of Public Health Officers with 
each disease rotation. The Legionella Epidemiologist and LT leader should also be 
represented.  
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5.1.5 Establish a working group to improve molecular typing 
The system would benefit from engaging with VIDRL and MDU to establish a working 
group to develop and evaluate a culture free qPCR sequence based typing technique, 
enabling typing of clinical samples in the absence of an isolate. Ideally, the 
departmental arm of the group would also work to incorporate molecular typing 
information into outbreak/cluster definitions to increase the specificity of these 
definitions. Sequence based typing of clinical and environmental isolates should also 
be evaluated as a potential means to link clinical and epidemiologically linked 
environmental samples in the absence of a clinical isolate.  
Ultimately, the discriminatory power of whole genome sequencing should be assessed, 
including reviewing the diversity of whole genome sequences amongst Victorian 
environmental isolates. If the method has good discriminatory power, the working 
group should work towards development of meta-genomic methods to enable whole 
genome sequencing on clinical samples in the absence of an isolate. Once whole 
genome sequencing is available to type both clinical and environmental samples, 
consideration should be given to adopting whole genome sequencing in preference to 
PFGE or SBT to confirm environmental sources.  
The departmental arm of the working group could also work toward increasing 
collection of sputum samples for typing by raising awareness amongst PHOs and 
clinicians of the importance of doing so.  
5.1.6 Orient incumbent PHOs with the Legionella Team 
Officers from both the Disease Surveillance and Environmental Investigation Systems 
suggested incumbent PHOs would benefit from an extended orientation session with 
the LT, ideally including a cooling tower inspection. Such an arrangement would be 
beneficial in building organisational networks as well as improving operational 
knowledge of the overall system.  
Minor Recommendations for Combined System 
5.1.7 Streamline incident notifications  
During stakeholder interviews a number of senior stakeholders expressed a preference 
to receive fewer notifications regarding legionellosis. Currently many stakeholders 
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receive both the IRR and the RIEMS incident notification to notify them of a case of 
legionellosis. While the information received is relevant for some stakeholders, the 
recipient lists could be reduced. For example, IRRs could be routinely sent to the LT for 
single cases, and distributed more widely only when a cluster/outbreak is identified. 
5.1.8 Improve investigation of cases with a serological diagnosis of L. longbeachae  
This includes raising awareness amongst PHOs and the LT that Legionella is difficult to 
speciate based on serology, and thus cases diagnosed with L. longbeachae on 
serology could be due to any species. As such, consideration should be given to 
conducting a full investigation including collecting a complete exposure site history and 
Environmental Investigation (if indicated) as for any other case of legionellosis. 
5.1.9 Develop a protocol for identifying clusters/outbreaks due to L. longbeachae.  
Currently there is no systematic way of identifying clusters/outbreaks due to L. 
longbeachae with shared potting mix/compost exposure. The system would benefit 
from a protocol for cross checking potting mix/compost exposures for L. longbeachae 
cases to identify shared non-geographical exposures (eg potting mix /compost). 
5.1.10 Clarify the use of buffers and the cluster/outbreak definition.  
If the current cluster/outbreak definition remains unchanged, technically the buffer 
distance should be increased to 1km to capture all potential exposure sites within 500m 
of the same geographical locations. Such an adjustment may increase the sensitivity 
for detecting clusters and outbreaks, although is likely to adversely affect specificity as 
some exposures may lie within 1km of each other through chance alone. Increasing the 
buffer distance is also likely to significantly increase the resources involved in 
environmental case investigations as many more outbreaks and clusters may be 
detected this way. Alternatively, the case definition itself may be reworded to better 
reflect current practice. 
5.2 Recommendations for Disease Surveillance System 
Major Recommendations for the Disease Surveillance System 
5.2.1 Develop a structured approach to PHO handovers  
To ensure the complexities of the system are communicated in full at each disease 
rotation, handovers should be conducted in a structured fashion.  Ideally, a structured 
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handover checklist would be developed. This could guide the handover and be signed 
by incumbent PHOs to ensure handovers are complete and thorough.  
At a minimum, handovers should include the Legionella Epidemiologist and cover the 
following information: 
• Basic outline of combined Legionella Surveillance System including the 
roles of CDPC and LT and introduction to important contacts 
• Case definition including complexities for serology cases 
• Diagnositic methods including importance of collecting a sputum sample 
• Speciation – unreliable using serology alone; how to determine species 
using Legionella urinary antigen tests 
• Collecting exposure information 
• Geocoding and how to check geocode completeness and accuracy 
• Identifying clusters/outbreaks  
• Record keeping for clusters/outbreaks 
• Communicating information to the LT 
• Recording results of environmental investigations in the laboratory 
package 
In addition, the following should be included in the handover process: 
• A Geocortex training session with the Legionella Epidemiologist and/or 
mapping administrator to learn how to use the mapping software 
• Ideally, an orientation session with the LT including a cooling tower site 
inspection. 
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5.2.2 Modify the PHESS interface to provide immediate feedback on geocoding 
accuracy and allow manual override of inaccurate geo-coded data.  
A major alteration to the PHESS contract has been requested through the software 
provider to address this recommendation. Until this is implemented PHOs should do a 
manual check of each exposure site to ensure it is plausibly positioned. 
5.2.3 Introduce a routine check for geocoding completeness  
The completeness of geocoding for a case can be rapidly assessed using the IRR 
exposure site table, and this should be routinely performed while awaiting the 
improvements in PHESS discussed above. The geocoding ‘confidence’ field appears 
blank where sites are not geocoded. PHOs’ should be encouraged to check this output 
to ensure geocoding completeness for every case prior to circulating the IRR (if IRRs 
are discontinued after transitioning to a shared database, the exposure table should 
still be generated for the purpose of checking geocode completeness). 
5.2.4 Enter case related environmental detections in PHESS  
The poor completeness of environmental detections in PHESS would be addressed by 
adopting a shared database that includes all case related environmental results, both 
detections and non-detections, as previously discussed. However in the short term the 
problem should be addressed by raising awareness amongst PHOs of the importance 
and approach to entering results in the appropriate field after receiving the “Notification 
of Legionella detection” form from LT. 
5.2.5 Increase collection of sputum samples  
Raise awareness amongst PHOs of the importance of sputum sample collection. 
Routinely report status of sputum samples for each case (ie collected or not) at 
surveillance meetings. Measure completeness of the field “sputum sample collected 
yes/no” during routine data quality checks (eg data quality manager monthly reports). 
5.2.6 Improve outbreak records 
Develop an outbreak package specific to legionellosis to improve data quality for 
cluster and outbreak records.  
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Develop an Outbreak Quick Entry Guide to provide guidance for PHOs completing 
legionellosis outbreak records. Include clear guidelines on recordkeeping where events 
overlap. Conduct quality checks to ensure outbreak records are complete. 
Develop a formal reporting mechanism for outbreaks; for example an automated 
Incident Response Report. This can be used to communicate information including a 
unique identifier for outbreaks and clusters to the Environmental Investigation System 
and the Office of the Chief Health Officer.  
5.2.7 Use Geocortex during weekly surveillance meetings 
This will improve familiarity with the system, provide regular quality checks, and 
promote trouble shooting. 
Minor Recommendations for the Disease Surveillance System 
5.2.8 Adapt case definition for serology cases to capture the complexities in diagnosis  
Currently, the case definition for serology cases does not reflect the complexities in 
diagnosis. Ideally the case definition would be adapted to succinctly summarise these 
details. Box 3 provides an example of how the laboratory component of the case 
definition could be adapted. Clarifying these rules would also improve transparency 
when comparing surveillance data between jurisdictions.  
Chapter 2. Evaluation of a surveillance system 
98 
 
Box 3. Suggested adaptations to laboratory component of case definitions for 
serology cases to simplify case classification 
Confirmed case:  
• Seroconversion or a significant increase in antibody level or a fourfold or 
greater rise in titre to Legionella, where the second bleed is collected 3-8 weeks 
following illness onset and tested in parallel with the first 
Probable case:  
• Single high titre to Legionella (≥512), where the sample is collected at least 2 
weeks after illness onset 
5.2.9 Include suspect cases in the data transmitted to Geocortex  
These cases could then be included in the workflow that identifies outbreaks and 
clusters. There are a few considerations to take into account: 
• The PHO would need to assess case classification when cases with shared 
exposure sites are identified. Appropriate training and attention to detail would 
address this. 
• The process would also require a small additional investment of time from the 
PHO, as they would need to add the case residential address to the list of 
exposure sites for the case. This process takes between one and two minutes 
to complete. 
• The outbreak detection workflow in Geocortex requires onset dates to identify 
outbreaks and clusters. Onset dates are often not known for suspect cases as 
these cases are usually notified by laboratories. The workflow could overcome 
this by using a calculated onset date (based on the notification date) as a proxy 
for onset date for suspect cases.  
• The legionellosis follow-up protocol should clarify how outbreaks involving 
suspect cases should be addressed. A clear position should be adopted 
regarding whether environmental investigation is conducted as soon as the 
suspected outbreak is identified, or after the diagnosis is first confirmed by 
urinary antigen or sputum analysis. The protocol should also specify whether a 
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response should be initiated if a case can’t be confirmed or rejected within a 
pre-determined time frame.  
5.2.10 Confirm cases based on primary laboratory urinary antigen results 
To improve timeliness cases should be confirmed and public health action 
implemented as soon as possible based on primary laboratory urinary antigen results, 
rather than waiting for confirmation at VIDRL. A phone notification from a primary 
laboratory is a form of notification and should be sufficient to confirm a case. This 
should be clarified in the protocol to minimise confusion. At the time of writing a new 
urinary antigen test (SOFIA) had recently been adopted by two primary laboratories in 
Victoria. The test has been associated with at least three false positive results in the 
few months it has been used. The test is being further evaluated and may be exempted 
from this recommendation in future. 
5.2.11 Improve timeliness of serology case follow-up  
Develop guidelines for timely case classification for serology cases eg: 
i. Contact the testing doctor to request clinical details within 3 days of receiving 
blood results. Strongly recommend a urinary antigen test and collection of 
specimen for PCR 
ii. If no response after seven days, contact by phone and letter  
iii. If no response after 3 weeks, contact the doctor again 
iv. Aim to classify or reject all suspect cases within 6 weeks of notification 
v. Classify probable cases as soon as possible after receipt of notification, do not 
await a second serology result if the first is sufficient to consider the case 
“probable” 
5.2.12 Provide an initial IRR as soon as possible after receipt of notification  
If the routine investigation of cooling towers near the home and workplace for sporadic 
case continues, the Disease Surveillance System should provide the Environmental 
Investigation System with key information as soon as possible rather than waiting for 
complete exposure histories. Eg the initial IRR could include residential address, and 
work address if available. Provide updates when they become available. 
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5.2.13 Include exposure sites for cases classified as “Not Notifiable” in Geocortex 
exposure tables  
This will enable inclusion of exposure sites for non-Victorian residents in the cluster 
and outbreak detection workflow. 
5.3 Recommendations for Environmental Investigation System 
Major Recommendations for the Environmental Investigation System 
5.3.1 Store case related data in a searchable database  
The potential to use PHESS for this purpose has already been discussed. PHESS can 
provide a solution to assist with the management of non-cooling tower data as well as 
cooling tower data. Some effort will be required to ensure cooling tower data in PHESS 
is appropriately linked to cooling tower records in Emerald, where they are required for 
registration and licensing purposes.  
5.3.2 Develop data-driven objectives  
The environmental investigation system would benefit from the development of data-
driven objective/s. An example could be : 
“Generate useful data. Document sample results for environmental Legionellae 
exposures for cases of legionellosis, and integrate this data with disease 
surveillance information to inform programming and policy”.  
Such an objective would ensure generation of quality data to drive research, 
programming and policy is prioritised and resourced; and continues to be prioritised 
during future decision-making. A data-driven objective should prompt 
training/appointment of a team member with data management skills required to 
oversee the collection and utilisation of high quality data.  
5.3.3 Capture reason for sampling 
Capture nature of case exposure for case-related cooling tower inspections to enable 
analysis of risk factors for Legionella detection. This may help inform program planning 
in future. Eg whether investigation is sporadic case or outbreak related; proximity to 
exposure site (metres), nature of exposure site eg. near home, at workplace, other.  
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5.3.4 Review the protocol for sporadic case investigations  
The finding that there is no increase in risk of Legionella detection in systems currently 
targeted for inspection and disinfection suggests these sites pose no greater risk to the 
public than other sites. Targeting sites within 500m of the home or at the workplace 
seems difficult to justify for all cases, although may be reasonable for cases with limited 
other exposures. Investigative effort may be better directed toward clusters rather than 
sporadic cases. Consideration should be given to assessing other risk factors for 
Legionella and target inspections based on these. For example, sites with an outbreak 
or cluster in the near vicinity and a history of Legionella detection or non-compliance 
should be prioritised. Spatio-temporal clustering of cases that falls outside the rigid 
protocol definitions could also be identified through the mapping system and help direct 
inspection efforts to a particular area. These factors are discussed further under 
recommendations for Geocortex.  
5.3.5 Specifically document outbreak investigations  
Each cluster/ outbreak should be specifically recorded along with all risk assessment 
and sampling information for the incident. Such records would provide useful data for 
later analysis, as well as good documentation for legal review in relation to outbreaks. 
The single record would provide a mechanism for keeping track of which sites have 
been sampled, which have been disinfected and when these interventions were 
performed. As previously discussed, using the PHESS database to store case 
investigation data would address this recommendation.  
5.3.6 Add a field for PHESS case ID to the form to notify CDPC of a Legionella 
detection 
This will assist the Disease Surveillance System to keep complete records of 
Legionella detections in the PHESS database. Once the teams share a single 
database, this form may no longer be required. 
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Minor Recommendations for the Environmental Investigation System 
5.3.7 Develop a mechanism to keep track of cooling tower inspections during large or 
complex investigations, when routine data entry is often delayed  
The Geocortex mapping system could be leveraged for this purpose. When an 
outbreak is identified the CTS sites targeted for inspection could be retrieved from the 
Geocortex interface using the “buffer identify” function to retrieve all systems within a 
selected radius of the outbreak. Data can easily be exported into an excel spread-sheet 
or the cooling towers could be linked to the event in PHESS. As sites are inspected 
and samples collected the investigation coordinator could record inspection date 
directly into the spread-sheet (or into PHESS), along with the anticipated date for 
culture results. If a spread-sheet is used it could later be attached to the outbreak 
record in PHESS or filed in TRIM alongside an outbreak summary sheet. 
5.3.8 Introduce regular monitoring of data quality to improve data completeness.  
Consider a quarterly or bi-annual audit of 1-2 randomly selected case investigations 
and associated Case Summary Sheets/Emerald/TRIM records (or PHESS records, in 
future) to assess record completeness. Results should be made available to all LT 
members to raise awareness of the importance of complete record keeping. 
5.4 Recommendations for Geocortex 
Major recommendations for Geocortex 
5.4.1 Increase the sophistication of the approach to selecting cooling towers for 
inspection  
Geocortex is currently utilised to identify cooling towers for case-related investigations 
based on a simple spatial relationship - that is, the distance between cooling towers 
and selected case exposure sites. However, Geocortex has potential to introduce more 
complex and useful analysis to aid in cooling tower risk assessment and sample site 
selection. These include consideration of Legionella detection history for cooling tower 
systems, and the development of spatial clustering algorithms able to detect 
statistically significant clustering of disease to identify areas for targeted inspections. 
History of Legionella detection: Currently, the Geocortex mapping system includes a 
field showing the most recent Legionella test result for each cooling tower. However 
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this information is currently of limited utility because a) it only shows results for sites 
inspected by the Legionella team; and b) it only displays the most recent test result. 
When Legionella is detected, disinfection is performed and a repeat sample collected 
every seven-ten days until the sample result is negative. Therefore if Legionella is 
detected the field only reflects this for a short period.  
These problems could be overcome by a small adjustment to the current systems. 
Victorian cooling tower operators are required to test for Legionella at least every three 
months under the Victorian Public Health and Wellbeing Regulations 2009 (30) but are 
not required to notify the Department unless Legionella is detected in three consecutive 
tests. The annual auditors could be leveraged to capture whether Legionella had been 
detected during routine CTS monitoring each year. This would involve the addition of a 
simple field to the current audit report (Legionella detected this year: yes/no). The 
cooling tower database would require a small modification to capture this information, 
which could then be transmitted to Geocortex. Geocortex could include such fields as 
“Legionella ever detected: yes/no” and “Date of most recent Legionella detection”. This 
would provide a means to prioritise cooling towers with a history of Legionella detection 
during case or cluster investigations. 
Spatial clustering algorithms: Selection of cooling towers for disinfection and sampling 
may be further aided by the use of a spatial clustering analysis. A recent New Zealand 
study used a sophisticated spatial analysis to identify the likely geographic source of a 
large urban legionellosis cluster of 19 cases (53). A similar system could be developed 
as an automated workflow in Geocortex. For example a workflow could utilise a local 
Moran’s I spatial autocorrelation test statistic (53, 54) or other spatial analysis to 
examine clustering of cases routinely. The local Moran’s generates a test statistic (P 
value) measuring the likelihood that clustering of features (eg. cases) has occurred 
through chance alone. Cooling towers in areas associated with spatial clustering could 
then be targeted as part of routine regulatory activities. Note that any spatial analysis 
must take into account the fact that a single case can have multiple exposure sites by 
only identifying clustering of ‘unique identifiers’. The system must also include an 
adjustment for “foot traffic” density. 
5.4.2 Adapt the automated workflow to search within the 2 year data table  
To ensure all relevant cases are considered during the search for shared exposure 
sites, the workflow should be reworked to search within the 2 year data table rather 
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than the 90 day data table, and adjusted to provide the capacity to search within a 
chosen onset date range, ie. cases with an onset date +/- 90 days from the onset date 
(not event date) from  the case of interest. 
5.4.3 Provide applied training in the use of the mapping system to staff in CDPC, 
CDES and LT 
This training should include senior Public Health Officers and the Legionella 
Epidemiologist. Consider developing a structured training workshop in collaboration 
with key stakeholders, specific to the needs of both PHOs and Environmental Health 
Officers.  
For the Disease Surveillance System stakeholders, training should include information 
on how data is transported to the maps, and requirements for accurate mapping. 
Minor Recommendations for Geocortex 
5.4.4 Highlight each cluster and outbreak in the workflow output 
To minimise the risk of error, tailor the workflow output to provide some form of alert 
where outbreaks or clusters are identified. For cases involved in more than one 
outbreak/cluster, aim to highlight each event separately. 
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Appendix 2. Example of an Incident Response Report (IRR) 
Risk classification1 Public health officer Incident update PHESS reference 
Confirmed Jay Healy Tel. 1300 651160 ***Update** 320142219050 
Incident details 
Incident date/time 17-Jun-2014 (reported to DH) 
Reported by VIDRL   (on: 17 June 2014) 
Initial classification 
Event classification Confirmed 
Organism identified Legionella pneumophila 1 
Case details 
Demographics Male   Birth date. 07-Aug-1964   ATSI. Not Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander 
Residence 213 Melrose drive  Tullamarine VIC 3043 
Work Employed Truck Drivers 
Toll Tasmania — 180-210 Williamstown Road  Port Melbourne   VIC   3207   
NORTHERN AND WESTERN METROPOLITAN — Melbourne (C) 
Melway. 56F3  --  Coord. -37.83926, 144.91142   (100) 
Private 
Onset of illness 07-Jun-2014 
Incubation period 28-May-2014 – 05-Jun-2014 
Diagnosis method Urinary Antigen 
Clinical presentation Fevers and lethargy from 7 June. Admitted to Austin Hospital on 10 June with 
ongoing fever, dry cough, shortness of breath, headache and extreme lethargy 
Predisposing 
conditions 
Chronic disease=No  
Immunocompromised=No  
Smoker=Current smoker 
Drinks alcohol=2-3 times per week 
Linked cases 3003 – None within 500 metres 
3012 – 320142214645 – attended FBT Transwest on 5-6 May. Site 600 metres from 
Knauf Brooklyn where current case attended on 3 June 
3018 – 320142214645 – attended McColls Transport from 29 April – 9 May. Site is 1 
km away from DHL Altona where current case attended on 29-30 May 
3020 – None within 500 metres 
3043 – Cluster identified – PHESS 320142210192. Attended Gladstone Park 
Hotel on 7 April – within 500 metres of Gladstone Park Shopping Centre which 
case attended sometime during incubation period (28 May – 05 June) 
3061 – None within 500 metres 
                                               
1 Further information on incident management is available in "Health Protection Branch Incident reporting instruction —
2012" and "Communicable Disease Incidents—Emergency/Incident Report Distribution Checklist." 
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3171 - None 
3207 – Possible Outbreak – PHESS 320142218242 who worked at Webb Dock on 
21 May, 27 May and 30 May. Current case is based at Webb Dock 
3218 – None 
Actions and comments 
Case is employed as a Truck Driver based at Webb Dock, Port Melbourne. Works Monday – Saturdays 
and drives to multiple sites. PHO has requested work run sheet from employer. 
Cluster identified with PHESS 320142210192 – LP1 – Pascoe Vale who attended Gladstone Park Hotel 
on 7 April 
Possible Outbreak identified with PHESS 320142218242 who worked at Webb Dock on 21 May, 27 May 
and 30 May. Current case is based at Webb Dock. Further information regarding the first case and their exact 
exposures sites is being sought. 
Exposure sites 
Site  Street1  
 
Street2  
 
City  
 
Postcode  
 
Confidence  
 
Exposure 
type  
 
From  
 
To  
 
Notes  
 
** exposure sites (n=20) have been removed to protect privacy * 
xxxx 
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Appendix 3. Example of a RIEMS notification 
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Appendix 4. Example Case Summary Sheet 
Legionella Team Action 
Incident Name : RIEMS No. Leading Officer Update No. 
Are there any cooling towers within 500m of the home? Y  N  
Cooling Towers that have been sampled and disinfected 
SID-CTS/Address Date Sampled Date Disinfected Results Date Resolved/Comments 
     
Are there any cooling towers at the workplace Y  N  
Cooling Towers that have been sampled and disinfected 
SID-CTS/Address Date Sampled Date Disinfected Results Date Resolved/Comments 
     
Have any other sites been inspected in response to case?  Y  N  
SID-CTS/Address Date Sampled Date Disinfected Results Date Resolved/Comments 
     
Any further samples taken? Y  N  
Details: 
Follow up action required  Y  N  
Details: 
Has this case been checked against possible linked cases Y  N  
DHHS Contacts Stuart Adcock X65028 
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Appendix 5. Example of an Emerald cooling tower inspection record 
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Appendix 6. Stakeholders interviewed for the evaluation 
Position Stakeholder 
Legionella Team 
Team Leader Stuart Adcock 
Environmental Health Officer Awnit Kumar 
Environmental Health Officer Caillean Michael 
Environmental Health Officer Zena Maalaki 
Environmental Health Officer Catherine Donoghue 
Environmental Health Officer Prabhaker Gaware 
Environmental Health Officer Lachland Chapman 
Manager, Environmental Health Regulation and 
Compliance 
Noel Cleaves 
Database Manager Ben Mudie 
CDCP 
 Public Health Officer Jay Healy 
Public Health Officer Jess Encena 
Public Health Officer Shaun Coutts 
Public Health Officer Frances Tiplady 
Senior Public Health Officer Nectaria Tzimourtis 
Manager, CDPC Philip Clift 
OCHO   
Medical Advisor Brett Sutton 
CDES   
Legionella Epidemiologist Lucinda Franklin 
Database Manager Trevor Lauler 
GIS and Planning 
 Database Administer Clare Brazenor 
  
Chapter 2. Appendices 
119 
 
Appendix 7. Cases reviewed for the case audit 
PHESS ID Event date  Organism Classification Cluster/ outbreak 
Environ
mental 
investiga
tion 
Number of 
cooling 
towers 
inspected 
Other sites 
inspected 
Legionella 
detected? 
320142219050 17/06/2014 L. pneumophila 1 confirmed 
outbreak  
and 
cluster 
yes 11 spa yes 
320142220384 23/06/2014 L. pneumophila 1 confirmed no yes 1 no no 
320142220725 23/06/2014 L. pneumophila 1 confirmed cluster yes 0 car wash no 
320142222195 2/07/2014 L. pneumophila 1 confirmed cluster yes 2 no no 
320142255195 10/12/2014 L. pneumophila 1 confirmed no yes 11 no no 
320152266412 6/02/2015 Legionella confirmed no yes 0 humidifier yes 
320142221037 24/06/2014 L. pneumophila 1 confirmed no no 0 no n/a 
320142221785 26/06/2014 L. pneumophila 1 confirmed no no 0 no n/a 
320142224372 7/07/2014 L. pneumophila 1 confirmed no no 0 no n/a 
320142247570 6/11/2014 L. pneumophila   probable no no 0 no n/a 
320142248538 11/11/2014 L. longbeachae probable no no 0 no n/a 
320142257251 19/12/2014 Legionella confirmed no no 0 no n/a 
320152272777 19/02/2015 L. pneumophila 1 confirmed no no 0 no n/a 
320152272992 20/02/2015 L. longbeachae confirmed no no 0 no n/a 
320152274977 3/03/2015 L. pneumophila 1 confirmed no no 0 no n/a 
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Preface 
Background to project 
Large scale whole genome sequencing (WGS) is becoming increasingly feasible and may 
soon be adopted for routine surveillance purposes in Australia. The unprecedented 
discriminatory power provided by WGS will revolutionise investigation of disease sources 
and transmission routes. However there is much to be learnt regarding the best way to 
record, use and interpret the massive amounts of data generated by WGS. 
In Victoria a single egg producer has been associated with recurrent Salmonella outbreaks 
dating back to 2004. Because sporadic cases are not followed up, the number of sporadic 
cases associated with the farm has remained unknown. This situation provided an ideal 
forum to explore the potential of WGS data, and gain an understanding of its strengths and 
limitations. 
This epidemiological project is the first application of large-scale WGS data in Victoria to 
investigate relationships amongst Salmonella isolates for surveillance purposes.  
My role 
I was the lead investigator in this project, although I was privileged to receive regular 
consultation and advice from a project team with Nicola Stephens and Marion Easton 
(DHHS). I also received invaluable support from Dieter Bulach (MDU) who provided WGS 
data in a usable format, tutored me in WGS theory, and guided me through the use of 
various software programs for tree visualisation.  
My role included: 
• Scoped the project and developed the research question and analysis plan, in 
consultation with Nicola Stephens and Marion Easton 
• Collated and analysed MLVA data provided by Karolina Dimovski and Mary Volcanis at 
the Microbial Diagnostic Unit (MDU). 
• Selected isolates for WGS with assistance from Marion Easton 
• Liaised with the Doherty Centre for Applied Microbial Genomics to arrange for 
sequencing of selected isolates, and monitored progress 
• Analysed WGS data provided by Glenn Carter, Dieter Bulach, Timothy Stinear, and 
Benjamin Howden at the Doherty Centre for Applied Microbial Genomics 
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• Developed tables and figures including the phylogenetic tree, in consultation with Nicola 
Stephens and Marion Easton 
• Lead author on an article for publication, with review of content by co-authors Karolina 
Dimovski, Mary Volcanis, Dieter Bulach, Glen Carter, Timothy P Stinear, Nicola 
Stephens, Martyn D. Kirk, Benjamin P Howden and Marion Easton 
Lessons learnt  
When I commenced this project I knew little about WGS or MLVA. Through collaborating 
with MDU I learnt some basic technical aspects of public health genomics. To assist readers, 
a brief outline of technical aspects of Salmonella typing and WGS is included in the 
appendix. 
 I learnt there is a strong need for epidemiologists to engage with this new technology to 
shape its adoption and to ensure it is used and presented in a relevant way.  
Once again, I learnt the value of collaboration between professionals with different skills in 
public health, including (in this case), microbiologists, bioinformaticians, veterinarians, and 
epidemiologists.   
I learnt that new technologies can be overwhelming and human resource skills take time to 
catch up.  
And, not surprisingly, I learnt that the burden of disease due to recurrent outbreak sources is 
likely to be substantially greater than cases identified in outbreaks. 
Public Health Implications 
The project led to valuable collaboration and exchange of skills and knowledge between 
DHHS and MDU. The skills and knowledge gained will help shape the adoption of WGS for 
surveillance purposes in Victoria, including a deeper understanding of the likely genetic 
diversity seen in point source outbreaks compared to recurrent outbreak sources. 
In addition, the findings provide support to the hypothesis that, when traced to a recurrent 
source, outbreaks likely form ‘the tip of the iceberg’. This highlights the need for 
comprehensive trace-back and public health action during outbreaks. 
Project outputs 
Project outputs include the following: 
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• Inclusion as a chapter in the Bound Volume submission for the Master of Philosophy 
in Applied Epidemiology 
• Publication in a peer-reviewed journal. The late draft for peer reviewed publication 
makes up the body of this chapter. 
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Abstract 
The number of sporadic salmonellosis cases attributable to outbreak sources is often 
unknown. We used multilocus variable-number tandem-repeat analysis (MLVA) and whole 
genome sequencing to estimate the number of sporadic isolates related to an outbreak 
source. We categorised S. Typhimurium Phage type 9 isolates from 2009-2015 according to 
MLVA then sequenced 99 isolates from a single outbreak source, 161 sporadic isolates, and 
41 from other outbreaks. We tabulated SNPs between sporadic isolates and those from the 
outbreak source according to MLVA. We then estimated the total number of sporadic cases 
potentially attributable to the outbreak source for each MLVA level. We estimate 72 of 1585 
sporadic isolates between July 2009-June 2014 were within 5 SNPs, and almost 400 were 
within 20 SNPs of the predominant outbreak clade. Sporadic salmonellosis potentially 
attributable to the outbreak source eclipsed cases identified in outbreak investigations, 
highlighting a pressing need for trace back and intervention. 
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Background 
Salmonellosis is a global public health problem often associated with consumption of 
contaminated food (1). Identifying sources of infection provides opportunity for public health 
intervention. Salmonella Typhimurium is the most common serotype in Australia, accounting 
for almost half of salmonellosis cases notified during 2011 (2). The majority of Australian 
jurisdictions use phage typing or multilocus variable-number tandem-repeat analysis (MLVA) 
(3, 4) or both to further type S. typhimurium isolates. MLVA uses the observed variation in 
the number of short tandem repeats at five loci; identical or highly similar patterns of repeats 
between isolates usually correlate with a close genetic relationship (5-12). 
In Victoria, one of  eight Australian states and territories, public health investigation occurs 
when salmonellosis notification identifies a potential source, an epidemiological link between 
cases, or spatiotemporal clustering. Other cases are considered ‘sporadic’ and trigger little 
or no investigation due to resource limitations and challenges in identifying a shared source 
using current typing (13). Because the source of infection remains unknown for the majority 
of cases ongoing sources of contamination may remain undetected, representing a missed 
opportunity for public health intervention. 
Improved isolate discrimination can be achieved using whole genome sequencing (WGS) 
comparison of isolates (14-16). WGS has better discriminatory ability than Victoria’s current 
typing standard, MLVA (16) and is sufficiently discriminatory to trigger investigation of 
genetically similar cases without an identified epidemiological link (17).  
This discriminatory power means WGS can detect clusters not identified by traditional 
subtyping methods and is useful for attributing ‘sporadic’ isolates to recognised outbreaks 
(18, 19).  
Large scale Salmonella WGS as a public health surveillance tool is increasingly cost 
effective and technically feasible (20-22); all Salmonella clinical isolates in the UK (23, 24) 
and a majority of food isolates across the USA (25) are now routinely sequenced. Australian 
laboratories have been exploring WGS to better define the nature of Salmonella outbreaks. 
In February 2014 eight point source outbreaks of S. Typhimurium Phage type 9 at different 
food establishments, accounting for 303 confirmed and probable cases, were 
epidemiologically linked to a Victorian egg producer, Farm A. Farm A had been 
epidemiologically linked to five other S. Typhimurium Phage type 9 outbreaks since 2004 
(one in 2004; two in 2005, and two in 2010) and an additional outbreak occurred in February 
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2015. Ongoing contamination of the farm, and therefore ongoing or intermittent 
contamination of eggs, is suggested by the persistence of a predominant MLVA pattern in 
outbreak isolates during 2004-2014. S. Typhimurium Phage type 9 is one of the top three 
notified Phage types in Victoria, but sources are usually only identified for outbreak 
associated cases. The number of sporadic cases associated with Farm A remains unknown. 
We examined MLVA and WGS data for a sample of S. Typhimurium Phage type 9 isolates 
and estimated the number of clinical isolates not identified to be associated with an outbreak 
that were genetically related to Farm A over a five year period.  
Methods 
Briefly, we examined MLVA patterns for all S. Typhimurium Phage type 9 isolates submitted 
to Victoria’s Salmonella reference laboratory during July 2009 – June 2015 (the initial study 
period). We identified the predominant MLVA pattern in Farm A associated isolates and 
categorised other isolates into MLVA levels according to variation from this predominant 
pattern. Next, we sequenced  clinical isolates not known to be associated with outbreaks 
(sporadic isolates)  clinical isolates from outbreaks associated with Farm A (Farm A 
isolates); and clinical isolates from cases linked to outbreaks with no known association with 
Farm A. We assessed WGS relatedness between Farm A associated and sporadic isolates, 
then examined the proportion of sequenced isolates in each MLVA level that were 
genetically similar to the dominant Farm A clade to estimate the number of sporadic isolates 
likely to be similarly related. These steps are represented in Figure 1, and further described 
below. 
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Figure 1. Study methods 
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Epidemiological Investigations 
All salmonellosis cases in Victoria are reported to the Department of Health and Human 
Services (DHHS) by doctors and laboratories under public health legislation. Epidemiological 
investigation is undertaken using standard disease investigation questionnaires if two or 
more cases are epidemiologically linked, a clinician nominates a suspected food source, or 
where spatiotemporal clustering is identified. The majority of other cases are considered 
sporadic, and not routinely investigated.  
Bacterial Isolates 
Primary laboratories in Victoria voluntarily forward Salmonella clinical isolates to the 
Microbiological Diagnostic Unit Public Health Laboratory (MDU PHL) for further typing. 
Virtually all isolates for the state are forwarded to MDU PHL. Salmonella isolates received at 
MDU PHL are serotyped (26) and Phage typed (27) according to published methods. 
Isolates received after 1 July 2014 have routinely been further typed using MLVA according 
to standard methods (28). Stored isolates received between 1 July 2009 and 30 June 2014 
underwent retrospective MLVA analysis using the same method. 
Establishing MLVA levels 
We examined MLVA patterns for all S. Typhimurium Phage type 9 isolates submitted to the 
MDU PHL culture collection during the initial study period, and categorised isolates into 
MLVA levels. MLVA levels were determined by the number of repeat difference variations at 
each loci relative to the predominant Farm A pattern, as follows:  
Level 1: Patterns indistinguishable from the predominant Farm A pattern (2-22-12-10-0212); 
Level 2: Differ at one of the three central loci (ie STTR5, STTR6, or STTR10pl) by one or two 
repeat differences;  
Level 3: Differ at two of the three central loci by one or two repeats; 
Level 4: Differ at one of the three central loci by three or more repeats;  
Level 5: Differ at two of the three central loci including three or more repeats at one of these 
loci; 
Level 6: Unrelated to the predominant pattern by MLVA, ie any number of repeat differences 
at all three central loci or at one of the outer loci (ie STTR 9 or STTR3).  
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Isolate selection for WGS  
Ninety-nine clinical isolates from 11 Farm A-associated outbreaks were selected for WGS. 
All available isolates were sequenced for 10 outbreaks (n=69); for the eleventh outbreak 
(associated with 116 isolates) 30 isolates were randomly selected.  
One hundred and sixty one sporadic isolates with no known Farm A association were 
selected using a stratified sampling approach based on MLVA level. This included 45 
isolates from MLVA level 1; 22 each from levels 2 and 3; 21 from level 4 and 25 from level 6. 
In addition, 41 isolates from outbreaks with no known Farm A association were randomly 
selected (regardless of MLVA pattern) to ensure the complete S. Typhimurium population 
structure was represented.  
Whole genome sequencing 
WGS of purified isolate DNA was performed on the Illumina NextSeq platform using Nextera 
XT libraries and protocols (Illumina, San Diego, California, USA). Raw sequence data has 
been uploaded to the European Nucleotide Archive (ENA) under the study accession 
PRJEB12216. 
Read Sequence Quality 
An initial quality check and filtering step was performed on each of the Illumina WGS read 
sets. Skewer (29) was used to remove Illumina Nextera adapters and low-quality sequence 
(Phred score <10). Kraken (30) was used to infer a taxonomic classification for each read 
and check for contamination.  
Core Genome Comparisons 
Filtered read sets were mapped to the reference genome Salmonella enterica subsp. 
enterica serovar Typhimurium strain LT2 (accessions: NC_003197 [chromosome] and 
NC_003277 plasmid pSLT]) and single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs) called using 
Snippy v2.5 (https://github.com/tseemann/snippy), requiring a minimum base quality of 20, 
minimum read coverage of 10x and 90% read concordance at a given nucleotide position for 
a variant to be reported. Those positions in the reference genome that were covered by at 
least one read from each and every genome defined a core genome (31).  Snippy v2.5 was 
also used to construct a core genome multiple alignment file and this was the input for 
inferring phylogenetic relationships among isolates using FastTree (32). Bootstrapping was 
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performed by feeding 1000 resampled core genome alignments generated in Seqboot v3.69 
(http://evolution.genetics.washington.edu/phylip/doc/seqboot.html) into FastTree using the –
n option. The resulting core genome phylogeny was viewed alongside relevant data for each 
taxon using the Interactive Tree of Life (33). Core genome pairwise SNP distances were 
additionally analysed using a custom R script (https://github.com/MDU-
PHL/pairwise_snp_differences) (34) and STATA (35).  
To understand the extent of genetic variability within and between S. Typhimurium Phage 
type 9 outbreaks in our local context, pairwise SNPs comparisons were made for all groups 
of outbreak isolates in the dataset. To explore variability arising between Farm A associated 
isolates over time, we examined pairwise SNP differences between Farm A associated 
isolates collected in 2010 against those collected in 2014. To examine the relatedness of 
sequenced isolates to isolates associated with Farm A, we identified a dominant clade of 
Farm A isolates (separated by 0 SNPs) and examined SNP differences between sequenced 
sporadic isolates and this dominant Farm A clade. We tabulated the number and percent of 
sequenced isolates within each SNP category according to MLVA level producing MLVA-
SNP categories. 
Estimating the number of historical isolates related to Farm A 
Next, we estimated the total number of sporadic isolates expected within each MLVA-SNP 
category. For each MLVA level we assumed the percentage of sequenced isolates in a given 
SNP category approximated the percentage of historic isolates from that MLVA level that 
would also fall in this SNP category. Therefore, for each MLVA level we multiplied the 
percentage of sequenced sporadic isolates in each SNP category by the total number of 
sporadic isolates in that MLVA level, to estimate the total number of isolates from the MLVA 
level expected in each SNP category. We calculated ninety-five percent confidence intervals 
in STATA (35) using confidence intervals for a proportion. 
Results 
We found that over 50 sporadic isolates are like to have indistinguishable core genomes, 
and almost 400 are likely within 20 SNPs of the dominant Farm A clade.  
Epidemiological Investigations 
Eleven outbreaks associated with consumption of raw or runny eggs were epidemiologically 
linked to Farm A during the initial study period (two during 2010, eight during 2014, and one 
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during 2015). These outbreaks accounted for 340 cases (187 laboratory confirmed) and 
were all associated with foods prepared in restaurants.  
Table 1. Summary of epidemiological investigations for outbreaks associated with 
Farm A during the initial study period 
Outbreak 
code Year Month 
No. isolates  
(No. cases) 
Predominant 
MLVA* 
% Isolates 
with 
predominant 
MLVA 
Suspected 
source (eggs 
from Farm A) 
Environmental 
microbiology 
Farm A 
Outbreak 1 2010 Jan 3 (13) 2-22-12-10-0212 100% Raw egg dish 
Salmonella not 
detected 
Farm A 
Outbreak 2 2010 Feb 4 (8) 2-22-12-10-0212 100% 
Scrambled 
eggs 
Salmonella not 
detected 
Farm A 
Outbreak 3 2014 
Jan - 
Feb 6 (6) 2-22-12-10-0212 83% 
Poached and 
scrambled 
eggs 
Salmonella not 
detected 
Farm A 
Outbreak 4 2014 Jan 3 (3) 2-22-12-9-0212 100% Runny eggs 
Samples not 
obtained 
Farm A 
Outbreak 5 2014 Feb 116 (242) 
2-22-12-10-0212 
97% Mayonnaise 
Salmonella 
Typhimurium 9 
isolated from 
mayonnaise 
spoon. 
Farm A 
Outbreak 6 2014 Feb 3 (3) 2-22-12-10-0212 100% Aioli 
Salmonella not 
detected 
Farm A 
Outbreak 7 2014 Feb 2 (2) 2-22-12-10-0212 100% French Toast 
Samples not 
obtained 
Farm A 
Outbreak 8 2014 Feb 13 (13) 2-22-12-10-0212 100% 
Scrambled 
eggs 
Samples not 
obtained 
Farm A 
Outbreak 9 2014 Feb 12 (14) 2-22-12-10-0212 100% 
Scrambled 
eggs,  French 
toast, and 
hollandaise 
sauce 
Salmonella 
Typhimurium 9 
isolated from 
Hollandaise sauce 
Farm A 
Outbreak 10 2014 Feb 11 (20) 2-22-12-10-0212 100% 
Menu includes 
aioli containing 
raw eggs 
(eggs from 
Farm A) 
Salmonella not 
detected 
Farm A 
Outbreak 11                                                                                                          2015 Feb 13 (16) 2-22-15-10-0212 85% 
Chicken and 
mayonnaise 
mix (eggs from 
Farm A) 
Salmonella 
Typhimurium 9 
isolated from 
chicken and 
mayonnaise mix 
* MLVA, multilocus variable-number tandem-repeat analysis. MLVA patterns provided using European nomenclature. See 
Supplementary table S1 for Australian nomenclature 
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MLVA Analysis 
MLVA results were available for 1655 sporadic S. Typhimurium Phage type 9 isolates during 
the initial study period. Prior to 2015, the majority of isolates associated with Farm A shared 
the MLVA pattern 2-22-12-10-0212. Outbreak 4 was the only exception; the predominant 
MLVA pattern amongst clinical isolates was 2-22-12-9-0212 (differing by one repeat). During 
the 2015 Farm A associated outbreak (Outbreak 11) most isolates had an MLVA type of 2-
22-15-10-0212, differing from previous outbreaks by three repeats at the STTR6 locus. The 
predominant MLVA pattern for each Farm A associated outbreak was detailed in Table 1.  
MLVA results for sporadic clinical isolates received during the initial study period are 
summarised according to MLVA level in Table 2. There were 225 unique patterns, with 20 
accounting for more than 1% of isolates. The predominant Farm A pattern accounted for 
12% of all sporadic isolates. Overall, 14% of MLVA patterns differed from the predominant 
Farm A pattern by one or two repeat difference at one locus, and 8% differed by one or two 
repeats at two central loci.   
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Table 2.  MLVA* level classification of S. Typhimurium 9 isolates, July 2009-June 2015 
MLVA level†  MLVA   All sporadic isolates (n=1655)   
Sequenced sporadic 
isolates (n=161) 
     No. %  No. % 
Level 1 2-22-12-10-0212   198 12   45 28 
Level 2 2-22-12-09-0212  94 6  14 9 
 2-20-12-10-0212  42 3  0 0 
 2-22-13-10-0212  31 2  3 2 
 2-23-12-10-0212  27 2  0 0 
 2-21-12-10-0212  25 2  0 0 
 Other (<1%; n=5)  19 1  7 4 
Level 2 subtotal     238 14   24 15 
Level 3 2-20-14-10-0212  24 1  2 1 
 Other (<1%, n=27)  115 7  20 12 
Level 3 subtotal    139 8   22 14 
Level 4 Other (<1%; n=11)   31 2   22 14 
Level 5 2-22-23-09-0212  53 3  10 6 
 2-25-15-10-0212  44 3  6 4 
 Other (<1%, n=50)  88 11  7 4 
Level 5 subtotal     185 17   23 14 
Level 6 2-24-15-11-0212  105 6  1 1 
 2-10-15-11-0212  103 6  6 4 
 2-10-14-11-0212  86 5  4 2 
 2-08-13-10-0212  60 4  0 0 
 2-08-14-10-0212  40 2  0 0 
 2-24-14-11-0212  35 2  0 0 
 2-23-24-09-0212  33 2  0 0 
           2-23-23-09-0212  31 2  1 1 
 2-20-11-12-0212  29 2  3 2 
 2-08-12-10-0212  18 1  0 0 
 2-09-12-10-0212  18 1  1 1 
 Other (<1%; n=117)  306 18  9 6 
Level 6 subtotal     864 52   25 16 
* MLVA: multilocus variable-number tandem-repeat analysis 
† Level 1: indistinguishable from the predominant Farm A pattern; Level 2: one central loci differs by 1-2 repeat 
differences; Level 3: two central loci differ by 1-2 repeat differences; Level 4: one central loci differs by 3 or 
more repeat differences; Level 5: two central loci differ and at least one differs by 3 or more repeat differences; 
Level 6 unrelated. 
Analysis of WGS data 
Mapping whole genome sequence reads from each of the 301 clinical isolates to the S. 
Typhimurium strain LT2 reference genome defined a 4473834 base pair (bp) core genome, 
spanning 90% of the 4951371 bp reference chromosome. Pairwise comparisons of SNPs 
among the 301 isolates revealed only 2193 variable nucleotide positions. All isolates differed 
by less than 200 SNPs and were between 662-7732 SNPs different to the S. Typhimurium 
strain LT2 reference genome sequence, apart from one outlier (MLVA 2-22-15-10-0212) that 
differed by up to 672 SNPs from the other isolates. Repeat wet lab analysis confirmed the 
Phage type and MLVA profile for this isolate. 
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Phylogenetic analysis reveals temporal clustering of Farm A isolates  
The high-resolution phylogenetic relationship inferred among the isolates from the core 
genome alignment is presented in Figure 2. Farm A associated isolates clustered in three 
temporal groups aligned with epidemiologically confirmed outbreaks, including a clade 
featuring isolates from 2009/10 and 2010/11, one from 2013/14, and one from 2014/15 
(Figure 2).  
All Farm A associated clades include sporadic isolates, and one includes outbreak isolates 
with no identified Farm A association. Two such outbreak isolates from January 2014 were 
within five SNPS of the dominant Farm A clade. These two cases shared a variety of raw 
and runny egg exposures including foods purchased outside the home. The Salmonella 
source was not identified, but this finding suggests a likely association with Farm A. 
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Figure 2. Phylogenomic relationships and MLVA patterns for Farm A and other 
isolates, July 2009-June 2015 Phylogenomic relationships between sequenced isolates are shown alongside key 
attributes. Attributes include: SNPs (single nucleotide polymorphisms) relative to the dominant Farm A clade (attribute column 
1); MLVA level (multilocus variable-number tandem-repeat analysis variation from the Farm A pattern, defined below) (attribute 
column 2), and epidemiological details (Farm A outbreak, other outbreak, or sporadic) (attribute column 3). Branch colors show 
financial year at the time of sample collection. Grey circles denote branches with bootstrap values above 70%. The dominant 
Farm A clade is boxed, and features isolates separated by zero SNPs difference. Branch lengths are transformed and not to 
scale. Three ‘Farm A associated clades’ include both Farm A associated isolates and ‘sporadic’ isolates from similar points in 
time.  
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SNP differences  
SNP differences within outbreaks are illustrated in Figure 3. Two Farm A outbreaks had a 
maximum of nine and 11 SNPs respectively, while nine were characterised by five or fewer 
SNPs. One non-Farm A outbreak exhibited 30 SNPs, three featured seven to 15 SNPs and 
seven outbreaks exhibited five or fewer SNPs. The outbreak with 30 SNPs was a point 
source outbreak of seven cases who all reported consuming Eggs Benedict at a single 
restaurant.  
Figure 3. Single nucleotide polymorphism differences observed in outbreaks for Farm 
A outbreaks and those from outbreaks with no identified Farm A association 
 
As shown in Figure 4, SNP differences between sporadic sequenced isolates and the 
dominant Farm A clade followed a bimodal distribution, with most isolates presenting less 
than 40 or 80-100 SNPs from the dominant clade. 
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Figure 4. Frequency of single nucleotide polymorphism differences amongst sporadic 
sequenced isolates, relative to the dominant Farm A clade 
 
Figure 5 presents SNP differences between Farm A associated isolates from 2010 relative to 
2014 isolates. The median difference between isolates from the two years (17 SNPs, range 
14 to 28) is substantially larger than that within 2010 isolates (1 SNP), or 2014 isolates (0 
SNPs), reflecting evolutionary change in the source population. 
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Figure 5. Frequency of single nucleotide polymorphism differences in pairwise 
comparisons between 2010 vs 2014 Farm A isolates 
 
Estimated number of sporadic isolates in each SNP category 
SNP differences between sequenced sporadic isolates and the main Farm A clade for the 
period July 2009-June 2014 (the estimation study period) are categorised in Table 3 
according to MLVA level. The estimated number of historic sporadic isolates in each MLVA-
SNP category is also presented. Calculations are provided in the column headers. Isolates 
from 2015 were excluded from calculations because a change in predominant Farm A MLVA 
pattern meant isolate selection utilising defined MLVA levels would not select Farm A 
isolates in a representative way.  
During the estimation study period, over one fifth of all sequenced isolates from MLVA level 
1 and one in twenty from level 2 had core genomes indistinguishable from the dominant 
Farm A clade. Therefore we estimated over one fifth of all historical isolates from MLVA level 
1 and one in twenty from MLVA level 2 may also be genetically indistinguishable. Overall we 
estimate 55 of 1585 historical isolates may have indistinguishable core genomes, 72 may fall 
within 5 SNPs, and almost 400 may be within 20 SNPs of the predominant Farm A clade, 
substantially more than the 174 lab confirmed cases known to be associated with Farm A 
during the period. 
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Table 3. Estimates of the pairwise core genome SNP* differences between the typical 
Farm A clade isolates and isolates at varying MLVA levels† amongst sporadic 
Salmonella Typhimurium Phage type 9 isolates, July 2009-June 2014 (n=1585) 
SNP* 
difference 
from 
dominant 
FarmA clade 
MLVA 
Level† 
Sequenced 
isolates in 
MLVA level  
Sequenced isolates in 
MLVA-SNP category  
Total 
sporadic 
isolates 
in MLVA 
level 
 
Estimated sporadic 
isolates  in MLVA-
SNP category 
  
  
No  No % 
95% CI 
(%)‡  No  No 95% CI 
  
  
s  n 
p 
[=(n/s)x100] (d, e)  t  (p/100)*t 
((d/100)*t, 
(e/100)*t) 
0 SNPs 
Level 
1 45  10 22 (12, 37)  195  43 (23, 72) 
Level 
2 22  1 5 (1, 30)  230  10 (1, 69) 
Level 
3 22  0 0   128  0 (0, 0) 
Level 
4 21  1 5 (1, 31)  28  1 (0, 9) 
Level 
5 23  0 0   181  0 (0, 0) 
Level 
6 25  0 0   823  0 (0, 0) 
0 SNPs subtotal 
          55 (25, 150) 
Cumulative total 
          55 (25, 150) 
1-5 SNPs 
Level 
1 45  4 9 (3, 22)  195  17 (6, 43) 
Level 
2 22  0 0   230  0 (0, 0) 
Level 
3 22  0 0   128  0 (0, 0) 
Level 
4 21  0 0   28  0 (0, 0) 
Level 
5 23  0 0   181  0 (0, 0) 
Level 
6 25  0 0   823  0 (0, 0) 
1-5 SNPs subtotal 
          17 (6, 43) 
Cumulative total 
          72 (31, 193) 
6-10 SNPs 
Level 
1 45  9 20 (10, 35)  195  39 (20, 68) 
Level 
2 22  1 5 (1, 30)  230  12 (2, 69) 
Level 
3 22  0 0   128  0 (0, 0) 
Level 
4 21  2 10 (2, 34)  28  3 (1, 10) 
Level 
5 23  0 0   181  0 (0, 0) 
Level 
6 25  0 0   823  0 (0, 0) 
6-10 SNPs subtotal 
          53 (22, 147) 
Cumulative total 
          126 (53, 340) 
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Table 3. continued 
11-20 SNPs 
Level 
1 45  19 42 (28, 57)  195  82 (55, 111) 
Level 
2 22  11 50 (29, 71)  230  115 (67, 163) 
Level 
3 22  12 55 (33, 75)  128  70 (42, 96) 
Level 
4 21  4 19 (7, 44)  28  5 (2, 12) 
Level 
5 23  0 0 (0, 0)  181  0 (0, 0) 
Level 
6 25  0 0   823  0 (0, 0) 
11-20 SNPs subtotal 
          272 (166, 383) 
Cumulative total 
          398 (219, 722) 
21-30 SNPs 
Level 
1 45  2 4 (1, 2)  195  9 (2, 4) 
Level 
2 22  7 32 (15, 55)  230  73 (35, 127) 
Level 
3 22  1 5 (1, 30)  128  6 (1, 38) 
Level 
4 21  0 0   28  0 (0, 0) 
Level 
5 23  0 0   181  0 (0, 0) 
Level 
6 25  1 4 (0, 26)  823  33 (0, 214) 
21-30 SNPs subtotal 
          120 (38, 383) 
Cumulative total 
          518 (256, 1105) 
31-50 SNPs 
Level 1 45  0 0 (0, 0)  195  0 (0, 0) 
Level 2 22  1 5 (1, 30)  230  10 (2, 69) 
Level 3 22  5 23 (9, 46)  128  29 (12, 59) 
Level 4 21  5 24   28  7 (3, 13) 
Level 5 23  3 13   181  24 (7, 65) 
Level 6 25  7 28 (13, 50)  823  230 (107, 412) 
31-50 SNPs subtotal 
          300 (131, 618) 
Cumulative total 
          818 (387, 1723) 
>51 SNPs 
Level 1 45  1 2 (0, 15)  195  4 (0, 29) 
Level 2 22  1 5 (1, 30)  230  10 (2, 69) 
Level 3 22  4 18 (6, 42)  128  23 (8, 54) 
Level 4 21  9 43   28  12 (6, 18) 
Level 5 23  20 87   181  157 (116, 174) 
Level 6 25  17 68 (46, 84)  823  560 (379, 691) 
>51 SNPs subtotal 
         767 (511, 1036) 
Cumulative total 
         1585 (898, 2759) 
* SNP single nucleotide polymorphism 
† MLVA: multilocus variable-number tandem repeat analysis level - Level 1: indistinguishable from the predominant Farm A pattern; 
Level 2: one central loci differs by 1-2 repeat differences; Level 3: two central loci differ by 1-2 repeat differences; Level 4: one central 
loci differs by 3 or more repeat differences; Level 5: two central loci differ and at least one differs by 3 or more repeat differences 
‡95% CI; 95% confidence interval, calculated using confidence interval for a proportion 
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Discussion 
We examined WGS and MLVA data for 301 S. Typhimurium Phage type 9 clinical isolates, 
calculated pairwise SNP differences between sporadic clinical isolates and a reference clade 
associated with a recurrent outbreak source, and estimated the number of sporadic isolates 
likely to be related to this dominant clade over a five year period. We found that over 50 
sporadic isolates may have had indistinguishable core genomes and almost 400 are likely 
within 20 SNPs of the clade indicating numerous ‘sporadic’ cases likely share a common 
source or reservoir. The estimated number of isolates within 20 SNPs eclipses the number 
of isolates with known epidemiological links to the outbreak source.  
Our finding that primary sources of Salmonella outbreaks may be associated with a 
substantial number of additional cases for whom epidemiological links are not currently 
recognised is consistent with previous studies. Octavia et al (36) observed a 107% increase 
in S. Typhimurium outbreak size when WGS was performed on sporadic isolates with 
indistinguishable MLVA notified within two weeks of the outbreaks. Similarly, den Bakker et 
al (19)  sequenced isolates with similar PFGE patterns received within three weeks of an S. 
Enteritidis outbreak. A distinct outbreak clade included seven identified outbreak cases, plus 
nine ‘sporadic’ isolates differing by no more than one SNP.  
Because there is uncertainty regarding SNP variation arising from a persistently 
contaminated source, we estimated numbers of isolates for a range of SNP differences from 
the dominant Farm A clade. Point source outbreaks of S. Typhimurium are frequently 
characterised by 5 or fewer SNPs (6, 24, 36). Thus, the 72 isolates estimated to be within 
five SNPs of the dominant clade are likely related to the outbreak source.  
At least some isolates with greater than five SNPs are also likely related to the outbreak 
source. Around one third of outbreaks we reviewed were characterised by over five SNP 
differences, including one with a maximum of 30 SNPs. The potential for genetic divergence 
in a source population (eg on a primary production property or feed supply) resulting in large 
SNPs between epidemiologically linked isolates has been recognised (19) and is consistent 
with a previous report documenting up to 30 SNPs in an outbreak of S. Typhimurium 
Definitive Type 12 (37). Single Nucleotide Polymorphisms within a single food borne 
outbreak may not reflect the diversity in the source population, because the majority of 
outbreak isolates arise from a small number of contaminating organisms (17). Where 
multiple outbreaks arise from a single source population this ‘bottleneck’ effect may be 
overcome because separate ‘bottlenecks’ contribute to each outbreak. 
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We documented up to 28 SNPs between isolates associated with Farm A collected four 
years apart. Other researchers have reported similar findings, for example 22 SNPs were 
observed between S. Typhimurium isolates linked to a single farm over a five year period 
(6), and 15 SNPs was identified between related S. Dublin isolates collected two years apart 
(38). The genetic diversity associated with the source population in this study is unknown. 
However, given Farm A has been linked to outbreaks with indistinguishable MLVA patterns 
for over ten years, a previously estimated rate of change for S. Typhimurium of 3-5 SNPs 
per year (39) suggests a difference of 30-50 SNPs may be reasonable.  
Distinguishing between linked isolates and background population is a vital step in outbreak 
investigations (24). Knowledge of the population structure through careful sampling of the 
background population is necessary for WGS to discriminate between outbreak-related and 
sporadic cases (14). We included sporadic isolates from a range of MLVA patterns as well 
as outbreaks with no identified Farm A association to document the population structure of 
S. Typhimurium Phage type 9. A shift in WGS observed in Farm A isolates during 2015 
coincided with enhanced control measures and perhaps increased evolutionary pressure at 
the farm, demonstrating the importance of supplementing WGS with epidemiological data.  
The study is limited by knowledge gaps regarding the genetic diversity of egg production 
sites in Victoria, and thus care must be taken in interpreting these findings. It is possible 
genetically similar isolates arose from other sites sharing a source of contamination with 
Farm A, such as parent stock or food supply. For example, two separate egg producers who 
shared a contaminated feed supply were both implicated in an outbreak of S. Enteritidis in 
the USA, leading to record egg recalls (15).  
We acknowledge that WGS data cannot be the sole basis for determining isolates originating 
from a common source (18), and epidemiological investigation to confirm such links is 
imperative to establish causation. Real-time WGS results that identify genetically similar 
isolates may soon be routinely available in Victoria. Increased discriminatory power will 
prompt increased recognition of potential outbreaks and better detection of outbreak 
associated cases, leading to increased public health follow up to confirm epidemiological 
links between isolates previously regarded as ‘sporadic’. Our findings suggest the burden of 
disease attributable to persistent sources will be demonstrably larger than cases observed in 
outbreaks, highlighting the need for comprehensive trace back and intervention at the 
primary production level.   
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Appendix 1. Supplementary Table 
S1. Australian and European nomenclature for MLVA patterns 
MLVA (European) MLVA (Australian) 
2-22-12-10-0212 03-24-13-11-523 
2-22-12-9-0212 03-24-13-10-523 
2-20-12-10-0212 03-22-13-11-523 
2-22-13-10-0212 03-24-14-11-523 
2-23-12-10-0212 03-25-13-11-523 
2-21-12-10-0212 03-23-13-11-523 
2-20-14-10-0212 03-22-15-11-523 
2-22-23-9-0212 03-24-24-10-523 
2-25-15-10-0212 03-27-16-11-523 
2-24-15-11-0212 03-26-16-12-523 
2-10-15-11-0212 03-12-16-12-523 
2-10-14-11-0212 03-12-15-12-523 
2-08-13-10-0212 03-10-14-11-496 
2-08-14-10-0212 03-10-15-11-496 
2-24-14-11-0212 03-26-15-12-523 
2-23-24-09-0212 03-25-25-10-523 
2-23-23-9-0212 03-25-24-10-523 
2-20-11-12-0212 03-22-12-13-523 
2-08-12-10-0212 03-10-13-11-496 
2-09-12-10-0212 03-11-13-11-496 
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Appendix 2. Technical Descriptions 
This appendix is provided as supplementary background information regarding 
Salmonella typing and whole genome sequencing.  
Traditional Typing Methods 
Traditional Salmonella typing includes (in order of discriminatory power): serotyping, 
phagetyping, and more recently multilocus variable-number tandem-repeat analysis 
(MLVA). The first two examine phenotypic (ie physical) characteristics of Salmonella 
isolates, while the latter examines genetic characteristics. 
Briefly, serotyping involves serological tests that use antibodies to detect antigens on 
the body (somatic or  “O” antigens) and tail (flagella, or “H” antigens) of the bacteria. It 
categorises Salmonella into over 2000 serovars or serotypes, including S. 
Typhimurium.  
Phagetyping is used to further differentiate between S. Typhimurium (and some other 
serovars). The method introduces a range of different viruses with differing capacity to 
kill bacteria (“bacteriophages”) to a bacterial lawn. The phagetype is allocated 
according to the pattern of lysis produced.  
More recently, MLVA has been adopted for routine subtyping of S. Typhimurium in 
Victoria. This method utilises PCR to examine five pre-defined regions on the genome 
where there are repeating units of DNA (base pairs). The number of base pair repeats 
at each location is generally identical or very similar for related isolates. However, as 
the regions are highly variable it is possible they may be identical through chance 
alone. 
Whole Genome Sequencing 
Whole genome sequencing involves a pipeline of pathogen preparation, sequencing 
and data analysis. The following brief description of the pipeline employed at MDU is 
adapted from Pathogen Genomics into Practice1. 
First Salmonella (or any other pathogen) is isolated in culture, and DNA is extracted 
and purified. DNA is broken down into shorter fragments to enable sequencing, and the 
ends of DNA fragments are linked to synthesized DNA molecules called “adapters”.  
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Next, sequencing is performed using an Illumina NextSeq, which uses “sequencing by 
synthesis” technology. In this process, DNA fragments are fixed to a glass plate using 
the “adapters”. DNA is then amplified, producing dense clusters of identical DNA 
fragments across the plate. This increases the quality of sequence data. Sequencing 
begins with the introduction of a universal primer, DNA polymerase and four 
nucleotides (A, T, C and G), each fused to a colour label and terminator. Incorporation 
of a complementary nucleotide onto the fragment terminates the reaction. 
Unincorporated nucleotides are washed off, and colour imaging is used to identify the 
incorporated base (the outermost complementary base on each strand). The raw signal 
is converted into a nucleotide (A, T, C, or G) based on its colour. The dye label and 
terminating group are washed off, and the cycle repeated until all nucleotides along the 
template fragment have been paired and identified.  
The fragments are then aligned into a whole genome sequence by orienting against a 
“reference” genome. This step involves significant computational effort.  
Quality measures 
Read depth. Fragments are sequenced multiple times, producing overlapping “reads”. 
Read depth refers to the number of times a particular sequence is “read”. Greater read 
depth increases the confidence that a given nucleotide has been inferred correctly. 
Generally, at MDU a read depth of 80 or greater is considered sufficient. 
Read length. Read length refers to the length of the sequenced fragments. Increasing 
length improves the accuracy when mapping against a reference genome, as it is 
easier to misplace smaller fragments. The maximum read length available using the 
NextSeq is 150 base pairs. 
Phred score. The Phred-like quality score measures the probability that a nucleotide in 
a particular position has been identified correctly. A score of 10 suggests a 1 in 10 
chance of error;  20 suggests there is a 1 in 100 chance of error, 30 suggests a 1 in 1 
000; 40 suggests 1 in 10 000 and 50 suggests 1 in 100 000. 
1. PHG Foundation (2015). Pathogen Genomics Into Practice. www.phgfoundation.org. 
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Preface 
Background to project 
Investigation of an outbreak or an acute public health event is a core requirement of the 
Master of Philosophy in Applied Epidemiology (MAE) program. This outbreak came to 
the attention of Communicable Disease Prevention and Control through a doctor’s 
notification of a case of Salmonella Typhimurium 44 infection. The doctor reported the 
patient had been a guest at a function and that other guests who attended the function 
were also unwell. OzFoodNet epidemiologists considered the reported outbreak to be 
an ideal incident for an MAE student investigation and the investigation was assigned 
to me. I interviewed the first notified case to confirm it was an outbreak and 
commenced an outbreak investigation. 
My role 
I was the sole investigator in this outbreak, though I sought advice as required from 
OzFoodNet epidemiologists, Public Health Officers, and my field supervisor.  
My role included: 
Interviewing the first notified case and confirming the situation was an outbreak. 
Liaising with event organisers and school administrators to obtain names and 
contact details for all attendees at the function 
Liaising with event organisers to obtain a copy of the menu 
Designing the menu-based questionnaire 
Conducting all telephone interviews  
Entering data into the Public Health Event Surveillance System (PHESS) database 
Extracting and analysing the data using STATA 
Writing the investigation report. 
Lessons learnt  
The investigation highlighted the value of epidemiological approaches for investigating 
outbreaks. During the investigation I identified a number of previously unknown cases 
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amongst the guest list. Although many guests could name a few cases, no single guest 
(nor any of the organisers) was aware of every case. This meant that until the 
investigation occurred no one was aware of the size of the outbreak, even amongst this 
group who all worked together. It taught me of the importance of active case finding to 
quantify the size of an outbreak, and in future outbreaks I will consider this a priority. It 
also illustrated how routine surveillance only captures a fraction of disease in the 
population, as only two out of the ten cases were reported to the routine notification 
system. 
The investigation demonstrated the importance of timely follow up for outbreaks. 
Unfortunately, by the time the guest list and menus were received and the investigation 
was underway it was too late to obtain faecal samples from most of the cases, and 
there were no food samples left for microbiological analysis. This meant the 
investigation was entirely reliant on the epidemiological investigation and the suspected 
food vehicles could not be verified by laboratory evidence. At the same time, this 
reinforced the value of having multiple streams of evidence when trying to determine 
disease causation. In future outbreak investigations I will ensure all possible streams of 
evidence are pursued as far as practicable. 
I learnt it can be difficult to identify a food source in an outbreak setting with a buffet 
style menu, because many people eat multiple items. This can be particularly 
problematic with a small cohort where the sample size limits the utility of stratified 
analysis. Microbiological evidence may have assisted in confirming the source if it were 
available.  
From a practical perspective I learnt how to conduct an outbreak investigation from 
start to finish. I also learnt how to set up an outbreak in Victoria’s Public Health 
Surveillance System Database, how to link cases to it, design and complete an 
outbreak questionnaire, and extract this data for analysis. 
Another valuable lesson was the human face of the outbreak. The cases reported here 
are more than simply ‘cases’; they are living, breathing people with busy lives, families, 
senses of humour and often an incredibly generous spirit. Their recollections of 
salmonellosis were of a debilitating and painful illness, yet many expressed concern for 
the organisers of the event and a desire to protect them against any negative 
ramifications following the incident. The other side of the outbreak has a human face, 
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too: the school staff who catered for the event in their home kitchens felt a strong 
sense of responsibility and were deeply troubled by news of the outbreak.  
Public Health Implications 
The public health implications were limited because the likely food vehicle was 
prepared in a private kitchen. The staff who catered for the event were provided 
information regarding Salmonella, safe food handling, and egg safety with the aim of 
preventing recurrence. 
The findings from the investigation will contribute to the evidence base regarding 
Salmonella Typhimurium epidemiology. Eggs are frequently suspected as the source of 
Salmonella Typhimurium infections in Australia, however, there are few robust studies 
documenting complete epidemiological investigation of outbreaks. For example there 
are currently only three published articles reporting investigations into Salmonella 
Typhimurium phage type 44 outbreaks in Australia despite it being a common cause of 
egg-associated outbreaks. 
Project outputs 
Project outputs include the following: 
• Inclusion as a chapter in the Bound Volume submission for the Master of 
Philosophy in Applied Epidemiology 
• Presented at the Communicable Disease Control Conference, 2015  
• Publication in a peer-reviewed journal (after thesis submission). 
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Abstract 
Background: In November 2014, a Salmonella Typhimurium phage type 44 outbreak 
occurred following a function in Victoria. An epidemiological investigation was 
conducted to characterise the outbreak by person, place and time, and identify the 
source of illness.  
Methods: A retrospective cohort study was conducted of all guests at the function 
using a menu-based questionnaire and descriptive statistics and relative risks were 
calculated for all food items. Private laboratories in Victoria performed microbiological 
analysis on faecal samples. Salmonella isolates were forwarded to the Microbiological 
Diagnostic Unit for typing including multilocus variable-number tandem-repeat analysis 
(MLVA). 
Results: Twenty-nine out of thirty guests were interviewed. Ten cases were identified 
giving an attack proportion of 30%. Risk of illness increased with consumption of an 
appetiser and frittata but after adjusting for confounding the roast beef appetiser was 
the most likely food vehicle. Both items were prepared in the same domestic kitchen. 
Cross contamination from eggs was suspected.  
Conclusion: A roast beef appetiser was the most likely food vehicle for this outbreak, 
but cross contamination from eggs appears likely. Appropriate food handling and 
hygiene is essential to minimise the risks of food borne illness. 
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Background 
Salmonella enteritis is a severe bacterial gastroenteritis. Transmission occurs through 
the faecal oral route, and contaminated food is the most frequent source of illness (1) 
although transmission from contaminated water, infected animals or person-to-person 
transmission is also possible (2). Symptoms commonly include diarrhoea, abdominal 
pain, nausea and fever lasting between 4 – 7 days (3). Around 20% of culture 
confirmed cases require hospitalisation, and death is rare (4). It is estimated around 94 
million cases of salmonellosis occur globally each year, including 155,000 deaths (2). 
In Australia it is the second most commonly notified gastrointestinal illnesss (5). 
Australia’s National Notifiable Diseases Surveillance System received 16358 
notifications of salmonellosis (a notification rate of 70.7 per 100,000) during 2014 (5). 
However because only a fraction of cases present to a doctor, a fraction of those 
presenting are tested, a fraction of tests detect Salmonella due to intermittent 
shedding, and not all cases of Salmonella isolated at the laboratory are reported to the 
disease surveillance system, this figure underestimates the true incidence of disease at 
the population level. It is likely the true rates of disease are around seven fold higher 
(6).  
To assist with identifying outbreaks, Salmonella bacteria can be subtyped using a 
variety of laboratory techniques (7). Subtyping is invaluable for monitoring trends, 
detecting outbreaks and identifying sources of illness. Current subtyping methods 
include serotyping, phage-typing, and more recently multilocus variable-number 
tandem-repeat analysis (MLVA). Serotyping is the first level of subtyping and 
categorises Salmonella into approximately 2,000 servoars or serotypes based on 
serological tests which detect antigens on the body (somatic or “O” antigens) and tail 
(flagella, or “H” antigens) of the bacteria (8). Phage typing is used to further 
differentiate bacteria within some serovars, including S. Typhimurium. Phage type is 
determined by introducing a range of bacteriophages (viruses which kill bacteria) to the 
isolate and examining patterns of lysis, which vary between phage types (8). In recent 
years, the use of phage typing has declined due to the difficulty in testing and the 
increasing popularity of molecular tools. MLVA is a more recent genetic fingerprinting 
technique with higher discriminatory power (9). It examines pre-defined regions of DNA 
to assess the number of repeats of base pairs and is useful for determining the degree 
of relatedness of different isolates (10). 
Chapter 4. Outbreak Investigation 
165 
 
Salmonella Typhimurium is the most commonly reported serotype in Australia, 
accounting for over one-third of all gastro-intestinal outbreaks (11) and is frequently 
associated with raw or runny eggs (11-14). For example, S.Typhimurium associated 
with raw and runny eggs was responsible for close to half of all outbreaks in Australia 
with a food source identified during 2010 (11).  
On the 3rd December 2014, Communicable Disease Prevention and Control at the 
Victorian Government Department of Health was notified by a doctor that a patient had 
been diagnosed with a Salmonella Typhimurium phage type 44 infection (S. 
Typhimurium 44) following attendance at a school function and that several other 
guests were unwell. An outbreak investigation was initiated to characterise the 
outbreak by person, time and place; identify the most likely source of the infection; and 
guide public health intervention to prevent further cases. 
Methods 
A retrospective cohort study was conducted to characterise the outbreak and identify 
the source of illness. The cohort included all guests who attended the function on 
Friday 22nd November 2014. The school administration provided a list of all attendees 
and their contact details. School staff members who had catered for the function 
provided details of all foods served. A structured outbreak questionnaire was 
developed and included demographics, details of illness both before and after the 
event, attendance at other school functions in the week prior to the function, and menu 
items consumed at the function. Interviews were conducted over the telephone by a 
single interviewer. As this was a public health investigation under the Victorian Public 
Health and Wellbeing Act (2008), ethics approval was not required. 
The case definition for the outbreak included any person who consumed food at the 
function and experienced diarrhoea within 48 hours of the function. Cases were invited 
to provide faecal samples within 14 days of the last day of symptoms if they had not 
already provided a specimen to a general practitioner. 
Questionnaire data were entered into Victoria’s secure Public Health Event 
Surveillance System (PHESS) database. Statistical analysis was conducted using 
STATA 13 (StatacorpTM). Descriptive statistics characterised the illness and 
demographics of cases. Univariate analysis calculated crude relative risk and 95% 
confidence intervals for illness associated with each menu item. Mantel-Haenszel 
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stratification was used to examine for evidence of confounding.  We considered results 
statistically significant if they were p <=0.05. 
Environmental investigation was not undertaken because there were no food samples 
remaining for microbiological analysis and the suspected food vehicles were prepared 
in a home kitchen rather than a licensed food premises.  
Faecal samples requested by general practitioners were submitted to private 
laboratories in Victoria. These laboratories forwarded isolates of Salmonella to the 
Microbiological Diagnostic Unit (MDU) for typing, including multilocus variable-number 
tandem-repeat analysis (MLVA). MLVA patterns for the outbreak isolates were 
compared against other notified cases within the preceding 12 months to identify other 
cases with indistinguishable isolates.  
Results 
All food served at the function was prepared at home by staff either the day before or 
on the morning of the event and transported to the school on the day of the lunch, apart 
from a pre-prepared quiche which was purchased frozen from a local supplier. 
Twenty-nine of thirty attendees were interviewed, a response rate of 96%. All 
attendees at the function were staff at the school. Ten cases were identified including 7 
males and 3 females, an overall attack rate of 34%. Median age of cases was 42 
(range 28 to 58), slightly younger than the median age of all guests which was 47 
(range 25 to 64). Cases were interviewed a median of 24.5 days after the event (range 
10 to 27), compared to a median of 25 for non-cases (range 19 to 30). 
The median incubation period was 25 hours (range 3 to 41), while median duration of 
illness was 7 days (range 1-8 days). An epidemic curve is presented in Figure 1. All 
cases experienced watery diarrhoea, and most (90%) also reported fever, nausea, 
abdominal pain and headaches. Only three cases (30%) reported vomiting. No blood in 
stools was reported. Half of all cases saw a doctor; one presented to an emergency 
department but was not hospitalised. 
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Figure 1. Epidemic curve showing time to symptom onset following attendance 
at Function B 
 
The results of the cohort investigation are summarised in Table 1. Amongst those 
interviewed, 30% attended an alternative event (Function A) at the school on the 
evening prior to Function B. There was no association between illness and attendance 
at Function A. 
Regarding food consumed at Function B, both roast beef appetiser and frittata had 
statistically significant crude associations with illness. The attack rates were 64% 
amongst those who ate roast beef appetiser and 53% of all those who ate frittata. The 
relative risk of illness was elevated for those who consumed roast beef appetiser 
(relative risk 5.09, 95% confidence interval 1.29 to 20.02) and for those who ate the 
frittata (relative risk 3.20, 95% confidence interval 0.83 to 12.35). Both were statistically 
significant associations (p<0.05). The two dishes were associated with each other; 
73% of guests who ate roast beef appetiser also ate the frittata, and 61% of those who 
ate the frittata also ate roast beef appetiser. After adjusting for confounding between 
these two items the combined risk ratio for each item remained elevated, but only the 
appetiser (stratified by frittata) approached statistical significance (95% confidence 
interval 0.81 to 15.36 and p=0.057).
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Table 1. Attack rates and risk ratios for menu items and salmonellosis in attendees of Library Lunch (n=29) 
  Exposed Not Exposed   Crude Analysis   Mantel-Haenszel Adjusted Analysis  
  Ill/Total (%) Ill/Total (%)   Risk Ratio 95% CI P Value*   Risk Ratio 95% CI P Value** 
Function A 3/7 (43%) 7/22 (32%) 
 
1.35 (0.47, 3.86) 0.593 
    Function B 
          Roast beef 
Appetiser (n=27) 7/11 (64%) 2/16 (13%) 
 
5.09 (1.29, 20.02) 0.006 
 
3.53a (0.81, 15.36) 0.057 
Salmon pie 5/12 (42%) 5/17 (29%) 
 
1.42 (0.52, 3.83) 0.494 
    Sour Cream Sauce 1/5 (20%) 9/24 (38%) 
 
0.53 (0.08, 3.32) 0.454 
    Quiche (n=27) 8/23 (35%) 2/4 (50%) 
 
0.70 (0.23, 2.15) 0.561 
    Frittata (n=27) 8/15 (53%) 2/12 (17%) 
 
3.20 (0.83, 12.35) 0.049 
 
2.1b (0.53, 8.38) 0.234 
Salad 8/35 (23%) 2/6 (33%) 
 
1.04 (0.30, 3.69) 0.947 
    Bread (n=27) 6/13 (46%) 2/14 (14%) 
 
3.23 (0.79, 13.24) 0.070 
    Cake 5/16 (31%) 3/13 (38%) 
 
0.81 (0.30, 2.21) 0.684 
    Juice (n=27) 7/15 (47%) 3/13 (25%) 
 
1.87 (0.61, 5.72) 0.247 
    Water (n=28) 3/6 (50%) 7/22 (32%) 
 
1.57 (0.57, 4.30) 0.410 
    Tea 0/2 (0%) 10/27 (37%) 
 
- - - 
    Coffee 1/4 (25%) 9/25 (36%) 
 
0.69 (0.12, 4.10) 0.667 
    Milk (n=28) 1/4 (25%) 9/24 (38%)   0.67 (0.11, 3.93) 0.629         
a. adjusted for frittata;  b. adjusted for roast beef appetiser 
* P from chi square analysis; ** P value from Fisher’s exact 
Chapter 4. Outbreak Investigation 
169 
 
The frittata contained eggs, cream, potatoes, olive oil, red onion, baby spinach, cherry 
tomatoes, red capsicum, and grated cheese. It was baked in a domestic kitchen the 
night preceding the event, refrigerated overnight and transported to school in an 
insulated bag with frozen bricks an hour before the event. Guests reported the frittata 
was firm, with no apparent undercooking. The roast beef appetiser consisted of a 
French stick sliced and baked on the same evening in the same kitchen as the frittata 
was prepared. It was topped with pureed tinned cannellini beans, lemon juice and rind, 
olive oil, roast beef and semi dried tomato pesto on the morning of the function. Both 
dishes were served cold. 
Three cases submitted a faecal sample to a general practitioner. Two were positive for 
Salmonella Typhimurium phage type 44 with indistinguishabble MLVA patterns. No 
pathogens were isolated from the remaining faecal specimen. A review of MLVA 
patterns found three additional notified cases in Victoria with indistinguishable MLVA 
patterns and onset dates within 30 days of the current outbreak. These cases were 
from an unrelated family outbreak and declined interview.  There were no other cases 
with identical MLVA pattern during the preceding 12 months.  
Discussion 
Outbreak investigations provide essential insight into the causation of Salmonella 
infections, because the large number of sporadic cases mean it is not feasible to 
investigate the source of individual infections (15). Previously published outbreaks of 
Salmonella Typhimurium phage type 44 in Australia have been associated with roast 
pork and apple sauce (16), eggs (14) and aioli (17). 
The investigation found a statistically significant crude association between S. 
Typhimurium 44 infection and two foods, a frittata and a roast beef appetiser which 
were frequently eaten together. Neither association retained statistical significance 
following stratification, probably a consequence of insufficient numbers in this small 
cohort. However, the adjusted risk ratio for roast beef appetiser approached 
significance (p=0.057) suggesting it was the most likely food vehicle for the outbreak. 
Salmonella Typhimurium is frequently associated with raw or undercooked eggs (10-
15, 17, 18) and kitchen utensils contaminated with raw egg can spread Salmonella (3). 
As both the frittata and roast beef appetiser were prepared in the same domestic 
kitchen at the same time it is plausible raw egg contamination of preparation surfaces 
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and implements (eg cutting boards, knives) occurred during the preparation of the 
frittata, with subsequent cross-contamination to the roast beef appetiser.  
Salmonella have been found on 3.5% of commercially available eggs in Australia (18). 
Incidence and shedding of Salmonella in laying hens is associated with a complex 
range of factors including husbandry practices, flock size and age, bird stress, 
weather, transport, initiation of egg lay and moulting (19). S.Typhimurium gain entry 
into eggs horizontally, that is by penetrating the shell after ovipositioning, or less 
commonly directly from infected ovaries during production of the egg (20). Alternatively, 
bacteria present on the external surface of the shell can lead to contamination of the 
egg proper when the egg is opened or cross contamination of other foodstuffs. 
Commercial egg washing is conducted in Australia on a large scale as a means to 
reduce bacterial contamination on the surface of eggs, but must be undertaken with 
care to avoid damaging the egg shell, as this increases the risk of bacteria entering the 
egg (21). A recent Australian study has shown the rate of horizontal Salmonella 
Typhimurium penetration was higher in washed eggs compared with non-washed eggs 
(20). Ultimately, appropriate food storage, hygienic food handling and thorough cooking 
are required to ensure any potential pathogens associated with eggs are destroyed 
prior to consumption. 
Limitations 
This study is subject to a number of potential limitations due to chance, bias and 
confounding. The investigation could have been strengthened by the inclusion of 
environmental and microbiological evidence to corroborate the epidemiological 
findings.  
Chance refers to the likelihood that the results generated by the study have occurred 
coincidentally rather than due to a true association at the population level. It is a 
function of sample size in epidemiological studies, with larger sample sizes reducing 
the likelihood that results are due to chance. In this study, many participants ate both 
foods crudely associated with illness, raising the possibility that one of the associations 
may be a result of confounding. A stratified analysis was performed to address this. 
However, due to the smaller sample size within each strata, the precision of the 
adjusted estimates was reduced. The adjusted risk ratio for roast beef appetiser 
approached but did not reach statistical significance. A larger sample size would have 
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produced more precise estimates and increased the confidence that this adjusted 
association was more than simply a chance finding. 
Bias is a systematic error in study design or execution. Like all retrospective cohort 
studies the results of this study may be affected by recall bias. This phenomenon 
occurs when there is a preconceived idea about the likely source of illness with the 
result that cases are more likely to recall certain exposures than controls. Attempts 
were made to minimise recall bias through the use of a structured menu-based 
questionnaire. Specific and targeted questions were designed to improve recall 
amongst all guests. Nonetheless it is possible recall bias has some influence on the 
findings, particularly if guests had formed their own theories regarding the likely food 
source prior to interview. Measurement bias can also be introduced by the interviewer if 
questions are asked differently of cases and controls. The use of a structured 
questionnaire and trained interviewer helped minimise this possibility. The study had an 
excellent response rate of 96%, which ensures selection bias will have very minimal, if 
any, effect on the measured association. 
Confounding occurs when the association between two variables is altered due to the 
effect of a third variable that is associated with both the exposure and the outcome but 
not on the causal pathway. It is likely that only roast beef appetiser was truly 
associated with illness while the crude association with frittata arose due to 
confounding, as both items were frequently eaten together. Stratification addressed this 
limitation in the statistical analysis. Stratification considers the association between 
exposure and outcome separately in two strata: those exposed to the third variable, 
and those not exposed to the third variable. This approach removes the effect of that 
third variable from the measured association, and thus controls for its confounding 
effect. Mantel-Haenszel stratification was used to calculate the association between 
illness and frittata for those who consumed roast beef appetiser and for those who did 
not, and likewise to calculate the association between illness and roast beef appetiser 
separately for those who consumed the frittata and for those who did not. The stratified 
risk ratios were then weighted to reflect the uncertainty associated with the different 
samples size in each strata, and pooled to produce an overall estimate of the risk ratio. 
After adjusting for roast beef appetiser the association between illness and frittata did 
not persist, indicating the crude association was due to confounding.  
This investigation faced limitations due to a lack of environmental and microbiological 
evidence. An environmental investigation was not possible as no food samples were 
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left over for sampling and the foods were prepared in a private kitchen. Insights gained 
through environmental investigation such as unsafe food handling practices or 
evidence of inadequate temperature controls can supplement and verify 
epidemiological evidence, and assist with identifying the source of an outbreak.  
Microbiological investigation has the potential to strengthen evidence of causation by 
isolating pathogens from food samples or preparation surfaces. However, in practice 
Salmonella is isolated from food in less than half of all Salmonella outbreak 
investigations (15). If food samples had been available, and if Salmonella had been 
isolated, this may have helped confirm epidemiologic findings. More importantly, 
isolating Salmonella from an ingredient in one of these foods could have provided 
opportunity for further trace-back and public health intervention, with the potential to 
prevent further cases of disease. 
Conclusion 
This outbreak was one of approximately fifty Salmonella outbreaks occurring in 
Australia each year (11, 22). Outbreaks provide an excellent opportunity for public 
health investigation to generate evidence regarding epidemiology and causation of 
food borne illness, which can have important implications for public health policy. In this 
outbreak a roast beef appetiser was epidemiologically associated with S. Typhimurium 
infection. It was not possible to identify the specific source for this outbreak, but cross 
contamination from raw eggs is a likely explanation for the findings. More timely public 
health follow-up including analysis of environmental and microbiological evidence may 
have assisted in identifying a food source, but left over food samples were not 
available.
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Appendix 1. Conference abstract 
 
Abstract Title:  Salmonella Typhimurium phage type 44: A Victorian outbreak and 
review of MLVA patterns 
Presenter: Zoe Cutcher.  Australian National University, ACT, and Department of 
Health and Human Services, Victoria. 
Authors: Cutcher, Z. Gregory, J. Valcanis, M. Mercoulia, K. Kirk, M.  Stephens, N. and 
Easton, M. 
Background: In December 2014, a Salmonella Typhimurium phage type 44 (STm44) 
outbreak occurred following a function in Victoria. We investigated the outbreak to 
determine a cause and compared Multi Locus Variable-number Tandem Repeat 
Analysis (MLVA) patterns to previous cases.  
Methods: We conducted a cohort study using a menu based questionnaire and 
calculated relative risks for all food items. We compared MLVA patterns for the 
outbreak strain against other Victorian STm44 cases and reviewed outbreak 
investigations from 2009-2014 to examine potential sources.  
Results:  There were 10 cases among 29 guests interviewed. Risk of illness increased 
with consumption of the appetiser and frittata. Cross contamination from eggs was 
suspected. The outbreak strain was indistinguishable from 1.7% (7/ 392) of MLVA 
patterns since 2009. A predominant historical pattern accounted for 45% of all patterns; 
another 51% were closely related including the outbreak strain. There were 5 historical 
STm44 outbreaks (78 cases) and 1 cluster (102 cases); all were related to the 
predominant MLVA pattern. Previous investigations all implicated or suspected eggs as 
the source. 
Conclusion:  We were unable to identify a specific source for this outbreak, but cross 
contamination from eggs appears likely. MLVA provided limited differentiation between 
STm44 isolates.  
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Appendix 2. Conference Presentation: Brisbane Communicable Disease 
Control Conference June 2015 
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Research Protocol: Melbourne Hot Water System (HoWS) Survey 
Study Team:  
Zoe Cutcher, Stuart Adcock, Noel Cleaves, Lucinda Franklin, Nicola Stephens with the 
assistance of Loretta Vaughan, VPHS. 
Research Questions 
“What is the prevalence of Legionella bacteria colonisation in residential hot water 
systems in Metropolitan Melbourne? How does the measured prevalence differ 
between culture and PCR detection techniques?”  
Study Aims and Objectives 
The aim of this study is to act as a pilot study for a planned case-control study 
assessing the association between Legionella contamination in residential potable 
water and the occurrence of Legionnaires’ disease in Victoria. 
The study objectives are to:  
1. Determine the prevalence of Legionella contamination in residential potable 
water sources in metropolitan Melbourne, to inform sample size calculations for 
the above study. 
2. Determine the risk factors for Legionella contamination in residential potable 
water sources in metropolitan Melbourne. 
3. Develop capacity for PCR detection of Legionella in environmental samples at 
Victoria’s State Reference Laboratory for Legionella. 
4. Compare the sensitivity of Legionella detection in environmental samples using 
the Standard culture method, an ultrafiltered culture method and PCR.  
5. Refine sampling strategies, laboratory methods and participant resources for 
the planned case-control study. 
Background 
Legionella bacteria are ubiquitous organisms that, under certain conditions, cause 
severe pneumonia known as Legionnaires’ disease (LD). Legionella thrives in wet 
environments and can colonize cooling towers, fountains, spas and plumbing 
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systems(1). Transmission occurs through aspiration or inhalation of the bacteria.  LD 
mainly occurs when those exposed have predisposing factors such as immune-
compromise, lung disease, male sex or smoking (2). It accounts for 3 – 15% of 
community-acquired pneumonia (3-5).  
The public health response to LD is focused on preventing outbreaks by identifying 
contaminated cooling towers. However approximately 80% of notified LD in Victoria are 
sporadic cases, the source of which is largely unknown. Contamination of potable 
water is a likely source for at least some of these cases (6), and some argue potable 
water may cause more cases of disease than cooling towers (7). 
Numerous case reports (8-15), and case series (6, 16) document cases of sporadic LD 
where Legionella bacteria from clinical isolates matched Legionella from potable water 
in patient’s homes. Outbreaks in apartment blocks (17), hotels (18) and suburbs (19) 
have been caused by contaminated potable water. Despite this the magnitude of the 
association between Legionella contaminated potable water and the occurrence of LD 
is not known. An outbreak in an apartment building attributed to potable water 
contamination had an attack rate of 4.7% (17); however as this was an outbreak setting 
it cannot be generalized to estimate the overall risk associated with contamination of 
residential potable water. Previous case-control studies (20, 21) failed to document a 
significant association between Legionella contamination in residential potable water 
and LD but these studies were flawed due to inadequate sample size calculation (20, 
21), poor timeliness for sample collection (20) and poor control participation (21). Well-
designed epidemiological studies including sample size estimation are needed to fill 
this knowledge gap. 
Sample size calculations require knowledge of the prevalence of Legionella 
contamination in the study setting. International estimates of Legionella prevalence in 
residential water range between 0-30% by culture (20, 22-27) and up to 50% by PCR 
(27, 28). Prevalence varies geographically and is influenced by numerous factors 
including sampling and laboratory methods, water temperature (22, 23, 26), hot water 
system type (20, 26), and water composition (20, 23, 25). To our knowledge the 
prevalence of Legionella in residential potable water in Australia has not been reported. 
Legionella’s ability to adopt a “viable but non-culturable” state limits the capacity to 
detect the bacteria with culture alone. PCR has been proposed as a tool to overcome 
this; however the correlation between culture and PCR is still unclear (29). Further 
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research is required to investigate the usefulness of PCR for routine environmental 
testing.  
Rationale 
The study is intended as a pilot study to refine sampling and laboratory methods for a 
future case-control study investigating the association between water-saving 
showerheads and LD in Melbourne, Victoria. Findings will inform sample size 
calculations for the case-control study to increase the likelihood of producing 
statistically significant results. 
Lay Summary 
This project aims to investigate how commonly a type of bacteria called Legionella are 
found in household hot water systems in Melbourne. It is a pilot study for a future case-
control study to find out whether there is any association between Legionella 
contamination in household hot water and the occurrence of Legionnaires’ disease. 
The pilot study will allow us to refine sampling methods. It will also provide information 
needed for a sample size calculation that will ensure the future case control study 
mentioned above is large enough to be meaningful. An additional aim is to explore new 
laboratory techniques for the detection of Legionella in environmental samples in 
Victoria. 
The study will collect hot water samples from around 80 homes in Melbourne and 
analyse them for the presence of Legionella bacteria. Participants will be owner-
occupiers recruited from the Victorian Population Health Survey Control Bank. This is a 
database of people who have previously participated in a health survey conducted by 
the Victorian Government Department of Health and agreed to be invited to participate 
in other departmental research studies.  
Hot water samples will be collected from up to three showers in each household, and a 
swab collected from the opening of a tap in the bathroom. Additional factors influencing 
Legionella colonisation will be recorded including type of hot water system, 
temperature of the hot water system, and type of shower fittings.  
Microbiologic analysis will be undertaken at Victoria's State Reference Laboratory for 
Legionella using the current Australian Standard unfiltered culture method (currently 
the default testing method for environmental Legionella testing in Victoria); an 
enhanced version of this method that uses filtration to concentrate the sample before 
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culture; and DNA detection technology (PCR). Results achieved by each method will 
be compared and contrasted to explore the correlation between the newer technology 
and the unfiltered Australian Standard method. 
Methods 
Study Design  
A cross sectional study design will be employed. Water samples will be collected over 
a 10-month period from showers in private residences located within metropolitan 
Melbourne. 
Study Parameters 
Study parameters include study factors and outcome factors. 
Outcome factors are laboratory measures of Legionella colonisation in domestic water 
systems: 
1. Positive culture of Legionella from domestic shower water samples using 
Victoria’s current standard method, which has a lower detection threshold of 
10,000 cfu/L. 
2. Positive culture of Legionella from shower water samples using an enhanced 
culture method, which has a lower detection threshold of 100 cfu/L. 
3. Detection of Legionella from domestic water shower samples using PCR. 
4. Detection of Legionella from direct swabs of bathroom taps using standard 
culture. 
Study factors are factors which are known to predispose water systems to Legionella 
growth: 
1. Type of hot water system (electric storage, gas storage, instantaneous gas, 
solar) 
2. Storage capacity of hot water system (for storage systems) 
3. Approximate age of hot water system (based on make and model)  
4. Approximate age of dwelling (estimated by resident) 
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5. History of plumbing work within the preceding 4 weeks 
6. Hot water temperature at shower  
7. Storage temperature of hot water (storage systems only) 
8. Chlorine and pH levels 
9. Concentration of iron, copper and zinc 
10. Apartment vs freestanding dwelling 
11. Type of showerhead (water-saving or other) 
12. Type of shower fitting (fixed or flexible pipe) 
Sample and collection procedures 
Sample Size 
A sample size calculation has been performed under the assumption the true 
prevalence of Legionella in domestic potable water in Melbourne is 5%. Under this 
assumption samples from 73 residences will be sufficient to estimate the prevalence to 
within a 5% margin of error and a confidence level of 95%. If the true prevalence is 
20% the required sample size increases to 246. 
Due to practical and resource limitations, the maximum number of water samples the 
laboratory is able to process for this study is set at 200. Thus, the study will recruit 
approximately 80 participants to give a total of 200 water samples.  
Study population  
Participants will be recruited from the Victorian Population Health and Wellbeing control 
bank. This is a register of participants from the Victorian Health and Wellbeing 
telephone survey who agreed to be invited to participate in additional health-related 
research.  Participants of the Victorian Population Health Survey (VPHS) are sourced 
from the Victorian resident population using an extensive random selection process 
based on random digit dialing. The sample size for the VPHS survey is 34,000 with the 
majority of participants agreeing to be contacted again for health related research. Until 
recently participants were recruited exclusively through landline telephones but the 
survey is currently trialing recruitment using mobiles to minimize any potential bias 
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associated with access to landlines. The control bank participants are all over 18 years 
of age. 
Recruitment  
A list of telephone numbers for recently recruited control bank participants residing in 
metropolitan Melbourne will be sourced from the Victorian Population Health and 
Wellbeing Survey control bank. Initial recruitment will be conducted via telephone; five 
attempts will be made to contact each participant using a recruitment script. A 
Participant Information Form will be mailed to interested potential participants along 
with an introductory letter. Approximately one week later potential participants will 
telephoned to confirm participation and book in sampling. Contact will be maintained 
between recruitment and sampling with the aid of an additional letter. Written informed 
consent for participation will be sought at the sampling visit, prior to proceeding with 
sample collection. 
 
Eligibility Criteria: Participants will be eligible to participate if they are over 18 years of 
age, reside in a private residence in Melbourne, own their own homes and provide 
written informed consent prior to sampling.  
Sample collection 
Written informed consent will be sought prior to proceeding with sampling. At this time 
a short survey will also be conducted to determine the secondary study factors. Age of 
premises and history of plumbing work will be determined through interview. Type of 
hot water system will be determined by examining the system (where possible) or 
through discussion with the resident. The approximate age of the hot water system will 
be estimated by recording the make and model in order to later investigate 
manufacture dates.  
A direct swab will be collected from inside the bathroom sink tap, by inserting a sterile 
cotton tip inside the opening and gently agitating to remove organic matter. This will be 
placed in a sterile specimen container with 10ml of water from the same tap. Shower 
water samples will be collected into sterile containers pre-treated with thiosulphate to 
de-activate chlorine, as it inhibits bacterial growth. Two and a quarter litres of hot water 
will be collected from each shower in the house immediately after turning on the hot 
tap. This “first flush” sample is designed to collect bacteria colonising the shower head 
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and proximal pipes. Mineral, chlorine and pH levels will be assessed using an onsite 
detection kit on a separate 50ml sample collected from the most commonly used 
shower immediately after collection of the primary sample. Once all showers have been 
sampled the hot water in the most frequently used shower will be allowed to run 
continuously until a maximum temperature is achieved (as measured by a laser 
thermometer), and an additional two and a quarter litre sample collected. This “second 
flush” sample is designed to collect bacteria colonizing the hot water system and distal 
pipes. The temperature of the second flush sample will be measured and recorded 
using an infrared thermometer. Many residences have a tempering valve that lowers 
the temperature of hot water prior to delivery at the showerhead. Therefore, for homes 
with storage hot water systems, the storage temperature of hot water system will also 
be measured by assessing water temperature at the outlet tap. 
All staff will be provided with heat proof gloves and training to minimise risk of scalding 
during sample collection. All samples will be transported in eskys immersed in ice and 
delivered to the lab within 12 hours of collection. 
Laboratory analysis  
Laboratory analysis will be performed by the Microbial Diagnostic Unit (MDU, Victoria’s  
State Reference Laboratory for environmental detection of Legionella) at the University 
of Melbourne. 
Three approaches will be used to detect and quantify Legionella.  
The first approach is the current standard in Victoria which follows the Australian 
Standard AS/NZS 3896:2008. The approach utilizes samples of 100ml and has a 
detection threshold of 10,000 cfu/L. The method includes direct inoculation of water 
samples onto Legionella selective medium (both MWY and BMPA plates) in addition to 
preparation of heat and acid treated samples. The heat treated sample is inoculated on 
a separate MWY plate following heat treatment at 50⁰ for 30 minutes; the acid treated 
sample is inoculated onto a BMPA plate after mixing with an HCl/KCL buffer. 
The second approach is an ultrafiltered culture technique. This requires samples of 1 
litre and has a detection threshold of 100 cfu/L. Samples will be concentrated using 
membrane filtration and re-suspended in 10ml for optimum coverage, before 
proceeding with the culture method outlined above. 
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The third approach will be a real-time polymerase chain reaction (PCR) to detect DNA 
fragments using commercial primers. Organisms in a one litre sample will be 
concentrated prior to analysis using membrane filtration. The filter membrane will then 
be processed for PCR.  The method will enable estimation of the number of organisms 
present and  include both detection of Legionella species, and a specific detection kit 
for Legionella pneumophila serogroup 1.  
Data storage and reporting 
Sample results and questionnaire data will be stored in the PHESS database. Data will 
not be used for any purpose apart from that for which it was collected. Access to the 
data will be restricted to departmental staff directly involved in the study.  
Results of all Legionella testing using Standard methods will be reported to all 
participants by mail. Where Legionella is detected by culture, participants will be 
notified of results over the telephone with the guidance of a results notification script 
and a factsheet will be provided. Professional advice will be provided to help 
participants interpret the results of testing and decide whether remedial action is 
required. In most cases remedial action will only be required if residents of the 
household are predisposed to Legionella. A study doctor will be available to consult 
with participants to help determine their risk of illness. 
At the request of the Laboratory results obtained through PCR will not be reported to 
participants, as these methods are not currently validated in Victoria and lack the 
support of an Australian Standard or National Association of Testing Authorities 
(NATA) accreditation. 
Data Analysis 
Data will be analysed using StataTM version 13 statistical software (Statacorp, Texas). 
Analysis will include: 
Descriptive analysis of Legionella prevalence as identified by the various detection 
methods 
o according to species  
 Legionella pneumophila serogroup1 versus  
 Legionella species 
o according to site  
 first flush versus  
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 second flush 
Chi squared comparisons 
o Detection by standard culture, enhanced culture and PCR  
Sensitivity of each culture method, comparing against PCR as the gold standard 
Correlation between concentration of Legionella as detected by enhanced culture 
and that estimated by PCR 
Univariate analysis of association between risk factors and Legionella detection 
Multivariate analysis of association between risk factors and Legionella detection 
for those factors found to be significantly associated on univariate analysis 
Ethics 
Benefits to the community 
The research will benefit the wider community by beginning to investigate to what 
extent Legionella contamination of domestic potable water contributes to the burden of 
disease due to Legionella in Victoria. The pilot study will inform a future case-control 
study to investigate the association between contamination of domestic potable water 
and the occurrence of Legionnares' disease. Once this issue is understood targeted 
educational and other interventions could be designed to reduce the burden of disease 
due to residential exposure for high risk groups. 
In addition, this study will provide an opportunity to develop and explore PCR detection 
of Legionella from environmental samples at Victoria's State Reference Laboratory for 
Legionella. This method will improve the sensitivity of detection and may be helpful for 
investigating future outbreaks of disease in situations where the current Standard 
method is not able to identify a source. 
Benefits to participants 
Legionella test results obtained using the Australian Standard culture method will be 
provided to all participants unless they elect not to receive them. Where Legionella is 
detected by culture participants will be informed of results by telephone.  For 
participants who are at risk of disease, identifying Legionella in their residential potable 
water provides them the opportunity to take steps to mitigate their risk (eg. arrange 
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treatment by a plumber, or modify their behaviour e.g. switch to baths instead of 
showers). Participants with Legionella contaminated samples who elect to pursue 
remedial action will be offered free  follow up testing to ensure the action has been 
effective. 
Informed consent 
The Informed consent process is described under recruitment. 
Strategies to reduce risk to participants 
There is a risk that participants may experience anxiety if Legionella is detected in their 
home. However in most cases the actual risk of illness will be extremely small, as 
Legionnaires' disease is exceptionally rare in people who are not predisposed to 
disease. Participants will be informed of this possibility in the participant information 
form (Appendix 3), which they will be required to read prior to providing written consent 
to participate (Appendix 5). 
Where Legionella is detected in participant homes extensive support will be available to 
help participants make an informed decision regarding what action to take, if any. This 
will include telephone consultation with Environmental Health Officers (Appendix 7), 
provision of a detailed fact sheet (Appendix 6), a letter explaining what the results 
mean (Appendix 9) and the option to consult with a public health physician if required. 
If the public health physician is concerned about a participant’s mental health referral to 
a counselling service will be arranged. 
For participants who are at risk of disease, identifying Legionella bacteria in their 
potable water system provides them with the opportunity to address the problem either 
by arranging for a plumber to treat the system or by modifying their activities (e.g., 
bathing instead of showering). 
Budget and Resources 
The project has been planned within existing Department of Health resources for 
staffing and laboratory analysis. In kind support includes 600 hours of staff time, 
comprising: 
120 hours for study design, review and ethics submission 
60 hours for participant resource development and piloting  
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160 hours for participant recruitment  
60 hours for sampling  
80 hours travel  
80 hours for data entry  
40 hours for reporting results  
Dissemination Plan 
Results will be disseminated internally in the Department through publication of a report 
and presentation of a seminar. 
It is anticipated results of the survey will be disseminated through conference 
presentations and publication in a peer-reviewed journal.  Target conferences include 
the Australian Communicable Disease Control Conference and the Australian 
Environmental Health Conference. Target journals are those with a local communicable 
disease focus, including the Medical Journal of Australia or Communicable Disease 
Intelligence. 
Information about the findings will also be fed back to the public through media release. 
The report of the findings will be made available on the Legionella team website. 
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Melbourne 
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Our Ref: PHESS ID 
 
Enter Date HERE 
Enter Name HERE 
Enter Address HERE 
ENTER SUBURB STATE PCODE HERE 
Dear Name, 
Your household recently participated in the Melbourne HoWS Survey. This 
important survey will increase our understanding of community-acquired 
Legionnaires’ disease and depends on the support of volunteers like you – thank 
you. 
 
Below, please find results of the Australian Standard testing methods performed on 
samples from your house.  
Sample Location Culture Result 
Main Bathroom Tap Not detected 
Main Shower Not detected 
Second shower Not detected 
Third shower * delete entire row if no third shower * 
 
We can report that we did not detect Legionella bacteria in any water samples 
collected from your residence using the Australian Standard testing methods for 
detection of Legionella. 
If you would like to discuss your results with our study team, or have any questions 
about the Melbourne HoWS survey please contact us on 1800 248 898. 
 
Thank you for contributing to this important work which will not only help improve 
the health of Victorians, but could also help save lives – and we couldn’t do it 
without you.  
 
Yours sincerely 
 
Noel Cleaves, Manager Environmental Health Regulation and Compliance 
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Our Ref: PHESS ID 
Enter Date HERE 
Enter Name HERE 
Enter Address HERE 
ENTER SUBURB STATE PCODE HERE 
Dear Name 
Your household recently participated in the Melbourne HoWS Survey. This 
important survey will increase our understanding of community-acquired 
Legionnaires’ disease and depends on the support of volunteers like you – thank 
you. 
 
Below, please find laboratory results listed for each sample from your house. To 
understand what your results mean please see the explanation below. 
Sample Location Result 
Bathroom Tap Not detected 
Main Shower Not detected 
Second shower Legionella detected at low levels 
Third shower * delete entire row if no third shower * 
Hot water storage 
temperature - if 
measured* 
xxx ⁰C   (NB if not measured  = “not measured”) 
* nb hot water storage temperature was only measured for storage systems. In 
some cases it could not be measured due to difficulty accessing the system or other 
practical barriers. 
 
Legionella bacteria have been detected in samples collected from a tap/ a shower/ 
both a tap and a shower in your house using Australian Standard detection 
methods. 
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What does this mean for my household? Legionella bacteria are widespread in 
wet environments and are found in plumbing systems around the world. The 
absolute risk of illness due to these bacteria in domestic homes is not well 
understood, but in general we do know the overall risk of disease for individuals 
exposed to Legionella bacteria is extremely low. Although the overall risk is 
extremely low, for particular people the risk may be slightly higher. Please see the 
attached fact sheet on Legionella to help decide if you or anyone in your household 
could be at risk of illness due to Legionella bacteria. 
 
** Insert appropriate hot water system paragraph if hot water system 
STORAGE temperature available. Otherwise, delete this line ** 
 
If you would like to discuss your results with our study team or if you have any 
questions about the Melbourne HoWS survey please contact us on 1800 248 898. 
If you wish to speak with a public health physician regarding your risk of illness our 
study team would be happy to arrange this for you. Alternatively, you may wish to 
consult your local doctor. 
 
Thank you for contributing to this important work which will not only improve 
Victorian’s health, but help save Victorian’s lives – we couldn’t do it without you.  
Yours sincerely, 
 
Noel Cleaves, 
Manager  
Environmental Health Regulation and Compliance 
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Additional comments for insertion into results letter, as appropriate based 
on hot water system temperature for culture positive households: 
HWS 
Type 
HWS 
Temperature 
Copy and paste the following: 
Storage 
(Electric 
or Gas) 
Inadequate 
(<60⁰) 
 
Hot water system temperature: Your hot water 
system temperature was xxx <60⁰ xxx. The Plumbing 
Regulations (2008) requires hot water be stored at or 
above 60⁰C to minimise the growth of Legionella 
bacteria in the system. This is because hot water 
storage temperature is one of the main factors 
affecting Legionella growth. We recommend you 
arrange a plumber to adjust the storage temperature 
on your system to above 60⁰C. In most cases the 
increase in storage temperature will be sufficient to 
clear the system of Legionella.  
Please note if you increase the temperature of your 
storage hot water system a tempering valve should 
also be installed to minimise the risk of scalding (if 
not already present) – we recommend you talk to 
your plumber about this. 
A repeat sample should be taken a week later to 
ensure the adjustment has been effective. Please call 
us on 1800 248 898 if you would like to arrange a 
repeat sample which can be done free of charge. 
 
Storage 
(Electric 
or Gas) 
Adequate  
(=>60⁰) 
Hot water system temperature: Your hot water 
system temperature was xxx =>60⁰ xxx, which is 
consistent with the Plumbing Regulations (2008) 
requirements. The Regulations require hot water be 
stored at or above 60⁰C to minimise the growth of 
Legionella bacteria in plumbing systems. This is 
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because hot water system temperature is one of the 
main factors affecting Legionella growth.  
Because the hot water system temperature was 
adequate, treating the Legionella bacteria in your 
system would require treatment by a plumber. In 
most cases (but not all) this treatment will be 
sufficient to resolve the problem. As this type of work 
is not routine we suggest you ask your plumber to 
speak with our experts before commencing the work. 
Please ask them to call us on 1800 248 898. If you 
elect to address the Legionella bacteria in your system 
we recommend a repeat sample should be taken a 
week after the treatment to ensure it has been 
effective. This repeat sample is free of charge. Please 
call us when your plumber treats the system if you 
wish to arrange a repeat sample. 
Storage 
(Electric 
or Gas) 
Unmeasured 
If you decide to address the Legionella in your hot 
water system this would involve arranging a plumber 
to check the system, including the storage 
temperature, as storage temperature is one of the 
main things affecting Legionella growth. The plumber 
may also do a heat treatment on the system. We were 
unable to measure the temperature in your hot water 
system, but the Plumbing Regulations (2008) require 
hot water be stored at or above 60⁰C to minimise the 
growth of Legionella bacteria in plumbing systems.  
We would be happy to collect another sample at no 
charge a week after the system is treated to make 
sure the treatment has worked. Please call us on 
1800 248 898 when your plumber treats the system 
if you wish to arrange a repeat sample. 
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Gas 
Instant, 
Solar or 
Other 
n/a 
If you decide to address the Legionella in your hot 
water system this would involve arranging a plumber 
to check the system is functioning properly and 
possibly do a heat treatment.  
We would be happy to collect another sample at no 
charge a week after the system is treated to make 
sure the treatment has worked. Please call us on 
1800 248 898 when your plumber treats the system 
if you wish to arrange a repeat sample. 
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Mission Report: SPC Assistance to Vanuatu Ministry of Health in 
Strengthening Surveillance System Post Cyclone Pam 
Prepared by: 
 
Zoe Cutcher 
Epidemiology Intern and MAE Scholar 
Research Evidence and Information Programme  
Public Health Division, Secretariat of the Pacific 
Community 
Report Date: 8 June 2015 
Date of deployment: 3 May to 22 May 2015 
Area of Deployment: Penama Province, Vanuatu 
Objectives: 
To support the Penama Provincial Surveillance Unit 
(PSU) to further develop the EWARN surveillance 
system by: 
• Establishing, via a consultative process, a 
template feedback report to be disseminated 
from the PSU to Penama Province’s sentinel 
sites reporting on EWARN. 
• Harmonizing syndromic case definitions 
between the hospital Out-patient Division 
(OPD) registry and EWARN reporting. 
• Act as technical lead for the Provincial EpiNet 
Team, if need be, to respond to public health 
emergencies/threats, including verifying 
EWARN signals, conducting outbreak 
investigations and initiation of mitigation/control 
measures. 
Background 
On 13 March 2015 Category 5 Tropical Cyclone Pam impacted Vanuatu. The cyclone 
led to significant infrastructure damage in the developing island nation. Potential 
threats to public health included structural damage to health care facilities, impaired 
health service delivery, damage to housing, food security, sanitation and loss of clean 
water supply.  
The Vanuatu Ministry of Health (MOH) (Health Cluster Lead), with assistance from the 
World Health Organization (WHO) (Co-Lead), expanded Vanuatu’s existing Pacific 
Syndromic Surveillance System to establish an Early Warning Alert and Response 
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Network (EWARN) comprising 24 sentinel sites across Vanuatu. The system was 
designed to provide timely surveillance of epidemic prone diseases during the 
emergency phase and enable rapid implementation of control measures if required.  
The introduction of EWARN was an opportunity to build capacity for disease 
surveillance and response in Vanuatu. Vanuatu’s surveillance system prior to the 
cyclone comprised eight sentinel sites reporting on four syndromes (acute fever and 
rash, prolonged fever, influenza like illness, and diarrhoea). However reporting was 
unreliable and there was no established system for response to surveillance signals or 
formal feedback material and mechanism to sentinel sites (George Worwor, National 
Surveillance Unit, MOH, personal communication). The pre-existing sentinel sites were 
located on 6 out of over 60 inhabited islands and are listed in Table 1. 
Table 1. Syndromic surveillance sites in operation in Vanuatu since 2012. 
Site Province Island 
Lenakel Tefea Tanna 
Vila Central Hospital (Vila) Shefa Efate 
Neil Thomas Ministry Hospital 
(Vila) 
Shefa Efate 
Welu Hospital (Vila) Shefa Efate 
Norsup Hospital Malakula Island Malampa 
Lolowai Ambae Penama 
Northern Provincial hospital Santo Sanma 
Qatvaes hospital  Vanua Lava Torba 
The MOH and the WHO requested assistance from the Secretariat of the Pacific 
Community (SPC) in (i) the establishment and implementation of EWARN in Penama 
Province, and (ii) to assure rapid diagnosis of disease with epidemic potential or public 
health importance, specifically at the two reference hospitals. In addition to these initial 
Terms of Reference SPC was also requested, upon arrival in Vanuatu, to operate and 
maintain the EWARN system recently established in Tanna for 4 weeks. SPC 
committed to an initial term of 2 months in Penama and met this commitment by 
deploying four epidemiologists on successive missions, each of 3-week duration on 
average, and one laboratory specialist for 3 days of intensive training in Lolowai 
Hospital.  My deployment was the third and final mission for this commitment. 
EWARN was intended to be a short-term disaster-response surveillance system. At the 
time of writing, it is planned that reporting will be wound back to previous levels over 
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the next few weeks as response efforts enter the recovery and rehabilitation phase. 
The imminent withdrawal of EWARN from the 16 additional participating sites provides 
an opportunity to adapt and continue elements of the system in a selection of sites to 
strengthen disease surveillance and response in Vanuatu. SPC’s activities in Penama 
Province were undertaken with a view to developing capacity at Provincial and local 
levels and establishing a sustainable surveillance and response system for the 
province. 
The main activities of the previous two deployments to Penama province are listed 
below: 
1. Onofre Edwin A. Merilles Jr. (Jojo) (28/03/2015 -17/04/2015).  
a. Enrolled and trained staff at three Penama EWARN sites: Melsisi 
(Pentecost); Mauna (Pentecost); and Kerepei (Maewo). 
b. Enrolled staff and initiated training at Lolowai provincial hospital 
(Ambae) where provincial data will be aggregated. 
c. Prepared for the establishment of a Provincial EpiNet Team 
2. Dr Salanieta Taka Saketa (13/04/2015 -27/04/2015). 
a. Rapid epidemic risk assessment for Penama province. 
b. 2 day training course on EWARN for Lolowai and provincial healthcare 
workers. 
c. Recruited 4 additional sentinel sites from Ambae (these report only to 
the provincial level) 
d. Developed TORs and supported the appointment of a Provincial 
Surveillance Co-ordinator  
e. Supported the establishment of Vanuatu’s first EpiNet team for 
investigation and control of outbreaks in Penama Province 
The purpose of this final SPC deployment to Penama province was to continue 
strengthening the newly established surveillance and response system for outbreak-
prone diseases in Penama, in order to facilitate the transition of EWARN including the 
EpiNet team into an ongoing, sustainable system for the province.  
Activities 
Key activities are described below. All were conducted with a focus on capacity 
building to strengthen the newly established system and improve sustainability. 
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1. Development of a surveillance feedback report template  
Through close consultation with local staff, I developed a template for the provision of 
surveillance feedback to reporting sites. Currently eight sentinel sites in Penama 
submit weekly reports to the provincial surveillance coordinator 2. Reports are 
aggregated at the provincial level and investigations and response undertaken by the 
EpiNet team if indicated. The provincial surveillance coordinator will be responsible for 
providing regular and timely feedback of surveillance data to reporting sites. Such 
feedback will strengthen the newly established system by: 
• increasing sentinel site engagement  
• increasing preparedness through awareness of outbreaks and other public 
health threats occuring within the province and nationally 
• providing information to assist with preparedness and response to sentinel 
sites.  
The feedback template was developed through consultation with the provincial 
surveillance coordinator, Epi-Net team members and representatives from sentinel 
sites. Its implementation is immediately feasible with the current capacity and 
resources available in Penama. However the document is expected to evolve as the 
system strengthens, capacity increases, and staff gain ownership of the system.  
A no-cost fortnightly distribution route was identified for the feedback. Accordingly the 
document was designed for fortnightly reporting. The template and guidelines for its 
use and dissemination are included in Appendix 2b. 
Challenges 
• Limited access to power at the hospital restricts access to PCs, printing and 
copying to a few hours per day  
• Provincial surveillance coordinator does not have access to a computer, 
internet or office space  
• Limited capacity in data analysis and data management 
                                               
2 Note that only 4 sites are participants in the National EWARN. Data for these 4 sites are relayed up to 
national level 
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• Limited capacity in basic epidemiology 
• Limited/no baseline information makes it difficult to interpret surveillance data 
and identify alerts 
• Enrolment of four additional reporting sites in recent weeks increases resources 
required to receive, analyse and feedback surveillance data. 
Documentation of reporting sources 
I mapped syndromes currently reported under EWARN against syndromes/conditions 
reported through the monthly national Health Information System (HIS) reports to 
identify potential double reporting and duplication of effort. HIS reports are submitted 
monthly to MOH by all hospitals and health centres and are designed for planning and 
monitoring rather than surveillance and response purposes. However if elements of 
surveillance and response are adopted and sustained throughout Vanuatu in the future 
the two systems would ideally be integrated to reduce duplication. Reporting of 
EWARN syndromes under HIS at both hospital and health centres was documented to 
provide guidance for potential future integration of the two systems, and to provide 
guidance to the EpiNet team for case verification and case finding from clinic records. I 
produced a data matrix demonstrating the relationship between syndromes under each 
system, and provided it to MOH and SPC. 
Challenges 
• There are no case definitions for diseases/syndromes reported under HIS 
• Health centres report more specific diagnoses than hospitals – eg Typhoid and 
Hepatitis B are reported by health centres, but not hospitals whereas diagnosis 
may not be available at either level 
• Potential for different cases of the same disease to meet case definitions for 
different syndromes under EWARN3 
• Some duplicate reporting was recognised within the EWARN system4.  
                                               
3 Important for surveillance staff to be aware of when interpreting surveillance report 
4 At Lolowai hospital EWARN cases were being counted from both the nurse OPD log book and the 
doctors log book; however all cases seen by the doctor are first seen by the nurse so appear in both log 
books. 
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Capacity Building and Outbreak Investigation  
During the deployment the newly established EpiNet team investigated two 
surveillance signals. These were a) increased cases of influenza like illness at Melsisi 
Health Centre in Central Pentecost and b) a rumor of conjunctivitis and rash in 
Northern Pentecost. These were the first investigations undertaken by the Penama 
EpiNet team which had no previous experience in outbreak investigation. Preparation 
and investigation of the two surveillance signals was used to build EpiNet team 
capacity through workshops and practice. Capacity building included: 
• verifying the signal 
• logisitcs and planning for a field investigation 
• constructing and interpreting a line list and basic analysis of line list data to 
identify risk groups 
• finding cases and gathering additional information through simple 
questionnaires  
• collecting blood samples, separating serum, packaging and shipping samples 
for laboratory analysis from a field investigation 
• providing guidance for implementing control measures 
• producing an outbreak report 
The increase in influenza like illness was considered likely to reflect a reporting issue 
rather than a true increase in cases following a phone call and visit to Melsisi Health 
Centre for verification. The rumour of conjunctivitis and rash was verified by a 
dispensary in Angoro as an outbreak of conjunctivitis and arthritis. The EpiNet team 
conducted an outbreak investigation on-site, during which I provided technical support. 
An outbreak report is provided in Appendix 2c. 
Challenges 
• EpiNet team has a fairly new and limited understanding of basic epidemiology 
• EpiNet team inexperienced in outbreak investigation 
• Clinical and laboratory EpiNet team members have limited availability for field 
investigations due to hospital duties; this includes the current EpiNet team 
leader 
Appendix B. Vanuatu Mission Report 
254 
 
• Only draft questionnaires available for use  
• No disease/syndrome specific protocols for outbreak investigation/response 
• Limited health promotion materials available to assist with intervention, and 
none specific to the disease/syndromes 
• Logistical challenges in maintaining cold chain and freighting samples to 
laboratory (infrequent flight schedule) 
• Cost of outbreak investigations likely to be a significant barrier to sustainability 
• Maintenance of field epidemiology and laboratory skills is also likely to be a 
challenge due to frequent staff turnover 
Recommendations 
The following general recommendations address the challenges encountered during 
the deployment: 
• Provision of ongoing capacity building in basic epidemiology and data analysis 
for the provincial surveillance coordinator and key EpiNet team members, 
ideally using a structured approach such as the Data for Decision Making 
(DDM) training courses.  
• Provision of a lap-top, a reliable and permanent internet access and office 
space for the surveillance coordinator 
• Improved provision of power to the Provincial Hospital 
• Review the structure of the EpiNet team to ensure members are available for 
field investigations. Consider seeking clinical expertise from the affected health 
centers to relieve the need for Lolowai clinicians to attend investigations 
• Train or refresh health centre and dispensary nurses in clinical skills in 
accordance with EWARN case definitions, as well as in sample collection, 
packaging and shipping to reduce the expenses for the EpiNet team’s 
operations. 
• Develop province-specific alert thresholds after one year of data collection  
• Develop protocols and questionnaires for each of the 8 syndromes, including 
targeted health promotion and risk communication resources for each 
syndrome/common disease under surveillance 
• Develop innovative financial solutions to ensure sustainability. Consider sharing 
cost of investigations among public health stakeholders,eg. contributions from 
the national programs such as environmental health, malaria, and health 
promotion, plus assistance from the central level; encourage provincial 
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authorities to support accommodation costs for the EpiNet Team during on-site 
investigations 
• Care with sustainability – ensure staged approach with consolidation of capacity 
and sustainability at each level before advancing to the next 
• Once EpiNet team is stable and sustainable, consider assisting the MOH in 
developing similar systems in other provinces. 
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Lesson from the field 5 – MLVA as a surveillance tool for Salmonella 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Learning Objectives 
After completing this exercise, you should be able to: 
• Explain in basic terms why typing is important for surveillance of Salmonella 
(and other common communicable diseases) 
• Describe some advantages of using MLVA for Salmonella surveillance 
• Describe some challenges of using MLVA for Salmonella surveillance 
• Use a basic relatedness schema to determine relatedness of Salmonella 
isolates based on MLVA patterns 
 
Scenario: 
You have recently started working as an OzFoodNet epidemiologist in Queensland. 
During routine review of Salmonella notifications during January you notice an increase 
in notified cases, many of which have identical MLVA patterns. You decide to 
investigate further, but first need to brush up on MLVA patterns. 
  
The LFF teleconference will be conducted on Tuesday 30th of June 2015 between 14:00 – 
15:00 AEST.  
 To join the teleconference, dial 1800 153721 and then enter the conference PIN code 
604499. If you have any trouble please call me on 0434 021 396 or email me on 
Zoe.Cutcher@health.vic.gov.au 
Please save your responses to the questions in a word file and send back to 
Zoe.Cutcher@health.vic.gov.au by COB Wednesday 24th of June 2015. 
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Questions: 
Read Torpdahl et al (2007) and answer the following: 
1. Why is typing of Salmonella useful for surveillance? 
 
2. List three essential criteria for typing methods and explain why they are 
important. 
 
3. Explain the major advantage of MLVA analysis compared to simple 
serotyping/phagetyping or PFGE analysis. 
 
4. Examine Figure 3.  
a. Describe Figure 3a.  
b. Describe Figure 3b.  
c. How would an investigation based on the information in figure 3a differ 
from an investigation based on the information in 3b?  
d. Discuss how bias might impact the results of a case-control investigation 
into the data shown in Graph 3a. What type of bias would this be, and 
what would be the effect on the investigation?  
Read Wang, 2007 before completing the exercise below. Note that there are other 
methods for assessing relatedness using MLVA, for example some authors consider 
any number of repeat differences at a given loci acceptable, whereas Wang allows only 
one or two repeat differences for related strains. For this example please use the 
method proposed by Wang. 
Examine the dataset provided “mlva activity dataset.xls” and identify possible 
outbreaks during the period. (Hint, create a stacked column chart displaying MLVA 
patterns over time).  
5. Select a surveillance signal you feel may warrant further investigation. Describe 
the signal and list any relevant MLVA patterns. What additional information 
would you ideally consider before deciding whether or not to investigate? 
 
6. Next, categorise all the MLVA patterns for the month of January according to 
their relatedness to the predominant pattern. This information is useful when 
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deciding which cases should be counted when quantifying the size of the 
outbreak. It also helps in deciding which cases should be investigated.  
Hint: Use the guidelines provided in Wang 2007, page 3. First identify the 
predominant pattern in the signal you wish to investigate, then categorise each 
isolate in the dataset as “Indistinguishable, Probably related, Possibly related, 
or Unrelated” to this pattern. This can be done in STATA, in Excel (if/then 
statements), or by eye.  
 
Relatedness to predominant 
outbreak pattern 
Number of isolates  
Indistinguishable 
 
Probably related 
 
Possibly related 
 
Unrelated 
 
Total 
 
 
7. Create an epi curve showing occurrence of MLVA patterns over time that are 
Indistinguishable, Probably or Possibly related to the outbreak, and paste it 
below.  
 
8. In the absence of any exposure information, how likely do you think it is that the 
“probably related” isolates relate to the same source as the outbreak? Justify 
your answer.  
 
9. You decide to conduct a case-control study to investigate this outbreak. Among 
notified cases, which cases would you interview? Would you handle the groups 
differently in your analysis? If so, how? 
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10. Now that you’ve revised the process of simple MLVA analysis, list some 
challenges that need to be overcome to successfully use MLVA for public 
health surveillance. 
 
11. Use the internet to identify some other organisms that can be analysed using 
MLVA. 
Reading 
1. Torpdahl M, Sorensen G, Lindstedt BA, Nielsen EM. Tandem repeat analysis 
for surveillance of human Salmonella Typhimurium infections. Emerging 
infectious diseases. 2007;13(3):388-95. 
2. Wang Q. A coding/naming system for molecular typing of Salmonella 
Typhimurium using multi-locus variable number tandem repeat analysis (MLVA) 
and the initial guideline for the interpretation of MLVA data in NSW. 2007 
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Lindstedt BA, Vardund T, Aas L, Kapperud G. Multiple-locus variable-number tandem-
repeats analysis of Salmonella enterica subsp. enterica serovar Typhimurium using 
PCR multiplexing and multicolor capillary electrophoresis. J Microbiol Methods. 
2004;59(2):163-72. 
 
 
